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Introduction
1.1 Purpose of the Thesis
Knowledge codification is central to utilize the non-rivalry of ideas for economic growth.
The usual models of economic growth treat knowledge codification as a by-product of
R&D-activities and as costless. In contrast to this, one can observe great efforts by
private firms for the purposeful codification of knowledge. The present thesis develops
a formal model of endogenous growth that incorporates knowledge codification as a
means of intergenerational knowledge transfer. It identifies the circumstances under
which knowledge codification takes place in the long run and studies its effects on long
run economic development.
1.2 Empirical Motivation
The starting point of the present thesis are the following observations.
Firstly, it is widely reported that the codified knowledge base in the world has increased
rapidly over the last decades. For example, the European Union research project “Tech-
nology and Infrastructures Policy in the Knowledge-Based Economy” (TIPIK) has ex-
plicitly concentrated on “the fact that the rapid cumulative expansion of the codified
knowledge-base is the salient characteristic of the development of a modern economy
based on knowledge.” It is argued that “an in-depth understanding of the incentives
to codify,[...] [and] of the advantages and drawbacks of the codification of knowledge,
is thus becoming essential for analyzing the process of innovation and growth of the
economy” (European Commission, 2004, p. 3). Similarly, “OECD analysis is increas-
ingly directed to understanding the dynamics of the knowledge-based economy and its
relationship to traditional economics, as reflected in ‘new growth theory’. The growing
codification of knowledge and its transmission through communications and computer
networks has led to the emerging ‘information society’ ” (OECD, 1996, p. 3).
Secondly, codified knowledge is intentionally created, for example, within ‘knowledge
management’ of private firms. Aoshima (2002) reports that Japanese automobile pro-
ducers extensively use documentation on design know-how, testing results, and prob-
lematic and successful cases found in previous development activities as a means to
store knowledge about past practices. Another example is Sandia National Laborato-
1
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ries, which conducted videotaped interviews to capture the extensive weapons design
and testing expertise of their aging and retired nuclear weapons designers (Sandia Na-
tional Laboratories, 1996). According to an empirical study by Edler (2003), 85% of
the 497 firms from seven economic sectors which answered his questionnaire, stated that
they are creating organizational memory by preparing written documentation such as
lessons learned, training manuals, good work practice etc. In an online journal article,
it is reported that 2.1 billion US $ have been spent in 2000 for knowledge management
worldwide (Ball, 2002). At the end of the year 2000, a German consulting company esti-
mated a market volume for “information portals” until 2002 of 6.8 billion Euro in Europe
and of 1.61 billion Euro in the German market (Meta Group Deutschland GmbH, 2001).
Thirdly, one major motivation for knowledge codification within firms is to prevent the
loss of knowledge of retiring employees. This was indicated by above’s example of Sandia
National Laboratories conducting videotaped interviews. In Edler’s study, 91% of the
firms rated “to accelerate and improve the transfer of knowledge to new workers” one or
two on a scale from 1 (extremely important) to 6 (not important at all) with regard to
the motivations to use knowledge management. This was the most important motiva-
tion. The third most often mentioned reason for knowledge management was “to protect
your firm or organization from loss of knowledge due to workers’ departure” which 82%
of responding firms rated one or two.
In fact numerous cases are reported where productive knowledge has been lost or is at risk
of being lost. For example, Cowan et al. (2000) argue that “[...] where there are critical
bodies of knowledge that are not kept in more-or-less continuous use, inadequate codifica-
tion and archiving heightens the risks of ‘accidental uninvention’.” Similarly, “according
to MacKenzie and Spinardi (1995), in the nuclear weapons design process specific local
and uncodified knowledge was so important that there was a constant appreciable risk
that critical elements of the knowledge base would be lost simply through the turnover
of scientists and engineers – a risk of technological retrogression, or at best of costly
reconstruction of the organization’s previous capabilities (competencies)” (Cowan et al.,
2000, p. 244). In a recent newspaper article, a spokeswoman of a German high tech firm
expressed concerns about a third of the employees in their R&D-department being over
50 years of age and soon becoming eligible for retirement. She claims that especially in
research, experience acquired over many years plays an important role as it is very costly
if young researchers replicate failures that the old have had before (Astheimer, 2005).
DeLong (2004) writes that “the transfer of knowledge to new generations of leadership is
a major area of concern for many organizations worrying about their long-term human
capital needs.” He argues that due to an expected increase in retirements1, “problems
of poor documentation will become increasingly evident as more experienced employees
leave behind badly flawed systems for preserving explicit knowledge about operations
and the context surrounding important decisions. The implicit or tacit knowledge these
1According to press reports, between 2002 and 2008, 75 percent of the U.S. Defense Department’s
civilian workforce of 675,000 people are expected to retire and the oil and gas production industry
expects to lose more than 60 percent of its employees by 2010 (Sandia National Laboratories, 1996;
Sapient Corporation, 2003; Farrell, 2002).
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veterans used to compensate for idiosyncratic documentation will be gone. What will
be left will be a lot of unusable paper and electronic files” (DeLong, 2004, p. 91).
Fourthly, although some information may accrue as a by-product of research and de-
velopment activities, for example, patent specifications or possibly the product itself,
empirical investigations such as Levin (1986) and Mansfield et al. (1981) suggest that
this is not sufficient for knowledge to flow freely. Instead substantial real resources are
often required to imitate an innovation, even one entirely lacking legal protection. Levin
(1986) concludes that public disclosure of a patent claim does not assure eventual dif-
fusion of the knowledge required to make economic use of an innovation. The study
of Mansfield et al. (1981) found that in a seventh of the cases imitation cost was no
smaller than innovation cost. According to them, this was not due to any superiority of
the imitative product over the innovation, but to the innovator’s having a technological
edge over its rivals in the relevant field. “Often this edge was due to superior ‘know-how’
- that is, better and more extensive technical information based on highly specialized ex-
perience with the development and production of related products and processes. Such
know-how is not divulged in patents and is relatively inaccessible (at least for a period
of time) to potential imitators” (Mansfield et al., 1981, p. 910). In line with this is
Zucker et al. (1998)’s argument that particularly breakthrough inventions “may be bet-
ter characterized as creating (rivalrous) human capital – intellectual human capital –
characterized by natural excludability as opposed to a set of instructions for combining
inputs and outputs which can be protected only by intellectual property rights. This
natural excludability arises from the complexity or tacitness of the knowledge required
to practice the innovation.” Based on both extensive interviews and empirical work
summarized in Zucker and Darby (1996), they believe that, “at least for the first 10 or
15 years, the innovations which underlie biotechnology are properly analyzed in terms
of naturally excludable knowledge held by a small initial group of discoverers, their co-
workers, and others who learned the knowledge from working at the bench-science level
with those possessing the requisite know-how” (Zucker et al., 1998, p. 291). In another
paper they state that “it is misleading to think of scientific breakthroughs as disembodied
information which, once discovered, is transmitted by a contagion-like process in which
the identities of the people involved are largely irrelevant” (Zucker and Darby, 1996, p.
12709).
The observations suggest that the knowledge transfer between generations is in general
imperfect and that purposeful and costly knowledge codification is playing an important
role in the transfer of an economy’s productive knowledge.
1.3 Theoretical Motivation
By the argument that the use of an item of knowledge – whether it is the Pythagorean
theorem, a soft drink recipe or an algorithm to brew coffee – in one application makes
its use by someone else no more difficult, new growth theory suggests that knowledge is
3
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non-rival. However, although ideas themselves (e.g. the Pythagorean theorem, a soft-
drink recipe or an algorithm to brew coffee) are non-rival, they possess direct economic
relevance only in so far as they are embodied in either persons or physical objects. We
refer to ideas embodied in persons as human capital or knowledge and to those embod-
ied in physical objects as information2. Both are rival. For example, an algorithm to
brew coffee can be used by many people and coffee machines simultaneously without
deteriorating. It is non-rival (and disembodied). However, to really have a cup of coffee,
it needs a person or a machine to use this algorithm. Hence, the idea of brewing coffee
must be embodied in a person, who devotes her effort to this activity. This precludes the
simultaneous use of her human capital by another activity. Similarly, a coffee machine
can brew only one kind of coffee at a time at a finite quantity. The fact that ideas that
are not embodied in someone or something are not directly relevant economically is im-
mediately obvious for all ideas that have not yet been discovered or have been discovered
and forgotten.3 Consequently long run economic growth is generated by the accumula-
tion of non-rival ideas in people and physical objects. That is, by the accumulation of
human capital and information.
A person, however, has only a finite number of years that can be spent acquiring ideas.
When this person dies, her human capital is lost. Any non-rival idea that this person
has discovered only lives on if it is either embodied in another person or as information.
The transformation of the codifiable part of knowledge via some code into information
is referred to as knowledge codification.4 For example, using a natural language to write
down an idea in a book, creating a new product or a piece of art. As compared to
human capital, information is long lasting if properly maintained and it may be more
easily accessible and distributed. In this respect, it may be useful for an economic anal-
ysis to refer to an idea as codified, if every individual of a certain group (for example
employees of a firm) can access the information independent of others. For instance,
there are enough books containing the same idea, such that anyone who is interested in
it is able to use a copy, or there are enough servers, such that anyone interested in an
idea can download the information via the internet or intranet. In this way, information
has the property of a local public good, and knowledge codification can be interpreted
as creating non-rival information from rival human capital.
The standard approach in the endogenous growth theory uses the assumption that knowl-
edge codification is an automatic by-product of research and development activities and
2Knowing an idea means to understand it. We do not ascribe the capacity to understand to physical
objects. For example, a person may be able to learn an idea, that is, understand it by attending to
a scientific paper. The paper, however, does not carry knowledge, because reading a scientific paper
does not automatically imply that this person can attach meaning to it, that is, knows more than
before.
3Boldrin and Levine (1999) strongly advocate this line of thinking.
4There is a discussion as to what extent knowledge may be codified. On the one hand, it is a function
of the code available, on the other, it depends on the idea itself. Highly abstract mathematical ideas
seem to allow better codification than the idea “how to ride a bicycle”.
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can be treated as costless. The (implicit) argument is that when the innovative product
is sold at the market, an interested individual or potential competitor could buy and
reverse-engineer it. If the innovation is patented, this person could consult the patent
specification and would then immediately know the idea embodied in it. However, the
empirical observations suggest that the information that accrues as a by-product of
research and development is, by itself, not sufficient for the transfer of knowledge be-
tween generations. Moreover, large parts of an economy’s productive knowledge are not
patented or embodied in a product directly sold at the market, such as for instance
many process innovations. This gives rise to the observed purposeful and costly knowl-
edge codification.
1.4 Premises
The thesis builds upon the following premises that are derived from empirical evidence.
First, intergenerational knowledge transfer is generally imperfect. In particular, infor-
mation that may accrue as a by-product of research and development is, by itself, not
sufficient to ensure the transfer of knowledge from one generation of employees to the
next.
Second, purposeful knowledge codification plays an important role in knowledge man-
agement activities of private firms and is largely motivated by transferring knowledge to
new employees and by retaining knowledge of retiring employees within the firm.
The line of argument is that the outcome of R&D-activities is human capital and may
additionally involve by-product information such as a patent specification and/or a new
product. According to empirical observations such as Mansfield et al. (1981) and Zucker
et al. (1998), this by-product information of research and development does not convey
large parts of the knowledge necessary to productively employ the respective idea and,
hence, is not sufficient to ensure the transfer of knowledge between generations. In this
way, the idea is not fully codified, which may induce further purposeful codification
activities. Focussing on the transfer of knowledge between generations of employees, the
analysis will neglect the by-product information and refer to an idea as codified or as
information if it is properly codified for intergenerational knowledge transfer and as not
codified, else.5
1.5 Key Issues
The central questions that are answered in the thesis are the following.
. How can the idea of intergenerational knowledge transfer by purposeful knowledge
codification be formalized within a model of endogenous growth?
5The corresponding assumptions and definitions are discussed in greater detail in chapter 2.
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. What are the effects of knowledge codification on the economy’s long run devel-
opment in such a model and under what conditions can one observe endogenous
knowledge codification?
. Does long run knowledge codification depend on particular assumptions on tech-
nological change?
. How does such a model with knowledge codification correspond to standard en-
dogenous growth theory?
. What are potential sources of social inefficiencies in models with knowledge codi-
fication?
. Is the suggested model dynamically inefficient?
1.6 The Economic Problem and Modelling Strategy
According to the empirical observations, the underlying economic problem exhibits the
following structure.
. The transfer of knowledge between retiring employees and newly hired employees
is imperfect.
. Once the retiring employee has left the firm, there is no further transfer of her
knowledge possible, except that it has been codified.
. The investment in knowledge codification has to be made before the employee
retires and, hence, also before the new employee can utilize it.
In principle the following two situations between retiring employees and young employees
of a firm are conceivable. First, the young employees and the retiring employees overlap
such that the young, knowing that human capital transfer is imperfect, agree with the
retirees on a certain investment in knowledge codification. If the young employees had
to pay in advance or there is some other device, that secures the direct exchange, the
economic problem basically reduces to a standard problem of human capital transfer by
training or education such as e.g. in Jovanovic and Nyarko (1995).
Consider a second situation in which the retiring employees and those newly hired do
not have the possibility to negotiate on knowledge codification before the retiring person
leaves the firm. For example if the new employee enters the firm after or at the time
the retiree leaves. Would further knowledge transfer be feasible in such a situation?
Yes, but only via codified sources. Would it happen? Considering only the retiring and
new employees, the answer tends to be negative. The reason is that a retiring employee
would have to invest in knowledge codification before the young employees enter the firm
and hence the investment is sunk when bargaining takes place. This creates a hold-up
6
1.6 The Economic Problem and Modelling Strategy
problem that can not be solved easily. However, within the firm, the problem can at
least be attenuated as the profits may be higher in the succeeding period if the newly
hired employees had been transferred additional knowledge by knowledge codification.
In this way, the firm owners invest in knowledge codification, or respectively, compensate
the retiring employee for her codification investment and provide it to the new employ-
ees. The firm owner only invests in knowledge codification up to the point to which it
maximizes future profits. She does not account for any (equilibrium) effects on the new
employees’ wage level.
Another aspect of the economic problem with respect to knowledge codification is that
the assumed non-rivalry of codified ideas may imply a public good problem. In the first
situation it is clear that the codified ideas being local public goods within the firm would
create the well known problem of its private provision if the new employees decided de-
centrally on their investment in knowledge codification. The same problem exists in the
second situation with more than one firm owner.
The analysis will focus on the second situation and assume that the firm owners solve
the public good problem by a collective decision within the firm. One may also think
of a manager acting on behalf of the owners. In this way, the incentive for knowledge
codification within the firm stems from the regular profit maximizing motive.
A natural modelling choice that reflects the underlying knowledge transfer problem and
allows to address the key issues is a two-sector overlapping generations framework with
two-period-lived individuals. The intermediate sector consists of long-lived oligopolistic
intermediate firms that carry out in-house R&D-programs. Within these intermediate
firms, the amount of knowledge that is transferred from the retiring researchers to those
newly hired can be increased by knowledge codification. It is assumed that the capital
owners, that is, the members of the old generation are the firm owners and the inter-
mediate firms are managed on their behalf. The young generation will take over the
ownership claims at the end of the period and may then be willing to compensate the
retiring researchers for knowledge codification. In this way, the codification decision
can be depicted as part of the general savings decision of the young generations’ utility
maximization problem. This decision process drives the main results.
Some central assumptions will play a crucial role for the framework that will be devel-
oped.
It is clear that the long run dynamics of the economy centrally depend on the specifica-
tion of the research process. Two possible variants will be discussed. First, it is assumed
that each researcher produces a certain finite amount of ideas in each period. The second
specification corresponds to the usual ‘standing on the shoulders of giants’ assumption of
endogenous growth models in which the research productivity per researcher in a period
increases linearly in the stock of knowledge. These two specifications have been chosen
for several reasons. On the one hand, the ‘standing on the shoulders of giants’ assump-
tion allows for a comparison to the standard models of endogenous growth. On the
7
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other hand, the assumption of a linearly increasing research productivity in the knowl-
edge stock has also been criticized due to the scale effects it involves (see e.g. Jones
(1995)) and consequently, it is interesting to study the effects of knowledge codification
on long run economic development in other cases. The particular choices highlight the
different roles of the information stock for the economy’s dynamics. For example, the
assumed longevity of the codified knowledge stock plays a more pronounced role in the
case with only a constant finite amount of ideas per researcher and may even entail
higher long-run output levels for an economy whose researchers are less creative, that
is, produce a lower amount of ideas per period.
Rather than assuming a Ramsey household that cares for all generations alike, the
model explicitly considers the interaction between the generations without altruism as
described above. The Ramsey consumer would face a tradeoff between capital savings,
R&D investment and knowledge codification, and knowledge codification should always
positively influence economic growth. It will turn out that this may not necessarily be
the case in the suggested overlapping generations structure and depends crucially on the
assumptions how the codified knowledge stock influences the researchers’ productivity.
Of course there are several other areas in which knowledge is codified, for example, the
academic sector or the cultural sector, such as in museums and the like. Another as-
pect is the commercial transfer of knowledge assets, where research firms purposefully
codify specific knowledge for transmission to a licensee.6 The focus on intergenerational
knowledge transfer by knowledge codification within firms has been taken up because
the knowledge management literature suggests that this is an important problem, yet,
it has not been studied in formal models of economic growth.
The thesis is related to the literature on the characteristics of knowledge and particularly
to the discussions on the tacitness and codifiability of knowledge such as Cowan et al.
(2000) and Dasgupta and David (1994). However, the discourse has been on an entirely
verbal basis.
A recent paper of Thoenig and Verdier (2004) is also concerned with the macroeconomic
aspects of knowledge management. However, instead of focussing on the incentive to
preserve knowledge in intergenerational knowledge transfer, they emphasize the tradeoff
that by knowledge codification contractual incompleteness between the firm owner and
the employee can be avoided, which, however, implies the risk of information spillovers
to competitors.
Further, the thesis is related to the literature on technology adoption models and the
literature on endogenous spillovers by own research. It possesses the same underlying
motivation, in that blueprints defined as the ”by-product” description of a technology
are incomplete in conveying what is useful to know about the technology at hand. It
6See for example Arora et al. (2001) and The Economist (2005).
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needs additional human capital to fully understand and work the blueprints.7 The focus
of building up this human capital in order to apply a new technology for production
is discussed in the adoption models. The present work is more related to the models
which focus on the human capital necessary to understand the idea embodied in the
blueprint (possibly the patent specification) in order to imitate the technology or use
the idea for further research. This kind of human capital is commonly referred to as
‘absorptive capacity’ which is built up by own research.8 The corresponding strand of
the literature usually examines endogenous knowledge spillovers between competitors in
a certain market. In such an environment the innovator of a new product is interested
in conveying as little information as possible to the competitors. That is, the patent
specification or other codified sources of the idea will only include the absolutely nec-
essary descriptions. The focus in the present work is on knowledge transfer between
generations of employees within a firm. In such a setting, there may be an incentive for
further knowledge codification in order to reduce the ”adoption costs” in terms of own
research by the newly hired employees.
The proposed formal model corresponds to the standard idea-driven growth models
as in Romer (1990),9 Aghion and Howitt (1992) or Grossman and Helpman (1991).
What sets it apart is that it explicitly models a human capital stock and a stock of
codified ideas. Ideas can only be used productively if they are learned and, hence,
are part of the employee’s (intellectual) human capital. The latter can be enhanced
by utilizing codified ideas if previous generations have codified them. In this way, the
model could be considered as what is sometimes called a hybrid version10 between the
idea driven growth models and the human capital accumulation growth models with
the peculiarity of endogenous knowledge spillovers between generations by knowledge
codification. Other differences are an oligopolistic intermediate sector with in-house
R&D and the overlapping generations framework.
1.7 Outline of the Thesis
The present thesis comprises three parts.
The first chapter of the first part introduces and explains the major assumptions on
knowledge and knowledge codification. Thereafter it provides a formalization that will
serve as a basis for the dynamics of the knowledge stock of the endogenous growth
model. The following chapter specifies a basic model with imperfect knowledge transfer
between generations. In order to convey the mechanics of the model as simple as pos-
sible, the intermediate sector comprises just one monopolistic firm. It will be shown in
7This terminology was taken from Jovanovic (1997).
8See Cohen and Levinthal (1989). Griffith et al. (2003) built a model that incorporates ‘absorptive
capacity’ into a model of economic growth.
9This will be discussed in the third part of the dissertation.
10See for example Klenow (1998).
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the second part of the thesis that this is not a necessary assumption for the qualitative
results. Chapter four determines the equilibria and the economy’s dynamics for both
specifications of the research process. The succeeding chapter derives the main results
with respect to the economy’s codification behavior. It reveals the conditions under
which the overlapping generations economy exhibits endogenous knowledge codification
and answers when it will do so in the long run. A discussion of the results of the basic
model concludes the first part of the dissertation.
The second part elaborates on the robustness of the results obtained from the basic
model. As Solow-neutral technological progress has been assumed in the first part,
chapter eight asks what other assumptions on technological change would be possible
for the results to still hold. Chapter nine identifies the general properties of the model
that drive the main results. It is shown in chapter ten that these properties also allow
for an interpretation with oligopolistic intermediate sectors, each of which is founded on
a separate field of knowledge.
The purpose of chapter eleven in the third part of the dissertation is to elaborate on the
differences and similarities of the proposed model structure with standard endogenous
growth theory. Romer’s model of endogenous technological change has been chosen for
a comparison. Chapter twelve features a mostly verbal discussion on aspects of social
optimality of the previously studied market allocations. Two perspectives are taken up.
First, the relation of the sequential markets equilibrium outcome to a social planner’s
welfare optimum is discussed, and different potential inefficiencies are identified. The
second perspective is characterized by the question as to whether it would be possible
to engineer Pareto-improvements to the sequential markets solution.
Final conclusions complete the dissertation.
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A Basic Endogenous Growth Model
With Imperfect Knowledge Transfer
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Chapter 2
Knowledge and Knowledge Codification
2.1 General Thoughts
Most models of endogenous growth are built around the distinction between technology
or abstract knowledge and human capital. The first is non-rival and spills over costlessly
whereas the latter is rival and consists of the acquired abilities, skills, and knowledge of
individual workers (see for example Romer (2001, p. 133)). Recently a growing number
of publications emphasizes a certain degree of complementarity between human capital
and technological ideas, such as in the technology adoption literature (Goldin and Katz,
1998; Benhabib and Spiegel, 2005) and the literature on skill biased technological change
(Autor et al., 2003).
Particularly, empirical observations such as in Mansfield et al. (1981), Levin (1986) and
Zucker et al. (1998), and even more so the case studies of Collins (1974) on the diffu-
sion of the TEA-laser technology and MacKenzie and Spinardi (1995)’s investigation of
the ability to produce nuclear weapons suggest a strong complementarity of technolog-
ical information and personal skills. This has sparked discussions on the economics of
R&D and technology transfers which assign “special significance to the tacit elements in
technological knowledge, calling attention to the fact that the information contained in
patents, blueprints and other codified forms of knowledge often are insufficient for the
successful implementation of the technical innovations they purport to describe; much
complementary ’know-how’ may be required, the acquisition of which, typically, is a
costly business” (Dasgupta and David, 1994). This strand of the literature particularly
focuses on the tacitness and codifiability of knowledge. ‘Tacit knowledge’ is usually
referred to forms of knowledge that cannot be articulated.1 Recently, the term ‘tacit
knowledge’ has come to be more widely applied to forms of personal knowledge that
remain ‘UN-codified’ (Cowan et al., 2000). The term ‘codified knowledge’ is used for
knowledge that has been converted into symbols for easy transmission, replication, and
storage. With regard to the relationship between codified and tacit knowledge, there are
two conflicting positions. The one shares the view that all knowledge can be codified
and the fact that there exists tacit knowledge is due to high codification costs for this
kind of knowledge. In this way, tacit and codified knowledge are substitutes. The other
1The term ‘tacit knowledge’ goes back to Polanyi (1961), who conceptualized it as the fact that we all
are often generally aware of certain objects without being focused on them. They form the context
which makes focused perception possible, understandable and productive.
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position argues that all forms of codified knowledge require tacit knowledge to be useful.
Hence, the two are viewed as essentially complementary. Drawing on this literature, the
following paragraphs illustrate the perspective taken here and give definitions that will
serve as an operational basis for the subsequent analysis. At this point it is necessary to
remark that this does not claim to be a comprehensive treatment of the topic, but tries
to capture the central aspects.
Let’s first assume that all persons are learning to read and write one common language
when young as we are not interested in effects of illiteracy. Further, we assume that
there exists an infinite set of disembodied ideas. By the process of thinking or invention,
a person P can discover an idea i and henceforth know this idea. Then we say that
this idea is part of person P ’s knowledge, respectively, it is embodied in person P . It
would now be possible for P to codify certain parts of idea i. The detailed definitions
are introduced and illustrated by the following example.2
Consider the idea “solving algebraic equations”, in the following also referred to as idea
i. A pupil in school does not know this idea and, written on the chalk board by the
teacher, sees algebraic equations being solved. Suppose on the board are only mathe-
matical expressions and no further explanation. In this way, the pupil will probably have
a hard time to figure out the idea. we will refer to the writings on the chalk board as the
codified component of idea i. However, there is more that could be articulated. The
teacher would be able to explain that the symbol ‘x’ usually means the same whether
it is written in ball point, chalk or print, irrespective of the day of the week, or the
temperature of the air. But in another sense the variable x may stand for anything –
weight in kilogram, number of people ... – and in general may only mean the same on
coincidental and unimportant occasions. Again, sometimes a capital X or an italicized x
may have a distinctive meaning. x in the equation x = 5y is the same as x in the equa-
tion 5y = x, but is not the same as x in x = 5z, unless y = z. But on the other hand,
‘x’ is being used in the same way in all the equations. All of this could in principle be
codified. Hence, the codifiable component of the idea comprises more than just the
codified part on the chalkboard and shall be defined by that part of an idea that can be
articulated or made explicit.3 With the explanation of the teacher, it is much easier for
the scholar to understand the idea. However, the claim is that there is still a tacit part of
the idea left that cannot be articulated.4 That is, although explained comprehensively
by the teacher, the young have to exercise mathematics in order to understand it. They
oftentimes do not comprehend an idea explained by the teacher immediately but have a
“light bulb moment” after attending to it for a while. This last piece of understanding
will be referred to as the tacit component in the narrow sense, whereas the part
that has not been codified is just called the tacit component of idea i. When coming
across the chalkboard for the first time, the pupil does not understand the idea writ-
2The example is in part taken from Collins (1974).
3This is obviously a function of the code available.
4For example Collins (1974) argues that “all types of knowledge, however pure, consist, in part, of
tacit rules which may be impossible to formulate in principle” (Collins, 1974, p. 167).
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ten on it, she misses the tacit component, which, in this case comprises the codifiable
explanation of the teacher and the light bulb part, that is, the tacit component in the
narrow sense. After having understood the idea, for instance, the day after the teacher
explained it and after having thought about it on her own, she would be able to attach
meaning to the chalkboard writings. Then the idea “solving algebraic equations” is part
of the pupil’s knowledge. According to this, the codified and the tacit component of
an idea are complements. So are the codifiable component and the tacit component
in the narrow sense. Knowledge codification is then defined as transforming the tacit
but codifiable part of knowledge into information. In this way, the codified component
can be interpreted as a substitute to the respective tacit but codifiable part of the idea.
Of course besides depending on the code available, the degree to which an idea can be
codified depends on its very nature. For example it is often claimed that highly abstract
ideas possess larger codifiable components than rather “craft-like” ideas such as “how
to ride a bicycle”. However, when teaching a child how to ride a bicycle, there are still
things to articulate that help in acquiring that skill. If one would like to codify this idea,
one could also use videotaping for example. Cowan et al. (2000) argue that very little
knowledge is inherently tacit and impossible to codify. Similarly, the assertion here is
that ideas of economic relevance do possess codifiable components.
The term knowledge as used in the present work, is defined via the ability to understand
an idea. In this way, it is congruent with what is often referred to as intellectual hu-
man capital. In the following, we will synonymously use the notion ‘human capital’5 as
this thesis is not concerned with other aspects sometimes attributed to human capital
such as health. The difference between knowledge or human capital and information
is whether the carrier is able to understand and use the respective idea. Hence, in the
previous example, the idea “solving algebraic equations” will only be part of the pupil’s
knowledge, if she is able to solve any algebraic equation, respectively use this concept in
thinking about related problems. This is different from learning an algorithm by heart
without being able to attach meaning to it. According to the previous definition, an
idea only learned by heart would not be part of this person’s knowledge because this
person misses the tacit counterpart.
With the previous considerations, the seemingly conflicting contentions of standard eco-
nomic theory and the empirical observations of Levin (1986) and Mansfield et al. (1981)
could be resolved as follows. The first time an idea becomes economically relevant is
when discovered by an inventor or a research group. Hence, it is initially embodied in
its discoverers. According to Zucker et al. (1998), this creates (rival) intellectual human
capital. Suppose now, a new product, representing a substantive technological advance,
has been invented and is sold at the market. A (potential) competitor can buy the prod-
uct and reverse engineer it, but, when lacking the respective intellectual human capital,
5According to Becker (1975), all activities that influence future monetary and psychic income by
increasing the resources in people are called investments in human capital. These investments like
schooling, on-the-job training, medical care, migration [...] improve skills, knowledge, or health and
thereby raise money or psychic incomes.
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may have to expend the same effort to imitate the product as the innovator did to invent
it. This is suggested by the observations of Mansfield et al. (1981). In analogy to the
previous example, the physical product represents the mathematical expressions on the
chalk board. Without any explanation by the teacher, the pupil would have to re-invent
the idea. That is, a large part of the technological idea embodied in the new product
stays tacit to the competitor. If the competitor does not possess this tacit counterpart,
it has to invent the idea itself. This view is supported by empirical evidence concerning
endogenous spillovers. For example, Levin (1986) observed that “on average, indepen-
dent R&D was rated as the most effective means of learning about rival technology.”
And well known is Cohen and Levinthal (1989)’s argument that if ”immediate costs of
assimilating technological knowledge” are small, “it is by the virtue of the considerable
R&D already conducted by the firms in the vicinity of the ‘emission’: the firm has al-
ready invested in the development of its absorptive capacity in the relevant field” (Cohen
and Levinthal, 1989, p. 570). In this way, firms with own R&D would already possess
large portions of the tacit counterpart of the new product and are possibly missing
only few links. When interpreting the R&D conducting competitor as the pupil of the
above example, it would already be acquainted with most of the teacher’s explanation.
Respectively, coming across the chalk board (the product) it would be much easier to
figure out the idea embodied in it. This line of argument suggests that in an industry,
where the firms’ researchers possess similar levels of intellectual human capital and are
researching in the same field, spillover effects would be very high as assumed in large
parts of economic literature, for example, in the patent race literature. Hence, patent
protection is necessary for rent appropriation. However, spillover effects only through
the physical product or patents (the chalkboard writings) are negligible if the innovator
has a technological edge, as observed by Mansfield et al. (1981). A similar argument has
been put forth by David (1998) for scientific research, claiming that “many ‘craft’ aspects
of scientific practice must be learned in modes of instruction akin to an ’apprenticeship’
by being afforded opportunities for first-hand observation of how they are done, leading
to trials under the guidance and supervision of experts. Otherwise, something like the
original process of acquiring mastery of such knowledge has to be repeated ab initio,
guided and encouraged only by the belief that others have found this to be possible”
(David, 1998, pp. 125f). With regard to knowledge transfer between generations, it is
very plausible, that old employees possess such a ‘technological edge’ in relation to the
new employees. And, referring to the examples of the introduction, within knowledge
management, it is the firms’ concern to transfer the respective tacit counterparts from
one generation to the next in order for the latter not to be forced to re-invent large parts
of their predecessors’ work.
In this way, the present thesis rests on the assertion that it is an economy’s human
capital that determines its technological or productive capability. That is, information,
such as a book, a machine, or a computer, cannot be productive in the long run without
the respective human capital. By this, it is associated to Lucas (1988) who argues that
when we talk “about differences in ‘technology’ across countries we are not talking about
knowledge in general, but about the knowledge of particular people, or perhaps particular
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subcultures of people”. Accordingly, the major assumption is that (a) a large amount of
an economy’s productive knowledge rests in the heads of the working population and is
not codified and (b) the information created as a by-product of research and development
such as the innovative product itself and patent specifications are not sufficient for
the intergenerational knowledge transfer of advanced technological ideas to the younger
generation. With respect to (b), the by-product information represents only a small
part of the ideas’ codifiable component and could, in analogy to the previous example,
be interpreted as the chalkboard writings. In summary:
Assumption 2.1 Suppose an economy’s information stock consists only of information
created as a direct by-product of research activities, then large parts of an economy’s
productive knowledge are tacit but codifiable.
Knowledge codification is defined as the transformation of the codifiable part of knowl-
edge into information such that the idea is easily transferable and accessible. This can
take many forms such as using a natural language to write down an idea in a book, but
also videotaping or drawing pictures and plans. For the subsequent economic analysis,
we will assume that independent of the media used, purposeful knowledge codification
codifies the entire codifiable part of the respective idea. Further it is useful to include
the dimension of accessibility in a definition of knowledge codification.
Definition 2.1 An idea is referred to as codified with respect to a group of per-
sons, if the entire codifiable part of the idea has been codified and the resulting informa-
tion is accessible to every person in the group independently.
By this definition, knowledge codification is the link between rival human capital and
idealized non-rival information. That is, the resulting information possesses the charac-
teristics of a local public good. If the codifiable part has not been codified entirely, the
idea will be referred to as partially codified with respect to a group of persons. This
thesis focuses on the knowledge transfer of (substantially) new ideas between genera-
tions. It seems then reasonable to argue that there exists a technological edge between
the old generation and the young and the by-product information, if existent, plays a
negligible role for knowledge transmission. Hence, we will refer to an idea as codified
with respect to a group of persons if the above definition applies and as not codified
else. In this way, the terms ‘information’ and ‘codified idea’ will be used synonymously
in the following analysis. It is further assumed that information is long lasting, that is,
it does not depreciate, and it is not “consumable”.6
As a summary, the main assumptions that will serve as a basis for the subsequent analysis
are:
6Although a book or a hard disk may also wear out, the depreciation rate would probably be very low.
To a certain extent, it would be possible to argue that books and computer hardware have positive
consumption value. For a first formal analysis of knowledge codification, it is useful to preclude this
point for reasons of simplicity.
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. There exists an infinite set of disembodied ideas.
. The first time an idea becomes economically relevant is when discovered by an
inventor. Consequently, it is initially human capital.
. Each piece of knowledge, that is, each idea embodied in a person, possesses a cod-
ifiable part which can be transformed into information.
. Knowledge codification is a costly activity.
. Information is long lasting, however, by itself not productive in the long run. It
needs the respective human capital to be productively employed.7
2.2 A Formal Approach
This section gives a formalization of the notions ‘knowledge’ and ‘information’, which
will serve as a basis for the following analysis. Let there be an infinite set of ideas and
assign each idea an index i ∈ I. Consider a person at time t, denoted by Pt. This
person’s human capital or knowledge is defined by all ideas that are embodied in her
and, hence, can be written as TPt = {i ∈ I | i is embodied in Pt}. This is the subset
of I of which the person acquired the respective tacit components over her educative
or professional career. The stock of information at time t is the index set of the cod-
ified ideas Ct = {i ∈ I | i is codified}. For illustrative purposes, imagine a bookshelf
with each book containing exactly one idea. The book’s title is i indicating the idea it
contains. Knowing a person’s human capital, one could immediately tell which books
this person can understand, that is {i ∈ TPt ∩ Ct}, and which ones she would encounter
difficulties with (I \ (TPt ∩ Ct)).
To operationalize this concept of knowledge, it is necessary to specify I. Let’s represent
the knowledge stock as an interval in R for better analytical tractability. In particular,
I = R+. Further, we order the ideas according to their difficulty. More precisely, if
i < j then idea i is easier to comprehend or more basic than idea j. For example, addi-
tion is less difficult than solving differential equations. Recalling the bookshelf example,
this would mean that the books are ordered, e.g. from left to right, starting with the
ones containing the rather basic ideas and becoming successively more difficult. They
are indexed continuously beginning at zero. We define a person’s measure of human
capital by the index of the most difficult idea she is able to understand. More precisely,
τPt = sup TPt . The central assumption of the ordering concept is:
7It needs human capital to understand and employ in productive processes the information contained
in, say, an academic paper.
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Assumption (A1) If i is embodied in person Pt, then j < i is also embodied in
person Pt.
As we defined I = R+, τPt would be the Lebesgue-measure of TPt . The definitions
imply that an individual with human capital of 5 possesses the set of tacit components
[0, 5] and, thus, comprehends the contents of all information indexed by i ∈ [0, 5], re-
spectively is able to use ideas i ∈ [0, 5] in production.8
Let Ct := sup Ct represent the economy’s stock of information. The ordering concept
may involve:
Assumption (A2) Before an idea indexed by i can be codified, all ideas with in-
dex j, j < i must have been codified. This implies that if i is codified in period t, then
j < i is also codified in t.
With assumption (A2), Ct is identical to the Lebesgue-measure of Ct. The following
figure illustrates the ordering concept:
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. . . . . . . . 
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Figure 2.1: Operationalization of the Notions ‘Knowledge’ and ‘Information’
The outer circle depicts the set of ideas I. Human capital of person Pt, TPt , and informa-
tion, Ct, are subsets thereof. The arrows indicate possible indices of the respective ideas.
For example, idea i is human capital, and it is also codified. In this way, it possesses an
index lower than Ct = sup Ct and also lower than τPt = sup TPt .
8Note that other ordering concepts, for example a chronological order, would work as well as long as
(A1) holds.
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The Model Specification
Consider an overlapping generations economy similar to the well-known Diamond (1965)
model, in which agents live for two periods. Time is infinite in the forward direction
and divided into discrete periods indexed by t. There is a continuum of individuals Pt
on [0, 1] =: Pt in each generation. There is no population growth and the size of each
generation is normalized to 1. Each individual inelastically supplies one unit of labor
when young and consumes its capital savings plus the capital rent when old. Hence,
total labor supply in each period t is given by Lt = 1. The economy features two
sectors. An intermediate goods sector that creates intermediate goods from physical
capital and knowledge and a production sector that uses the intermediate product and
labor to generate a homogenous physical good that can be used for consumption and
investment. The difference to the usual models of endogenous growth is that within the
intermediate sector, the individuals can influence the return on capital by investing in
knowledge codification.
3.1 The Production Sector
Final-goods production is characterized by a continuum (on [0,1]) of identical firms which
produce the homogenous good with the use of labor LA,t and the intermediate good xt as
inputs. Since final-goods firms earn zero profits and own no assets, they can be ignored
in the specification of endowments.1 The firms maximize profits and act competitively
in the product and factor markets. For better tractability, the most convenient way
to model final production is by means of a representative firm whose production and
factor demands represent aggregate values. The aggregate production function is of the
constant-returns-to-scale type:2
F (xt, LA,t) = x
α
t L
1−α
A,t ,
where α ∈ (0, 1). Consequently, the representative firm solves the following maximiza-
tion problem:
max
xt,LA,t
pifpt = F (xt, LA,t)− px,txt − wA,tLA,t.
1For illustrative purposes one could assume that the final-goods firms are managed and owned by the
members of the young generation.
2According to Sargent (1979), the preceding assumptions guarantee the existence of such a represen-
tative final-product firm.
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As it is a constant-returns-to-scale firm, its input demands are defined only after the
scale of operation is pinned down. However, the demand for labor and intermediate
goods is characterized by the first order conditions. Labor and the intermediate goods
are being compensated by their marginal product:
xdt =
(px,t
α
) 1
α−1
LA,t,
LdA,t =
(
1− α
wA,t
) 1
α
xt.
3.2 The Intermediate Goods Sector
In general, the intermediate sector is assumed to consist of long-lived intermediate firms
whose ownership is handed down from one generation to the next. More precisely, the
capital stock is sold publicly at the end of a period t to the next period’s old generation.
This process could be interpreted as secondary public offering. Further, the young
generation of t may additionally increase the capital stock of t+ 1 by saving more than
the amount of capital left from the previous generation. Physical capital left at the
disposal of the intermediate firm is interpreted as ownership claims. As mentioned in
the introduction, we assume that the firm owners collectively decide on the values of the
control variables of the intermediate firm’s profit maximization problem. For simplicity,
in the basic model the intermediate goods sector is characterized by a single intermediate
firm.
3.2.1 The Decision Process
The economic problem with respect to the transfer of knowledge by knowledge cod-
ification between two succeeding generations of employees can be translated into the
overlapping generations framework by the following three-stage game:
Stage 1: At the end of period t, the new capital owners may invest in knowledge
codification before the employees of the intermediate firm, the researchers,
retire.3
Stage 2: At the beginning of t+1, the newly hired researchers are asked to compensate
the firm owners for their codification investment. (Under the assumption that
the knowledge database or library is excludable4.)
3Note that within the overlapping generations structure, the next period’s researchers are not born,
yet.
4With respect to excludability, two specifications would be possible. On the one hand, a codified idea
could be a public good with respect to the new researchers as soon as the the firm owners give access
to it. On the other hand each employee could be given exclusive access to certain ideas dependent
on her compensatory payment. These specifications have not been explicitly distinguished as it does
not change the outcome of the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
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Stage 3: The capital owners decide on giving access to the firm’s information stock.
We assume that allowing access to the knowledge database does not incur costs. It is
clear that no newly hired researcher would make a compensatory payment independent
of the decisions of her colleagues, as she knows that the capital owners will provide the
information for free. By backward induction, the firm owners, knowing that they bear
the full codification costs, will only invest in knowledge codification up to the profit-
maximizing amount.
One may ask whether the problem within the firm is well depicted by this game struc-
ture. For example, why do the firm owners give away the information for free, although
they know that the new employees might benefit from it by higher wages? The argument
is that as long as the firm owners can only ask for a compensatory payment, the new
employees will always deny. Suppose the game were extended to more than three stages,
in which after the third stage the new employees are asked for a compensatory payment
and the firm owners decide on giving access to the information stock in an alternating
sequence. With finitely many stages, there must be a last stage before the production of
the intermediate goods has to start. At the last but one stage, the new employees know
that if they again deny a compensatory payment, the firm owners would give access to
the information for free at the last stage, as otherwise they would forgo a certain amount
of profits.
Further, a threat by the firm owners to destroy the information would be empty be-
cause they would forgo additional profits and the information stock is not consumable
by assumption. The assumption of a non-consumable information stock is not critical
as long as the utility derived from consuming it is lower than that from giving access to
the information to the new employees. In this case, the new employees again know that
the firm owners will not consume the information even if they make no compensatory
payment.
In this way, profit maximization of the firm owners proceeds in two stages:
Stage 1: At the end of period t, the firm owners collectively decide on how much to
invest in knowledge codification before the researchers retire.
Stage 2: At the beginning of t+1, given the amount of ideas that have been codified,
the capital owners decide on the amount of intermediate goods to produce
and on how many new researchers to hire.
Of course by backward induction, the second-stage maximization problem of t + 1 is
solved given a certain stock of information and then the optimal codification decision is
taken. The collective decision process with respect to knowledge codification takes the
following form:
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. Every individual capital owner can propose an amount ζt,prop to spend on knowl-
edge codification. The costs are split up among the individuals according to their
capital shares.
. Each shareholder votes for or against the proposal and the amount is approved
according to the unanimity rule.
. If the proposal has been accepted, the amount is collected and the retiring re-
searchers are paid to codify their ideas.
For simplicity we assume that this decision process does not incur transaction costs. It
would also be possible to assume that a manager acts on behalf of the capital owners.
It is clear that given the capital and information stock in period t+ 1, the second-stage
maximization problem is a static profit optimization within the period. However, the
codification decision at the first stage cannot be made independent of the households’
preferences concerning the distribution of consumption between periods. Hence, the
second-stage problem will be solved at the end of this section and the decision on knowl-
edge codification will be elaborated further within the households’ utility maximization
problem.
3.2.2 Research and Intermediate Goods Production
The intermediate good can be produced according to the following production function:
xt = G(Kt, τt) = Ktτt.5 Kt denotes the measure of the capital stock at time t. The
knowledge stock of the intermediate firm which corresponds to the knowledge stock of
the economy in period t, τt, is defined by the index of the most difficult idea in the
union of all sets of tacit components τt = sup∪Pt∈PtTPt . It equals the highest measure
of human capital in the set Pt at time t.
Human capital of a person Pt ∈ Pt may originate from three sources:6
τPt = qτt−1 + βmax{0, Ct − qτt−1}+ ε(qτt−1)Φ.
First, every individual is exogenously transferred a share q of the economy’s knowledge
stock of the previous period, e.g. in school or by other educative means.7 This transfer
5Note that this specification implies that a technological improvement increases production of the final
product in the same way as an increase in the stock of capital, which is usually referred to as Solow-
neutral technological progress. The innovation process could be regarded as both, process or product
innovation. The interpretation of the first would be that the higher knowledge stock allows for the
production of more homogenous intermediate goods with a certain capital input. On the other hand,
one could argue that the capital stock is transformed into higher quality intermediate products, which
possess a productivity in final-goods production identical to xt units of some standard intermediate
good.
6The dynamics of the knowledge stock have also been inspired by a working paper on technological
regress by Aiyar and Dalgaard (2002).
7It could also be interpreted as imperfect human capital transfer within the intermediate firm.
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is imperfect, q ∈ (0, 1).
As a second source, the members of the new generation who are becoming researchers in
the intermediate firm can enhance their human capital by attending to codified ideas if
previous generations of researchers have codified their knowledge. Recall the bookshelf
example: If the highest index of the books in the shelf Ct is greater than the highest in-
dex of the ideas the young generation of t has already learned, qτt−1, they are interested
in reading the books indexed by (qτt−1, Ct]. In each period the new generation is able
to build up additional human capital of a fraction β ∈ (0, 1) of those codified ideas.8 As
(A2) is a strong requirement, most part of the analysis will consider situations without
(A2). Then, the following assumption with regard to knowledge codification holds in-
stead.
Assumption (A2’) In a period t and for all i, j ≥ qτt: Before an idea indexed by
i is codified, all ideas with index j, j < i have been codified already. This implies that if
i is codified in period t, then j < i is also codified in t.
Finally, a person Pt deciding to do research is able to generate a number ε(qτt−1)Φ
of new ideas. The term ”new ideas” is supposed to reflect the subjective perspective of
person Pt. That is, the ideas generated are new to Pt, but not necessarily to all other
persons. As mentioned in the introduction, we intend to examine the cases of Φ = 0,
which means that every researcher generates a constant number ε ∈ R+ of new ideas,
and of Φ = 1, which reflects the assumption often used in endogenous growth theory
that researchers are becoming more productive with an increasing stock of knowledge to
draw upon. In the latter case the researchers’ productivity increases with the knowledge
they received from the previous generation.
The process of knowledge acquisition shows a sequential nature, proceeding from school-
ing via reading to own research. For analytical simplicity, the first two kinds of knowledge
transmission happen at no time at the beginning of each period. Research and develop-
ment, however, takes time, such that a person has to decide as to whether she is going to
work in final-goods production or to do research. Let LR,t denote the number of persons
who are hired to do research in period t and let them be arranged on the continuum from
0 to LR,t. That is, all persons Pt ∈ [0, LR,t] decided to become researchers. Since they
have been transferred the same amount of human capital from the old generation and
generate the same number of new ideas each, they all possess the same level of knowl-
edge. More precisely, τP 1t = τP 2t , for all P
1
t , P
2
t ∈ [0, LR,t]. Analogously, the symmetry
of the knowledge level applies to the workers. Until now we have implicitly assumed
that each researcher is doing research on her own, which means that they all discover
the same ideas. However, when working together in a research group they can exchange
their ideas and as a consequence reach a higher level of knowledge altogether. Hence,
we assume spillover-effects occur within research groups. A research group is defined as
8β reflects how easy ideas can be acquired from reading.
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Gt ⊆ [0, LR,t]. Let LGt be the Lebesgue-measure of Gt, representing the number of re-
searchers in research group Gt.9 We further assume that every researcher can participate
in one research group only. Since every researcher brings in the same amount of ideas,
we define the knowledge level of each person Pt ∈ Gt by
τPt = qτt−1 + βmax{0, Ct − qτt−1}+ εqτt−1LGt .
Consequently, researchers are symmetric with respect to knowledge if they are in the
same research group or belong to different research groups of the same size. In detail, if
P 1t ∈ G1t , P 2t ∈ G2t , then
τP 1t Q τP 2t ⇔ LG1t Q LG2t .
It immediately follows that
τt = τPt ⇔ (Pt ∈ G∗t ∧ LG∗t ≥ LGt , ∀Gt).
Research groups may be employed by the intermediate firm. As we preclude spillovers
between research groups, it follows from the preceding considerations that for the same
research expenditures, one would achieve a higher level of knowledge by creating one big
research group, instead of many small ones. In this way, the intermediate firm can be
interpreted as a single research joint venture owned by the old generation. Having only
one research group of size LR,t implies that τPt = τR,t, Pt ∈ [0, LR,t], where
τR,t = qτt−1 + βmax{0, Ct − qτt−1}+ εqτt−1LR,t.
Further there is the symmetry of the workers’ knowledge: τPt = τA,t, ∀Pt ∈ Pt \ [0, LR,t],
where
τA,t = qτt−1.
Consequently, the economy’s knowledge stock is determined by that of the researchers:
τt = τR,t. It is the maximum level of knowledge that can be productively employed at
time t. The dynamics of the economy’s knowledge stock can then be written as follows10
τt =
{
qτt−1 + β(Ct − qτt−1) + εqτt−1LR,t, Ct > qτt−1;
qτt−1 + εqτt−1LR,t , Ct ≤ qτt−1.
9Of course, this definition involves a measure theoretic problem. Since single points on the interval
[0, LR,t] possess measure 0, there exist research groups Gt consisting of more than one person with
measure 0. We preclude such groups by assumption.
10The assumption of only one research group in the economy is not necessary to obtain this difference
equation. However, all research groups of the economy must be of equal size.
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3.2.3 Second-Stage Profit Maximization
Within period t, the intermediate firm maximizes profits by deciding on the intermediate
goods supply and the number of researchers to employ. Hence, it faces the following
problem:
max
xt,LR,t
piintt = px,t(xt)xt − wR,tLR,t.
Taking the information stock and physical capital as given, the problem is one-dimensional
in LR,t. Using the demand for intermediate products of the final-goods firms, the neces-
sary condition of the intermediate entrepreneurs’ optimization problem writes
wR,t = α
2xα−1t
∂xt
∂LR,t
L1−αA,t .
In this way, the supply of intermediate goods, xst , and the factor demand for researchers,
LdR,t, are given by11
xst =
(
α2 ∂xt
∂LR,t
wR,t
) 1
1−α
LA,t,
LdR,t =
(
α2
wR,t
) 1
1−α
(
Kt
∂τt
∂LR,t
) α
1−α
LA,t − 1∂τt
∂LR,t
(qτt−1 + βmax{0, Ct − qτt−1}).
Consequently, the profits of the intermediate firm accrue to
piintt = αK
α
t L
1−α
A,t τ
α
t (1− ατ−1t
∂τt
∂LR,t
LR,t) =: Ktrt.
For reasons of clarity in exposition, LdR,t was not inserted into the profit function. The
profits are allocated among the shareholders of the intermediate firm proportional to
their shares. Hence, the return on capital investment is
rt = αK
α−1
t L
1−α
A,t τ
α
t (1− ατ−1t
∂τt
∂LR,t
LR,t). (3.1)
3.3 The Costs of Knowledge Codification
Knowledge codification takes time and physical resources as carriers of information such
as paper, CD-ROMs or hard disks. There is also a need for reproduction and storage
devices. Additionally knowledge databases have to be maintained and administrated.
Costs could even include the creation of new codes, e.g. if the existing one does not
11The sufficient condition for a maximum is satisfied due to the strict concavity of the objective function
in LR,t: ∂
2pit
∂L2R,t
= α2(α− 1)τα−2t
(
∂τt
∂LR,t
)2
KαL1−αA,t < 0.
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suffice for expression. Although the notion ‘knowledge codification’ may also comprise
the creation of all kinds of artifacts, for illustrative purposes, it will be referred to as
the creation of information via some natural language.12 For simplicity, we assume that
every idea can be codified at the same cost of γt units of the homogenous good within
period t. The codification costs per idea γt may change over time, hence the index t in
the cost function. However, the marginal costs are supposed to be constant within each
period. In this way, the cost function shows a linear form within periods:
Γt(4Ct) = γt4Ct.
Additionally fixed entry costs f may accrue once in the first period of knowledge codifi-
cation for setting up computer systems, establishing management structures or building
archives or libraries.13
Two implicit assumptions with respect to the cost function are that, first, the costs of
knowledge codification per idea do not depend on the number of new employees to access
the information in the next period. According to the definition of information, it may
well be that an increasing number of researchers may necessitate further costly copying
and distribution activities. However, it is assumed that the cost share of these activities
due to variations in the number of new researchers between periods is negligible.
Second, if the new capital owners decided on a positive codification level, those to
actually codify the ideas are the researchers of that period as they possess the highest
level of knowledge. However, would they codify at the marginal costs γt? The reasoning
is in the Bertrand-fashion: As long as there is more than one researcher, they will agree
to codify at the marginal costs because they are symmetric with respect to knowledge.
The situation with only one researcher is mathematically precluded by the representation
of the population on the interval [0, 1], because positive research implies a research
group of measure greater than zero. For a more general interpretation, it is assumed
that when having only one researcher, the firm owners offer a forcing contract that
contains a compensation for knowledge codification slightly above the marginal costs.
The researcher will accept the contract. This is the case as the firm owners know that
the researcher will be better off if she codified at slightly above the marginal costs and
hence has no incentive to revise the conditions of the contract, even if the researcher
would neglect the contract at first.14
3.4 The Problem of the Household
Each individual lives for two periods and maximizes the discounted sum of utilities.
There is a constant discount factor δ > 0.15 The individuals inelastically supply one
12For illustrative purposes, one could think of writing a book for the previously described bookshelf.
13It will explicitly be mentioned in the analysis when entry costs are considered.
14It depends on the number of the stages of the game how often the researcher may neglect the contract.
However, she will accept it at the last stage.
15This implies a constant rate of time preference ρ > −1.
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unit of labor when young and may choose as to whether they want to work in final-
goods production or in research and development. The budget constraint when young
is given by the wage wt that can be split into consumption today c1,t, saving wtst in
physical capital and investment in knowledge codification wtςt. The physical capital
savings plus the real return on capital rt+1 equal consumption when old c2,t+116. The
household privately saves in physical capital which is interpreted as ownership claims
on the intermediate firm and then takes part in a collective decision within the firm on
knowledge codification. The problem of the household can be depicted by the following
three-stage process.17
Stage 1: The household decides on how much it would like to save in physical capital
and how much to propose for investment in knowledge codification.
Stage 2: The collective decision with respect to knowledge codification within the in-
termediate firm is taken.
Stage 3: The household may adjust capital savings given the investment in knowledge
codification.
It is assumed that the households cannot commit to or be constrained to a certain
amount of physical capital saving. In particular, at the third stage, the individual can
revise her decision after the amount of knowledge codification has been set. In this
way, each young individual makes a decentral decision over her capital savings.18 As the
model is entirely deterministic, the individuals know that they are all symmetric with
respect to wage and preferences. Accordingly, at the first stage, she decides whether she
would like to make a proposal on the codification investment by solving
max
st,ςt
Ut(c1,t, c2,t+1) = u(c1,t) + δu(c2,t+1)
subject to
c1,t = wt(1− st − ςt),
c2,t+1 = (1 + rt+1)stwt.
16The index indicates whether the person is young (1) or old (2) in period t.
17In principle, there are two ways to solve the households’ problem. One is a two stage decision process
in which, at the first stage, each household decides on how much consumption in total to transfer to
the next period, and then at the second stage participate in a collective decision on how much of the
consumption forgone to invest in knowledge codification rather than in physical capital. The second
way as chosen here is to omit the first stage and directly determine the amount of consumption
forgone for knowledge codification and for physical capital.
18This is plausible because although by coordination the households could choose the monopoly capital
stock, each individual has an incentive to deviate by increasing her saving rate. The coordination in
the codification case is possible as by assumption they have to pay the codification costs immediately
and hence cannot deviate to lower codification. Of course, every household could privately pay for
additional knowledge codification, but none has an incentive to do so.
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For notational convenience, let St := stwt and ζt := ςtwt, where st, ςt ∈ [0, 1]. The
individual’s proposal on the intermediate firm’s codification investment would then be
ζt,prop =
∫ 1
0
ζtdPt. Further, it is assumed that utility takes the form of a CIES-utility
function:
u(c) =
c1−θ − 1
1− θ ,
where θ ∈ [0.5, 1]. The agent obtains the utility maximizing pair (st, ςt) from the follow-
ing necessary conditions:
u′(c1,t) = δu′(c2,t+1)(1 + rt+1),
u′(c1,t) = δu′(c2,t+1)
∂rt+1
∂ςt
st.
With the particular functional form of utility, the conditions write
st =
1− ςt
δ−
1
θ (1 + rt+1)
θ−1
θ + 1
,
ςt = 1− δ− 1θ
(
∂rt+1
∂ςt
)− 1
θ
(1 + rt+1)s
θ−1
θ
t − st.
and further transformations yield
st =
1 + rt+1
∂rt+1
∂ςt
,
ςt = 1− 1 + rt+1∂rt+1
∂ςt
(
δ−
1
θ (1 + rt+1)
θ−1
θ + 1
)
.
As information cannot be transformed into the consumption good, a negative codifica-
tion investment suggestion is not possible. Hence, an agent will make a suggestion if her
optimal level ζt,prop is greater than zero. In particular, if no proposal has been put forth
or no proposal has been accepted, the optimization problem is equivalent to the regular
maximization problem in an overlapping generation model with production.
Since all individuals are flexible to choose their profession, the model features only one
labor market, and wages of the different occupations must be equal in equilibrium. As
a consequence, each household faces an identical optimization problem, such that in
fact each person makes the same proposal on knowledge codification expenses which, of
course, will be accepted. It is thus convenient to work with a representative household
as being the young generation characterized by its date of birth t.19 Each generation
faces the first-stage optimization problem and its solution is interpreted as aggregate
19In fact, individuals belonging to the same generations may be heterogenous with respect to human
capital. Earning the same wage, this heterogeneity does not carry over to the households’ utility
maximization problem.
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savings St and investment in knowledge codification ζt ≥ 0.
Note that the utility function exhibits the following properties:
(c1) u′(c) > 0, u′′(c) < 0;
(c2) limc→∞ u′(c) = 0, limc→0 u′(c) =∞;
(c3) ∂st
∂rt+1
≥ 020 and if ςt = 0, the saving rate is a function of rt+1, only;
(c4) u
′′(c2,t+1)
u′(c2,t+1)
+ 1
2c2,t+1
< −u′′(c1,t)
u′(c1,t)
1
1+rt+1
.
Given that rt+1 ≥ 0 and wt ≥ 0, the Inada conditions (c2) guarantee a positive saving
rate st. In contrast, the optimal choice for ςt may be the corner solution ςt = 0. Property
(c4) constrains the curvature of the utility function as necessary to guarantee for a unique
maximum.21 With regard to CIES-utility, this condition translates to a lower bound of
the constant elasticity parameter22, θ > 1
2
1−st−ςt
1−ςt , and is always satisfied for θ ∈ [0.5, 1].
Note that this also includes logarithmic utility. More generally, the model allows for
other utility functions as long as they satisfy (c1)− (c4).
3.5 Sequence of Events
This section summarizes the time-line of the model’s typical events in a regular period
t:
(1) At the beginning of period t, the members of the new generation are exogenously
transferred a share q of the economy’s knowledge stock of the previous period:
τPt = qτt−1, Pt ∈ Pt.
(2) The intermediate firm hires a number LR,t of researchers. If the researchers of the
previous periods have codified their ideas, the new generation of researchers in t
would additionally build up human capital of β(Ct − qτt−1).
20If ςt = 0, the derivative is written as ∂st∂rt+1 = δ
− 1θ 1−θ
θ (1 + rt+1)
− 1θ
(
δ−
1
θ (1 + rt+1)
θ−1
θ + 1
)−2
≥ 0,
θ ∈ (0, 1]. For an interior solution where ςt > 0, st = γt(1+rt+1)
1
α
wt
“
∂τt
∂LR,t
”α−1
α ( 1−α
α2 )
1−α
α (νβ)
1
α
. Consequently,
∂st
∂rt+1
= γt
1
α (1+rt+1)
1−α
α
wt
“
∂τt
∂LR,t
”α−1
α ( 1−α
α2 )
1−α
α (νβ)
1
α
> 0.
21Appendix 7.1 verifies that there is a unique solution of the necessary conditions which implies a
maximum of the objective function.
22To be precise, θ would be the constant coefficient of relative risk aversion and its reciprocal value the
constant elasticity of substitution between consumption in the two periods.
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(3) The intermediate firm produces intermediate good xt with the capital saved by
the now old generation Pt−1 and the researchers’ human capital. The researchers
receive wage wR,t. The profits piintt are split among the capital owners.
(4) The final-product firm rents the intermediate products at price px,t and hires a
number LA,t of workers at a wage wA,t in order to produce the final good Yt.
(5) At the end of period t, the young generation decides how much of the wage income
to consume c1,t and how much to transfer to the next period. On the one hand,
the young generation (decentrally) saves in physical capital, which ensures owner-
ship rights of the intermediate firm in t+ 1 involving a return rt+1. On the other
hand, it may invest in knowledge codification which is the result of a collective
decision made at the shareholder’s meeting of the intermediate firm. Knowledge
codification increases the knowledge stock of t+ 1 and consequently the rent rt+1.
(6) Dependent on the investment in knowledge codification, ζt, the researchers of pe-
riod t codify an amount 4Ct of their ideas.
(7) The old generation sells its capital to the young, consumes its receipts Kt plus the
return on capital rtKt = piintt , and then dies.
As usually assumed in overlapping generations models, there is one physical good that
can be consumed. Output that is not consumed can be used as capital in the following
period. The literature suggests two ways of interpretation with respect to the capital
stock. In both, savings of the young generation in t equal the capital stock of period
t+1. In the first, the young generation buys the current capital stock from the old with
their savings and “net-saves” the difference St −Kt, which becomes the net increase in
capital of the subsequent period. The second approach assumes that capital is ”eatable”
or consumable, such that the old generation consumes its capital at the end of its life. In
this way, the capital stock of the next period is always identical to consumption forgone
of the previous period, which has become productive with a time lag.
Both interpretations could apply to our model, however, suggesting a long-lasting in-
termediate firm, we will go with the first.23 In detail, we assume that the intermediate
firm transforms the capital stock to the intermediate good, which is rent to final-goods
production. Over one period the intermediate good depreciates in the sense that it can-
not be used in final production unless it is overhauled. But it can still be used as raw
capital in the next period.24
23Adopting the first interpretation and assuming that capital is not consumable may be problematic
for finite time horizons and if the capital stock is decreasing. Both problems will not occur in this
thesis.
24It is well known that overlapping generations economies may exhibit equilibria with asset bubbles.
As bubbles are not the focus of the dissertation, we exclude them from the following analysis.
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Note that if information were consumable, the firm owners could demand at least the
respective consumption value from the next generation of firm owners for those ideas
with positive marginal value in the next but one period. The question is how high the
amount of consumption from the physical object(s) in which the respective idea is em-
bodied (e.g. books) would be. We argue that it should be lower than γt as the costs
of knowledge codification do not translate one-to-one into the physical object but also
comprise consumable materials like office supplies and the like. It would be possible to
introduce the assumption that information is equivalent to e.g. %γt units of the con-
sumption good in the next period, where % ∈ (0, 1). However, this would complicate
the model without yielding much additional insights. For this reason, the consumption
value of information has been set equal to zero.25
The following figure sketches the structure of the established overlapping generations
model.
Final Goods Production
Intermediate Sector
tRtRtttxtL
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tR
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Figure 3.1: The Structure of the Overlapping Generations Model
25In this way, the intertemporal externality to future generations from knowledge codification tends to
be too high. In particular, with respect to libraries or the hardware of a knowledge database that
have been established from fixed overhead costs f in the first period of knowledge codification would
be handed down from one generation to the next at its consumption value. This has been neglected
for reasons of simplicity.
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Chapter 4
Equilibria and General Dynamics
4.1 Sequential Markets Equilibrium
The economy comprises three markets: The labor market, the market for intermediate
products and the market for the consumption good. The following analysis will focus
on the sequential markets equilibrium, which is defined by the three markets to clear in
each period.
Definition 4.1 Given K1, τ0 > 0, C1 ≥ 0, and St = Kt+1, Ct+1 = f(Ct, ζt), a sequen-
tial markets equilibrium is allocations c2,1, {c1,t, c2,t+1, St, ζt, LA,t, LR,t, xt}∞t=1 and prices
{px,t, wt}∞t=1, such that
(i) they solve the utility maximization problem of the representative household and the
profit maximization problems of the representative final-goods firm and of the in-
termediate firm for all t ≥ 1 and
(ii) in every period the economy is in temporary equilibrium, that is, for all t ≥ 1:
(a) (Labor Market)
Lst = L
d
A,t + L
d
R,t;
(b) (Intermediate Goods Market)
xst = x
d
t ;
(c) (Final Goods Market)
Y st = c1,t + c2,t + St + ζt.
As the supply and demand functions are derived by the respective optimization problems,
it is clear that the model satisfies (i). Further, the properties of the final-goods produc-
tion function imply that the temporary equilibrium of the labor market will exhibit a
positive share of workers in this sector due to the Inada conditions. Using the respective
35
Chapter 4 Equilibria and General Dynamics
demand functions from the first order conditions of the representative final-goods firm
and the intermediate firm, the equilibrium condition writes
Lst =
(
1− α
wt
) 1
α
Ktτt
(
1 +
(
α2
wt
) 1
1−α
(
Kt
∂τt
∂LR,t
) α
1−α
)
(4.1)
− 1
∂τt
∂LR,t
(qτt−1 + βmax{0, Ct − qτt−1}).
Since Lst − LdA,t = LdR,t, we receive the equilibrium wage
wt = (1− α)1−α
(
α2Kt
∂τt
∂LR,t
)α
.
Note that as ∂τt
∂LR,t
= ε(qτt−1)Φ, the wage is independent of the amount of knowledge
codification of the previous period. In this way, the model characterized by a specifica-
tion of the production of intermediate goods with Solow-neutral technological progress
does not exhibit a hold up problem with respect to knowledge codification. However,
knowledge codification may possess positive externalities to the wage levels from the
next but one period on. A further discussion on social welfare can be found in chapter
12.
Inserting the equilibrium wage into the labor demand functions and using Lst = 1 gives
LA,t =
1− α
α2
τt
dτt
dLR,t
.
Hence, the equilibrium allocation is
LA,t = min
{
1,
1− α
α2 + 1− α
(
1 +
qτt−1 + βmax{0, Ct − qτt−1}
∂τt
∂LR,t
)}
,
LR,t = max
{
0,
α2
α2 + 1− α −
1− α
α2 + 1− α
qτt−1 + βmax{0, Ct − qτt−1}
∂τt
∂LR,t
}
.
The corner solution (LA,t, LR,t) = (1, 0)1 would involve a successively decreasing knowl-
edge stock because the ideas of the previous period cannot be recovered fully by direct
transfer and knowledge codification. As shown in appendix 7.2, the economy’s equilib-
rium allocation of labor always possesses an interior solution for Φ = 0, that is, with a
constant amount of ideas per researcher.2 In contrast, with Φ = 1 the marginal produc-
tivity of the researchers increases with a growing stock of knowledge. In this case, the
share of researchers will be positive, whenever the following condition holds:
α2
1− α >
q + β(1− q)
qε
. (4.2)
1Note that there is no other corner solution due to the Inada conditions for final-goods production
and a positive value of the knowledge stock in the first period, τ0 > 0.
2If C1 < τwCst , which is the interesting case with endogenous codification.
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Otherwise, the economy would stay in a low level trap with a declining knowledge stock
and declining output as a consequence. Without explicit mention otherwise, we assume
that (4.2) is satisfied.
As utility is non-saturated in consumption, one of the market clearing conditions is
redundant by Walras law. We leave aside the consumption goods market and concentrate
on the intermediate goods market. The equilibrium condition is written as
xdt =
(
α
px,t
) 1
1−α
LA,t =
(
α2 ∂xt
∂LR,t
wt
) 1
1−α
LA,t = x
s
t .
Hence, for all wt > 0, there will be a positive price px,t that solves the intermediate-goods
market equilibrium condition. In particular,
px,t =
wt
αKt
∂τt
∂LR,t
,
and with the equilibrium wage from the labor market,
px,t = α
2α−1Kα−1t
(
∂τt
∂LR,t
)α−1
(1− α)1−α.
Let the homogeneous good be the numéraire. The sequential market equilibrium is then
characterized by a price vector
{px,t, wt}∞t=1 =
(
α2α−1Kα−1t
„
∂τt
∂LR,t
«α−1
(1−α)1−α, (1−α)1−α
„
α2Kt
∂τt
∂LR,t
«α)∞
t=1
.
4.2 Dynamics
This section introduces the general dynamics of the model, which are described by the
difference equations of the economy’s three stocks: capital, knowledge and information.
The development of the capital stock is determined by each period’s saving decision,
Kt+1 = stwt. Using the equilibrium wage it transforms into
Kt+1 = stK
α
t (1− α)1−αα2α
(
∂τt
∂LR,t
)α
and leads to a growth rate of capital according to
gK,t =
Kt+1 −Kt
Kt
= stK
α−1
t (1− α)1−αα2α
(
∂τt
∂LR,t
)α
− 1. (4.3)
The behavior of the knowledge stock, given the equilibrium number of researchers, can
be written as
τt+1 = qτt + β(max{0, Ct+1 − qτt}) + ε(qτt)Φ − τt+11− α
α2
,
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which transforms into
τt+1 = ν(qτt + β(max{0, Ct+1 − qτt}) + ε(qτt)Φ),
where ν = α2
α2+1−α .
From this equation, we obtain the growth rate of knowledge as
gτ,t = ν
(
q + β
max{0, Ct+1 − qτt}
τt
+ εqΦτΦ−1t
)
− 1.
Finally the stock of information accumulates according to
Ct+1 = Ct +4Ct, 4Ct ≥ 0.
In the two extreme cases in which the researchers are not codifying at all (indexed by
”woC”) and the one in which they are codifying every new idea in each period (”wC”),
the maximum term in the knowledge stock’s difference equation will be zero in the first
case and we can set Ct = τt−1 in the latter. This gives
gwoCτ,t = ν(q + εq
ΦτΦ−1t )− 1,
gwCτ,t = ν(q + β(1− q) + εqΦτΦ−1t )− 1.
The properties of the economy’s dynamical system crucially depend on the assumptions
concerning the research process, that is, whether Φ = 0 or Φ = 1. As shown in appendix
7.3, Φ = 1 implies long run growth. The economy possesses two kinds of steady states
distinguished by whether the economy exhibits positive or zero knowledge codification.
Moreover, an economy with zero codification will approach growth at constant rates in
the long run. Every steady state exhibits the same relation of the growth rates of capital
and knowledge:
gK,s =
α
1− αgτ,s. (4.4)
For Φ = 1, the growth rates of knowledge with full and zero codification are constant.
gwoCτ = νq(1 + ε)− 1,
gwCτ = ν(q(1 + ε) + β(1− q))− 1.
As we preclude negative codification and codification of ideas that have not yet been
discovered, gτ,t ∈ [gwoCτ , gwCτ ], ∀t.
With regard to output, we can write
Yt = F (Kt, LA,t, τt) = K
α
t τ
α
t
(
1− α
α2εq
)1−α
(1 + gτ,t−1)1−α.
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Log-differentiating and using the steady-state relation of the growth rates of capital and
knowledge as given by (4.4) verifies that the steady-state growth rate of output equals
that of capital:
gY,s = gK,s =
α
1− αgτ,s.
Assuming Φ = 0 implies that the economy approaches a stationary state in the long
run. This is also verified in appendix 7.3. Consider an economy with an initial level of
information of zero (C1 = 0). By full or zero codification in the following periods, the
economy will reach stationary-state levels of knowledge of
τwCst =
νε
1− ν(q + β(1− q)) ,
τwoCst =
νε
1− νq .
For initial values C1 < τwCst , the system realizes stationary-state knowledge levels of
τst ∈ [τwoCst , τwCst ]. Only in case there is some exogenous source of information such that
Ct > τ
wC
st from some period t on, the knowledge stock may exceed τwCst . Focussing on
endogenous knowledge codification, only the case C1 < τwCst is of interest for the thesis.
With the saving rate depending positively on the knowledge level in stationary state,
the capital stock approaches Kst ∈ [KwoCst , KwCst ], where
KwoC,wCst =
(
swoC,wCst
) 1
1−α
(1− α)α 2α1−α ε α1−α .
Clearly then, the economy’s stationary-state level of output must be Yst ∈ [Y woCst , Y wCst ],
where
Y woCst =
(
swoCst
) α
1−α (1− α)α 4α−21−α ε α1−α ν
1−νq ,
Y wCst =
(
swCst
) α
1−α (1− α)α 4α−21−α ε α1−α ν
1−ν(q+β(1−q)) .
The dynamics show that with codification, the economy would reach a higher stationary-
state level of output in the case Φ = 0 as well as a higher steady state growth rate of
output for Φ = 1. The magnitude crucially depends on the transfer rate q and the
reading capacity β. Hence, knowledge codification may account for a large proportion
of an economy’s growth rate if other knowledge transfer capabilities are bad, i.e. q is
low. When bearing no cost, the researchers would always codify their knowledge to the
full extent at the end of the period.
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Codification Behavior of the Economy
The last section of the previous chapter on the economy’s dynamics revealed that the
economy’s output level, respectively its growth rate may substantially increase due to
knowledge codification activities. This chapter examines under which conditions knowl-
edge codification will be observed. For this purpose, it will first be necessary to revisit
the households’ utility maximization problem. Thereafter, the general structure of the
problem will be unfolded by three lemmata, which serve as a basis on which the results
dependent on the different specifications with respect to the research process are derived.
With the given model specification, the amount of knowledge codification is derived
from the representative household’s utility maximization problem. As ζt = γt4Ct, γt
being constant within periods and St = Kt+1, the household’s problem can equivalently
be solved via the control variables Kt+1 and 4Ct. For convenience, we will use this
notation in the following. The usual procedure is to calculate the derivative of the rent
with respect to the amount of codification in t and solve the first order condition for
4Ct. This is what will be done, however, drt+1d4Ct exhibits a discontinuity which necessi-
tates some preliminary considerations.
Recall the difference equation of knowledge given that the economy will be in temporary
equilibrium in each period:
τt+1 = νqτt + νβ(max{0, Ct+1 − qτt}) + νε(qτt)Φ. (5.1)
The maximum term indicates that the codification of one more idea in t contributes to
the economy’s knowledge stock in t only if the young generation in t + 1 has not been
transferred the respective tacit component. That is, codification in t of ideas that the
new researchers of t + 1 will know without reading the information (because they will
have been transferred exogenously), possesses no value in t+ 1. Therefore, codification
of an additional idea given the information stock Ct – this idea would be indexed by
Ct + η, η → 0 – would enhance the knowledge stock of time t+ 1 by:
dτt+1
d4Ct =
{
νβ, if Ct ≥ qτt;
0 , if Ct < qτt.
Accordingly, the ideas to be codified in t can be distinguished by their marginal value
in the subsequent period t + 1. The number of ideas that are of zero marginal value
are denoted by 4Cie,t ∈ [0,max{qτt −Ct, 0}] and those with positive marginal value by
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4Ce,t ∈ [0,max{0,min{τt(1− q), τt−Ct}}]. It follows that Ct+1 = Ct+4Cie,t+4Ce,t.
Consequently, (5.1) can be rewritten as:
τt+1 = νqτt + νβ(4Ce,t +max{0, Ct − qτt}) + νε(qτt)Φ. (5.2)
The middle term expresses that the new employees can build up knowledge from read-
ing information codified in the last period 4Ce,t and, in case it has been transferred a
measure of human capital less than what has already been codified in the periods before
t, it can additionally utilize ”the older books” labeled by indices i ∈ [qτt, Ct]. The latter
would imply that all additionally generated information in t is of positive value in the
next period, that is, 4Ct = 4Ce,t. On the other hand, if Ct < qτt, 4Cie,t is positive.
This implies that the representative agent may also have to pay for information that will
not generate any benefit in the next period. Hence, the codification decision is crucially
affected by assumption (A2), which may involve an additional “entry cost” for knowledge
codification. Without (A2), the representative agent would be able to codify ideas with
positive marginal value in the next period only. In this case, Ct cannot be interpreted as
the measure of the stock of information. It is just the highest index of all codified ideas.
However, with assumption (A2’), Ct+1 − qτt is well defined as the (Lebesque-)measure
of efficient information. In this way, the dynamics of the knowledge stock are also well
defined without (A2).
Rather than asking how many ideas in total, that is 4Ct, the new capital owners are
willing to codify, the discontinuity can be eliminated by reformulating the question to:
How many ideas of positive marginal value 4Ce,t are the owners of the intermediate
firm willing to codify in period t, given the stock of information Ct, that is, given that
they may have to codify some ideas of zero marginal value in t+1. Note that this would
structurally correspond to the household’s problem with (A2’) and fixed entry costs f .
Altogether, the utility maximization problem then writes:
max
Kt+1,4Ce,t
Ut(c1,t, c2,t+1) = u(c1,t) + δu(c2,t+1)
subject to
c1,t = wt −Kt+1 − γt4Ct,
c2,t+1 = (1 + rt+1)Kt+1.
The respective first-order conditions yield:
u′(c1,t) = δu′(c2,t+1)(1 + rt+1),
γtu
′(c1,t) = δu′(c2,t+1)
∂rt+1
∂4Ce,tKt+1.
Inserting optimal saving in physical capital into the necessary condition with regard to
knowledge codification then gives:
γt(1 + rt+1) =
∂rt+1
∂4Ce,tKt+1. (5.3)
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This equation gives all pairs (Kt+1,4Ce,t) that are candidates of the solution to the rep-
resentative household’s maximization problem. Or, in other words, it defines a function
4Ce,t(Kt+1)1, that determines the optimal choice of 4Ce,t for each optimal Kt+1. As
negative codification is precluded, the solution to the household’s problem must be a
point on the graph of this function or involve the corner solution 4Ce,t = 0. Equation
(5.3) illuminates the household’s tradeoff between saving, that is capital investment, and
knowledge codification. On the left hand side is the amount of consumption the young
would receive when old, if they used the marginal codification costs for saving in physical
capital, which in the optimum must be equal to the marginal benefits of codification.
Using the equilibrium allocation of labor, the rent given by (3.1) is written as:
rt = K
α−1
t L
−α
A,tτ
α
t (LA,t − 1 + α) (5.4)
= Kα−1t
(
1−α
α2
)−α ( dτt
dLR,t
)α(
τt
(
1−α
α2
) (
dτt
dLR,t
)−1
− 1 + α
)
.
Calculating the derivative of rt+1 with respect to4Ce,t and inserting it into the marginal
condition (5.3) gives:
γt =
Kt+1
(
1−α
α2
)1−α ( dτt+1
dLR,t+1
)α−1
dτt+1
d4Ce,t
K1−αt+1 +
(
1−α
α2
)−α ( dτt+1
dLR,t+1
)α(
τt+1
(
1−α
α2
) (
dτt+1
dLR,t+1
)−1
− 1 + α
) .
With the difference equation of the knowledge stock as in (5.2), it is possible to solve
for 4Ce,t:
4Ce,t = Kt+1γt −
K1−αt+1
dτt+1
d4Ce,t
(
1−α
α2
)α−1 ( dτt+1
dLR,t+1
)1−α
+ α
2−ν
dτt+1
d4Ce,t
dτt+1
dLR,t+1
− νqτt
dτt+1
d4Ce,t
−max{0, Ct − qτt}. (5.5)
Note that these marginal considerations imply that entry costs are sunk, in the sense
that they have to be paid in any case, or there are no entry costs for codification.
With assumption (A2), there may be no entry costs because the previous generation
has created enough information such that 4Cie,t = 0. Of course, without entry costs
for knowledge codification, the amount of ideas to codify as reflected in equation (5.5)
is optimal. With (A2) or (A2’) and f > 0, it is necessary to verify that the represen-
tative agent’s life-time utility with codification, given entry costs (γt4Cie,t and/or f)
is higher than her utility when only investing in capital and thence not incurring entry
costs. Certainly, assumption (A2) represents an extreme, possibly rather hypothetical
case where all previously invented ideas have to be codified before being able to codify
an idea i. The reasoning behind it is that if new ideas draw upon previous ideas, the
1Using the implicit function theorem, letM(Kt+1,4Ce,t) = ∂rt+1∂4Ce,tKt+1−γt(1+rt+1) = 0. We obtain
∂M
∂4Ce,t =
∂2rt+1
∂4C2e,tKt+1 − γ
∂rt+1
∂4Ce,t < 0, ∀Kt+1 ≥ 0.
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codification of the first would have to refer to the latter. However, if those are not
codified, it is not obvious whether this can be easily done, for example, if vocabulary of
precisely defined and commonly understood terms are lacking. Cowan et al. (2000) refer
to this situation as the lack of a ‘code-book’. This case however will not be the main
focus of the following analysis. Hence, we will proceed with marginal considerations and
thereafter address the case with entry costs f that have to be paid once when setting
up the structures for knowledge codification. In each period, the case with assumption
(A2) can then be interpreted as the previous one with the peculiarity that the entry
costs are growing as long as the economy does not codify. Let the case with (A2’) and
f = 0 be the standard situation. This means agents are able to just codify ideas with
positive marginal value in t + 1 without any entry costs. Explicit notion will be made
when fading in f or (A2).
It is now interesting to examine the economy’s codification behavior over time:
d4Ce,t=
(
∂4Ce,t
∂τt
+ ∂4Ce,t
∂Kt+1
∂Kt+1
∂τt
)
dτt+
(
∂4Ce,t
∂Ct
+ ∂4Ce,t
∂Kt+1
∂Kt+1
∂Ct
)
dCt+
∂4Ce,t
∂Kt+1
∂Kt+1
∂Kt
dKt
= ∂4Ce,t
∂τt
dτt+
∂4Ce,t
∂Ct
dCt+
∂4Ce,t
∂Kt+1
(
∂Kt+1
∂τt
dτt+
∂Kt+1
∂Ct
dCt+
∂Kt+1
∂Kt
dKt
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
dKt+1
.
Changing stocks of knowledge and information possess a direct and an indirect effect
via Kt+1 on 4Ce,t. For convenience, the indirect effect is subsumed in dKt+1 and it is
referred to the direct effect when speaking of influences of the knowledge stock or the
stock of information on knowledge codification in period t. From (5.5) it is obvious that
the direct effect of a marginal increase in Ct is either zero, if the maximum term is zero,2
or negative. Taking the partial derivative with respect to τt yields:
∂4Ce,t
∂τt
=
{
K1−αt+1
νβ (
1−α
α2
)
α−1
ε1−αΦ(1−α)(qτt)Φ(1−α)−1q+ (α
2−ν)εΦq(qτt)Φ−1−q
νβ
<0 , Ct ≤ τt;
K1−αt+1
νβ (
1−α
α2
)
α−1
ε1−αΦ(1−α)(qτt)Φ(1−α)−1q+ (α
2−ν)εΦq(qτt)Φ−1−q
νβ
+q<0, Ct > τt.
The direct effect of knowledge growth on codification is negative because it increases the
return on physical capital and in this way increases the opportunity costs for knowledge
codification. In contrast, an increasing knowledge stock has no direct effect on the
codification benefit, because the rent in t+ 1 is linear in τt+1.3
Choosing a marginally higher level of capital saving would influence the representative
household’s optimal amount of knowledge codification according to:
∂4Ce,t
∂Kt+1
=
1
γt
− (1− α)K
−α
t+1
dτt+1
d4Ce,t
(
1− α
α2
)α−1
ε1−α(qτt)Φ(1−α).
2Note that in this case the indirect effect via Kt+1 is also 0. Of course the clause above holds an
inaccuracy since if Ct = qτt, the maximum term would be zero but the partial derivative of 4Ce,t
with respect to Ct would be negative.
3For this reason
∂
∂rt+1
∂4Ce,tKt+1
∂τt
= 0. This is due to the model showing Solow neutral technological
progress. With other specifications of technological progress an increasing knowledge stock directly
decreases the marginal codification benefit.
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The partial derivative is negative for small Kt+1. More precisely, if
Kt+1
γt
<
(1− α)K1−αt+1
dτt+1
d4Ce,t
(
1− α
α2
)α−1
ε1−α(qτt)Φ(1−α).
Inserting this condition into (5.5), it is possible to estimate from above the values of4Ce,t
for which Kt+1 capital saving exerts a negative influence on the benefits of knowledge
codification:
4Ce,t < −αK
1−α
t+1
dτt+1
d4Ce,t
(
1− α
α2
)α−1(
dτt+1
dLR,t+1
)1−α
+
α2 − ν
dτt+1
d4Ce,t
dτt+1
dLR,t+1
− νqτt
dτt+1
d4Ce,t
−max{0, Ct − qτt} < 0.
It shows that a negative partial derivative with respect to Kt+1 would imply 4Ce,t < 0,
which is precluded by assumption. Further, we can formulate:
Lemma 5.1 There exists a single-valued function Kt+1,crit : R+ × R+ → R+, which
gives the amount of the capital stock in t+ 1, Kt+1,crit(τt, Ct), such that 4Ce,t = 0.
Proof. Consider the derivative of 4Ce,t with respect to Kt+1 at 4Ce,t = 0. 4Ce,t = 0
requires
K−αt+1
νβ
(
1−α
α2
)α−1
ε1−α(qτt)Φ(1−α) = 1γt +
ε(qτt)Φ(α2−ν)−νqτt−νβmax{0,Ct−qτt}
νβKt+1
and thence4
∂4Ce,t
∂Kt+1
∣∣∣
4Ce,t=0
= α
γt
− (1− α) ε(qτt)Φ(α2−ν)−νqτt−νβmax{0,Ct−qτt}
νβKt+1
> 0.
Using the implicit function theorem proves lemma 5.1. 
Lemma 5.2 Let U ⊂ R3+ be the set {(τt, Ct, Kt+1)|4Ce,t(τt, Ct, Kt+1) ≥ 0}. 4Ce,t is a
strictly increasing function of Kt+1 on U .
Proof. 4Ce,t ≥ 0 implies
K−αt+1
νβ
(
1−α
α2
)α−1
ε1−α(qτt)Φ(1−α) ≤ 1γt +
ε(qτt)Φ(α2−ν)−νqτt−νβmax{0,Ct−qτt}
νβKt+1
and therefore,
∂4Ce,t
∂Kt+1
∣∣∣
4Ce,t≥0
≥ α
γt
− (1− α) ε(qτt)Φ(α2−ν)−νqτt−νβmax{0,Ct−qτt}
νβKt+1
> 0.
4Note that α2 − ν < 0 for α ∈ (0, 1).
45
Chapter 5 Codification Behavior of the Economy
From lemma 5.1, we know thatKt+1,crit(τt, Ct) is continuous, and since the partial deriva-
tive of 4Ce,t with respect to Kt+1 can only be negative for 4Ce,t < 0, U must be a
connected subspace of R3+. 
The previous lemmata apply to the marginal consideration leaving out possible entry
costs of knowledge codification f and/or γt4Cie,t. In order to address the case with
entry costs, it is necessary to distinguish the two situations which the agent compares
in her decision process. As mentioned previously, from a representative household per-
spective, the decision on knowledge codification does not depend on whether the fixed
entry costs originate from having to create information of zero marginal productivity in
the next period due to assumption (A2) or from set-up costs f or both. This is because
in the situation with (A2) the household does not take into account that if it did not
codify, the next generation would have to pay even higher entry costs. Hence, in the
following lemma, total fixed costs are just denoted by f˜ , which may originate from both,
(A2) and f , that is, in general f˜t = f + γt4Cie,t.5
For a given budget wt:
(S1) The representative agent does not pay the entry costs of knowledge codification
and, hence, invests in physical capital only. Her optimal choice of physical capital
saving in a period t is denoted by K¯t+1. The generation of period t will then realize
life time utility of
u[wt − K¯t+1] + δu[(1 + rt+1(4Ce,t = 0))K¯t+1] =: UwoCt .
(S2) The household pays entry costs f˜t and chooses the optimal pair (Kˆt+1,4Cˆe,t).
Lifetime utility in this case can be written as
u[wt − f˜t − Kˆt+1 − γt4Cˆe,t] + δu[(1 + rt+1(4Cˆe,t))Kˆt+1] =: UCt ,
for wt ≥ f˜t, and let UCt (wt < f˜t) := UCt (wt = 0).
Note that the household’s optimization problem possesses unique solutions in both sit-
uations (see Appendix 7.1).
Lemma 5.3 For every (τt, Ct, f˜t) ∈ R3+ exists a unique (Kˆt+1,crit, K¯t+1,crit) such that
UCt = U
woC
t . For all Kˆt+1 > Kˆt+1,crit(τt, Ct, f˜), UCt > UwoCt .
Proof. The proof proceeds as follows. First, we ascertain that for planned capital sav-
ing Kt+1 > Kt+1,crit6, the representative agent would be willing to pay entry costs for
codification up to a certain amount. In a second step, we identify the uniqueness of
a w∗t for every amount of fixed costs which leaves the agent just indifferent between
5Of course, if in a previous period the entry costs f have already been paid, f˜t reduces to γt4Cie,t.
6Kt+1,crit represents the critical value of saving without entry costs as introduced by the previous
lemmata.
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paying entry costs for codification or investing in capital only. The uniqueness of the
solutions (Kˆt+1,4Cˆe,t), K¯t+1 to the household’s optimization problem for every wt yields
the lemma’s contention.
If f˜t = 0, lemma 5.1 implies Kˆt+1,crit = K¯t+1,crit = Kt+1,crit. Further, from lemma 5.2 we
know that if Kˆt+1 > Kˆt+1,crit, UCt > UwoCt . That is,
u[wt − Kˆt+1 − γt4Cˆe,t] + δu[(1 + rt+1(4Cˆe,t))Kˆt+1]
> u[wt − K¯t+1] + δu[(1 + rt+1(4Ce,t = 0))K¯t+1].
The representative household’s budget is its wage wt. Fixed costs would reduce the
budget the agent can allocate for consumption, physical capital saving and knowledge
codification. A reduction of the resources to allocate must reduce utility. The reason is
that utility is assumed to strictly increase in consumption. Hence reducing the budget by
one unit of the homogeneous good, the agent must abstain from one unit of consumption
when young, if she wants to realize the same allocation (Kˆt+1,4Cˆe,t) as before or she
chooses another optimal pair (Kˆ ′t+1,4Cˆ ′e,t), which must lead to less lifetime utility,
because otherwise it is not possible that her previous choice (Kˆt+1,4Cˆe,t) was optimal.
The reason is that she could always replicate (Kˆ ′t+1,4Cˆ ′e,t) with the higher budget.
Hence,
dUt
dwt
> 0.
Since being able to choose a pair (Kˆt+1,4Cˆe,t), when Kˆt+1 > Kˆt+1,crit, instead of K¯t+1
leads to higher lifetime utility, utility is continuous in the budget constraint wt and
U(wt = 0) ≤ 0, there must be a unique wnet,t such that
u[wnet,t − Kˆt+1 − γt4Cˆe,t] + δu[(1 + rt+1(4Cˆe,t))Kˆt+1]
= u[wt − K¯t+1] + δu[(1 + rt+1(4Ce,t = 0))K¯t+1].
Hence, the representative household is willing to pay a maximum entry cost of wt −
wnet,t =: f˜
max. With this result, we define:
4Ut(wt, f˜t) := u[wt − f˜t − Kˆt+1 − γt4Cˆe,t] + δu[(1 + rt+1(4Cˆe,t))Kˆt+1]
−u[wt − K¯t+1]− δu[(1 + rt+1(4Ce,t = 0))K¯t+1]
= UCt (wt, f˜t)− UwoCt (wt)
and
4Ut(wt, f˜max) = 0.
Let Σ′t = St + ζt be the total amount of investment in t without fixed costs.7 In the
situation where the household does not codify Σ¯′t = St = K¯t+1 and in (S2) Σˆ′t =
7By this, ζt = γt4Ce,t.
47
Chapter 5 Codification Behavior of the Economy
Kˆt+1 + γt4Cˆe,t. Due to the strict concavity of utility in consumption, we must have
dΣ′t
dwt
> 0.
The argument is that the representative household chooses Σ′t such that u′(c1,t) =
δu′(c2,t+1)
dc2,t+1
dΣ′t
. Relaxing the budget constraint by one unit would decrease u′(c1,t)
when keeping Σ′t constant. If Σ′t is unchanged, it follows that u′(c1,t) < δu′(c2,t+1)
dc2,t+1
dΣ′t
.
Hence, equalling out marginal utility, the agent must enhance total investment. We
further know from Lemma 5.2 that for Kˆt+1 > Kt+1,crit, it is optimal to invest in
codification. Hence, when relaxing the budget constraint by one unit, the increase
in lifetime utility with knowledge codification must be greater than without. That is, if
Kˆt+1 > Kt+1,crit(τt, Ct),
dUCt
dwt
>
dUwoCt
dwt
.
It follows that for any level of fixed entry costs to knowledge codification and Kˆt+1 >
Kt+1,crit(τt, Ct),
d4Ut(wt, f˜t)
dwt
=
dUCt (wt, f˜t)
dwt
− dU
woC
t (wt)
dwt
> 0.
Consequently, 4Ut(wt, f˜t) = 0 implicitly defines a function w∗t : R++ → R++ which
gives the wage for every fixed cost level f˜t such that the representative household enjoys
the same utility in situations (S1) and (S2). As
dw∗t
df˜t
= −
∂4Ut(wt,f˜t)
∂f˜t
∂4Ut(wt,f˜t)
∂wt
> 0,
w∗t (f˜t) is strictly increasing in f˜t.
In the case with (A2), the knowledge stock τt and the stock of information Ct determine
entry costs γt4Cie,t. Hence, at w∗t (γt4Cie,t), 4Ut = 0. The fact that there is a unique
choice of (Kˆt+1,4Cˆe,t) and K¯t+1 for every wt completes the proof.
The claim that4Ut > 0 for Kˆt+1 > Kˆt+1,crit(τt, Ct, f˜t) follows directly from dU
C
t
dwt
>
dUwoCt
dwt
,
dΣ′t
dwt
> 0 and Lemma 5.2. 
Before examining the codification behavior of the economy for Φ = 0 and Φ = 1 sepa-
rately, the following proposition applies to both cases.
Proposition 5.1 An overlapping generations economy with C1 ≤ qτ1, where τ1 > 0, and
an initial stock of capital K1 close enough to zero will not be codifying at the beginning
of its development.
Proof. In other words, one can always find a K1 such that for all τ1 there exists a time
interval I = {t|1 ≤ t ≤ T} in which 4Ce,t = 0. It is sufficient to show that there is
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no incentive to codify in the first period from a marginal perspective, leaving out entry
costs. Lemma 5.1 and Lemma 5.2 imply that if Kt+1 < Kt+1,crit(τt, Ct), the economy
realizes the corner solution 4Ce,t = 0 (4Ce,t would be negative which is precluded by
assumption). It follows from Lemma 5.1 and ∂4Ce,t
∂τt
< 0 that Kt+1,crit(τt, Ct) is an in-
creasing function of τt. Hence, for any τ1 ∈ R++, the economy will not be codifying in
the first period ifK2 ≤ Kt+1,crit(τ1, C1). Equation (5.5) implies thatKt+1,crit(τ1, C1) > 0.
Consequently there exists a positive K2 ≤ Kt+1,crit(τ1, C1). Since Kt+1 = stwt, st bound
from above and wt for given τt a continuous function of Kt where wt(Kt = 0) = 0, one
can always find an initial value K1 close enough to zero such that K2 ≤ Kt+1,crit(τ1, C1)
and hence 4Ce,1 = 0. 
The intuition of the proof is the same as for lemma 5.1. That is, the Inada conditions
hold for physical capital saving, but not for knowledge codification as the members of
the succeeding generation are exogenously transferred a positive share of the previous
period’s knowledge stock and hence, the marginal benefit of the first idea to be codified
is finite.
5.1 Constant Number of Ideas per Researcher and
Period
For a detailed discussion on the economy’s codification behavior over time, the focus
will first be on the case of Φ = 0. For the specification of the research process with
a constant number of ideas per researcher and period, the economy will approach a
stationary state in the long run. With the previous lemmata, we are now in a position
to state the following proposition.
Proposition 5.2 With constant codification costs γ, an overlapping generations econ-
omy that develops over time from initial values K1, τ0, C1 close enough to zero will reach
a higher stationary-state level of output than Y woCst if and only if there exists a period tc
in which (S1)-savings satisfy K¯tc+1 > K¯t+1,crit(τwoCst , Ctc , f˜tc).
Proof. ”=⇒”: From Lemma 5.3 we know that UCt > UwoCt if Kˆt+1 > Kˆt+1,crit(τt, Ct, f˜t).
Consider a period tc where τtc is close enough to τwoCst and Ctc < qτwoCst . If the optimal
amount of (S1)-saving in this period is K¯tc+1 > K¯t+1,crit(τtc , Ctc , f˜tc), the representative
household wants to pay for codification of an amount 4Ce,tc > 0 of ideas with positive
marginal value in the next period.8 Consequently, Ctc+1 > qτtc ' qτwoCst and the economy
will subsequently move into a stationary-state level of knowledge at
τst =
βCst + ε
1
ν
− q(1− β) > τ
woC
st , qτst < Cst ≤ τst.
8This payment may also imply entry costs.
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Knowledge codification in tc implies that τt+1 > τwoCt+1 , ∀t > tc. Since ∂rt+1∂τt+1 > 0 and from
condition (c3) of the utility function ∂st
∂rt+1
≥ 0, we must have sst ≥ stc . Consequently,
Kst ≥ K¯tc+1 > K¯t+1,crit(τwoCst , Ctc , f˜tc) ≥ KwoCst . As output is an increasing function of
knowledge and capital, it immediately follows that Yst > Y woCst .
The proposition states that it is sufficient to observe one period t with K¯t+1 >
K¯t+1,crit(τ
woC
st , Ct, f˜t) to know that the economy will realize a higher output as a con-
sequence of knowledge codification. However, in such a period t, τt may not be close
enough to τwoCst to ensure that τt+1 > τwoCst . The result still holds because as the initial
stocks of capital and knowledge K1, τt are close enough to zero, the economy approaches
its stationary state from below. Since in this case the knowledge stock increases mono-
tonically, so will the capital stock. Hence, if ∃tk, K¯tk+1 > K¯t+1,crit(τwoCst , Ctk , f˜tk) it
follows that there must be a period tc > tk, where K¯tc+1 > K¯t+1,crit(τwoCst , Ctc , f˜tc) and
τtc is close enough to τwoCst .9
”⇐=”: Suppose the economy realizes stationary-state output Yst > Y woCst . With out-
put being an increasing function of knowledge and capital, it follows that Kst ≥ KwoCst
and τst > τwoCst . By definition, Kst > KwoCst can only be the case if τst > τwoCst . For
the latter to hold, the stationary-state level of information must exceed qτwoCst . From
Lemma 5.3, 4Ce,t is only positive if K¯t+1 > K¯t+1,crit(τt, Ct, f˜t). Hence, for Cst > qτwoCst ,
4Ce,t must be positive if τt is close enough to τwoCst and consequently there must be a
period tc in which K¯tc+1 > K¯t+1,crit(τwoCst , Ctc , f˜tc). 
Note that the assumption that the economy develops from a low initial level of capi-
tal K1 is necessary to make the statement that it is sufficient to observe one period in
which K¯t+1 > K¯t+1,crit(τwoCst , Ct, f˜t) to infer that the economy will realize a higher level
of output in the long run due to knowledge codification activities. The reason is that if,
for example, K¯2 > K¯2,crit(τwoCst , C1, f˜1), the economy will be codifying in the first period,
but, in case of a low initial level of knowledge, it is not clear whether it will still do so
when τt is close enough to τwoCst . It may be that Kst << Kt+1,crit(τwoCst , C, f˜) and the
economy will stop codifying before the stock of information C exceeds qτwoCst .10
The following discussion explicitly includes the role of the codification costs. It seems
reasonable to assume that they fall over time due to technical achievements such as
typewriters or computers.
9In greater detail, the argument is that with f˜tk ≤ f + γt(qτwoCst − Ctk), [the inequality depending
on whether f has to be paid or not,] the economy will be codifying in period tk by the assumption
that K¯tk+1 > K¯t+1,crit(τwoCst , Ctk , f˜tk). Consequently we must have Ctk+1 > Ctk and f˜tk+1 =
γt(qτwoCst − Ctk+1) < f˜tk . As Ctk+1 < qτwoCst , otherwise tk would satisfy the requirements for tc,
Ctk+1 does only play a role for the fixed costs not for the marginal considerations as reflected in
equation 5.5 and lemma 5.1. By this, K¯t+1,crit(τwoCst , Ctk+1, f˜tk+1) ≤ K¯t+1,crit(τwoCst , Ctk , f˜tk) and
due to τtk+1 > τtk , K¯tk+1 > K¯tk . Hence, the economy will also codify in tk + 1 and so on at least
until there is a period tc close enough to τwoCst and the above line of the argument applies.
10C can be any value smaller qτwoCst and f˜ ≤ f + γt(qτwoCst − C).
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Proposition 5.3 For every overlapping generations economy there is a finite maximum
entry cost f that will prevent knowledge codification. If f = 0, then independent of its
codification history, that is, independent of (A2), every economy will start to codify if
codification costs approach zero, γt → 0.
Proof. The first part of the proposition is a direct consequence of lemma 5.3. For every
wt there is a finite fmaxt such that UCt = UwoCt . Denote by fmax = supt{fmaxt }. This
supremum must exist as there is a maximum set-up cost, fmaxst , that the household would
be willing to pay in stationary state without codification such that4Ut(wwoCst , fmaxst ) = 0.
Hence, for all f ≥ fmax, there is no period in which the economy would start to codify.
For f = 0, in an arbitrary period t, the representative household would like to codify an
amount 4Ct, if and only if
u[wt − Kˆt+1 − γt4Cˆe,t − γt4Cie,t] + δu[(1 + rt+1(4Cˆe,t))Kˆt+1]
≥ u[wt − K¯t+1] + δu[(1 + rt+1(4Ce,t = 0))K¯t+1].
Since ∂rt+1
∂4Ce,t > 0 and γt → 0 it is obvious that
lim
γt→0
u[wt − Kˆt+1 − γt4Cˆe,t − γt4Cie,t] + δu[(1 + rt+1(4Cˆe,t))Kˆt+1]
= u[wt − K¯t+1] + δu[(1 + rt+1(4Ce,t > 0))K¯t+1]
> u[wt − K¯t+1] + δu[(1 + rt+1(4Ce,t = 0))K¯t+1].

Instead of codification costs approaching zero, it may be that they drop by a certain
amount, e.g. as a consequence of an innovation.11
Proposition 5.4 For overlapping generations economies close enough to stationary
state in which Cst < qτwoCst and with equal levels of capital KwoCst , the codification costs γ
must drop the more the higher the stationary-state level of knowledge in order to induce
knowledge codification.
Proof. The first question is whether economies with identical stationary-state levels of
capital KwoCst can exhibit different stationary-state values of knowledge. We want to
preclude that they possess different aggregate production functions. From section 4.2,
we have τwoCst =
νε
1−νq and K
woC
st = (s
woC
st )
1
1−α (1 − α)α 2α1−α ε α1−α . Hence, a higher number
of ideas per period ε (creativity) or a higher transfer rate q would enhance τwoCst . How-
ever, a higher creativity would directly increase KwoCst and q would indirectly increase
KwoCst via the saving rate swoCst .12 Differences in the saving rate may result from different
11This innovation would be exogenous to the model.
12As ςt = 0 in stationary state, the saving rate writes
swoCst =
1
δ−
1
θ (1 + rwoCst )
θ−1
θ + 1
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inter-temporal elasticities of utility or different rates of time preference. Let’s consider
economies with different triples (δ, ε, q). As swoCst is increasing in δ,13 so is KwoCst . Let
KwoCst,0 be characterized by (δ0, ε0, q0). The implicit function theorem then implies that
there are open neighborhoods D0, E0, Q0 ⊂ R+ around δ0, ε0 and q0 respectively and a
single valued function δ : E0 ×Q0 → D0 such that KwoCst,0 = constant. Hence, the model
allows for economies achieving equal values of capital, but different levels of knowledge
in stationary state.
The representative agent plans to save Kt+1 = KwoCst < Kt+1,crit(τwoCst , 0), given a certain
level of codification costs γˆ. This condition must hold because the economy is assumed to
not codify in period t. Denote by γ˜t the level of codification costs that implies 4Ce,t = 0
as an interior solution for given Kt+1, τt, Ct. γ˜t is written as
γ˜t = Kt+1
(
K1−αt+1
νβ
(
1−α
α2
)α−1
ε1−α− α2−ν
νβ
ε+ qτt
β
+max{0, Ct − qτt}
)−1
.
Hence, the codification costs would have to drop by more than4γ = γˆ−γ˜(KwoCst , τwoCst , Cst)
in order to induce codification. Holding KwoCst constant as we compare economies with
identical stocks of capital, comparative statics with respect to ε and q give
∂γ˜
∂ε
= −
KwoCst
(
(1− α) (KwoCst )1−α
νβ
(
1−α
α2
)α−1
ε−α− α2−ν
νβ
+ νq
(1−νq)β
)
(
(KwoCst )
1−α
νβ
(
1−α
α2
)α−1
ε1−α− α2−ν
νβ
ε+
qτwoCst
β
)2 < 0,
∂γ˜
∂q
= −
KwoCst
(
νε
β(1−νq)2
)
(
(KwoCst )
1−α
νβ
(
1−α
α2
)α−1
ε1−α− α2−ν
νβ
ε+
qτwoCst
β
)2 < 0.
Hence, it is clear that 4γ increases in q and ε or, equivalently, in τwoCst . 
This result is interesting in the following situation.
Corollary 5.1 Consider two economies close enough to stationary state with KwoC1,st =
KwoC2,st and let one be more sophisticated τwoC1,st > τwoC2,st due to a higher creativity ε1 > ε2.
There exist codification costs γ and parameter values for α, q, θ, δj, εj, j ∈ {1, 2} such that
the initially less sophisticated economy 2 will reach a higher output level than economy
1 in the long run.
Proof. As Y woCst = (KwoCst )α
(
1−α
α2
)1−α
εα ν
1−νq , K
1,woC
st = K
2,woC
st implies Y
1,woC
st > Y
2,woC
st
whenever ε1 > ε2. That is, the more sophisticated economy realizes a higher level of
output. Proposition 5.4 suggests that there is a γj for each economy j at which the
and rwoCst = (swoCst )−1(1 − α)α−1α−2α
(
1−α
α2
)−α ( ν
1−νq
1−α
α2 − 1 + α
)
. Hence, swoCst does not depend
on ε. Using the implicit function theorem gives that swoCst is unique and
∂swoCst
∂q > 0.
13The argument again uses the implicit function theorem.
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amount of first period consumption they are willing to forgo for knowledge codification
is just zero14 and γ1 < γ2. This generates an interval of codification costs [γ1, γ2) for
which economy 2 would start to codify, but not economy 1. In this case, economy 2
would approach a new stationary-state level of knowledge at
τ2,st =
νβC2,st + νε2
1− νq(1− β) > τ
woC
2,st , qτ2,st < C2,st ≤ τ2,st.
Note that by the same argument as in the proof of proposition 5.2, K2,st ≥ KwoC2,st . The
formerly less sophisticated economy 2 would realize a higher stationary-state output
than economy 1 if (
K2,st
KwoC1,st
)α
>
(
ε2
ε1
)1−α νε1
1−νq
νβC2,st+νε2
1−νq(1−β)
. (5.6)
The condition only holds if economy 2’s stock of information in the long run satisfies
C2,st >
1− νq(1− β)
νβ
τwoC1,st
(
KwoC1,st
K2,st
)α(
ε2
ε1
)1−α
− ε2
β
.
In stationary state 4Ce2,t(K2,st, τ2,st, C2,st) = 0, ∀t. Given γ < γ2, this implies15
C2,st = (1− νq(1− β))
(
K2,st
γ
− K
1−α
2,st
νβ
(
1−α
α2
)α−1
ε1−α2 +
α2−ν
νβ
ε2
)
− νε2q
(
1−β
β
)
.
We choose γ = γ1 such that economy 1’s stock of information will stay below or equal
to qτwoCst . From the proof of proposition 5.4, the codification costs then write
γ1 = K
woC
1,st
(
(KwoC1,st )
1−α
νβ
(
1− α
α2
)α−1
ε1−α1 −
α2 − ν
νβ
ε1 +
qτwoC1,st
β
)−1
.
Consequently, economy 2 will approach the following stationary-state level of informa-
tion:
C2,st = (1− νq(1− β))
(
K2,st
KwoC1,st
(
(KwoC1,st )
1−α
νβ
(
1−α
α2
)α−1
ε1−α1 − α
2−ν
νβ
ε1 +
qτwoC1,st
β
)
−K
1−α
2,st
νβ
(
1−α
α2
)α−1
ε1−α2 +
α2−ν
νβ
ε2
)
− νε2q
(
1−β
β
)
.
Using this expression, the condition for economy 2 to reach a higher stationary-state
level of output can be transformed into(
1−α
α2
)α−1 ( K2,st
KwoC1,st
(KwoC1,st )
1−αε1−α1 −K1−α2,st ε1−α2
)
− (α2 − ν)
(
K2,st
KwoC1,st
ε1 − ε2
)
+τwoC1,st
(
K2,st
KwoC1,st
νq −
(
KwoC1,st
K2,st
)α (
ε2
ε1
)1−α)
+ νε2 > 0.
14The interior solution is zero.
15Equation 5.5 is used.
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Inserting Kj,st = s
1
1−α
j,st (1− α)α
2α
1−α ε
α
1−α
j yields
α2
0@ s2,st
swoC1,st
! 1
1−α “
ε2
ε1
” α
1−α swoC1,st ε1−s2,stε2
1A−(α2−ν)
0@ s2,st
swoC1,st
! 1
1−α “
ε2
ε1
” α
1−α ε1−ε2
1A
+ νε1
1−νq
0@ s2,st
swoC1,st
! 1
1−α “
ε2
ε1
” α
1−α νq−
 
s2,st
swoC1,st
! α
1−α “
ε2
ε1
” 1−2α
1−α
1A+νε2 > 0.
From this expression, is not clear whether there are reasonable parameter values that
satisfy this condition. Let θ be one, that is, assume logarithmic utility. The saving rate
in stationary state is then a function of the discount factor, only:
sj,st =
1
δ−1j + 1
.
From KwoC1,st = KwoC2,st follows that
s1,st
s2,st
=
δ−12 + 1
δ−11 + 1
=
(
ε2
ε1
)α
.
This simplifies the condition for Y2,st > Y woC1,st to
α2s2,st
((
ε2
ε1
)α
ε1−ε2
)
−(α2−ν)(ε1−ε2)+ νε11−νq
(
νq−
(
ε2
ε1
)1−α)
+νε2 > 0.
Choosing α = 0.5 yields a quadratic term with respect to εj. Assuming a transfer rate
of q = 0.95 and a discount factor of economy 2 of δ2 = 0.7, the condition transforms into
0.237805ε1 − 0.384964√ε1ε2 + 0.147059ε2 > 0.
It will hold for all ε2 < ε1. Hence, for γ = γ1, θ = 1, α = 0.5, q = 0.95, ε2 < ε1, δ2 =
0.7, and δ1 =
(
17
7
√
ε1
ε2
− 1
)−1
, economy 2 will realize a higher level of output and, thus,
a higher level of each generation’s lifetime utility than economy 1 in the long run.16 
The intuition of proposition 5.4 is that an economy with a lower rate of time preference is
more likely to transfer consumption to the next period. Further less creative researchers
leading to a lower stationary-state level of knowledge involves a lower negative influence
of the knowledge stock on the incentive for knowledge codification. In this way, it is
clear that the individuals of this economy are willing to forgo consumption for knowledge
codification at higher costs than less patient individuals of a more sophisticated economy.
Interestingly enough, as shown in corollary 5.6, this may lead to a kind of leapfrogging,
where an initially less sophisticated economy with lower stationary-state output will
reach higher levels of output in the long run than an initially more sophisticated economy
if the codification costs stay in the respective interval for a sufficiently long time. If
thereafter the codification costs would increase again, the order of output levels would
persist due to the assumed longevity of information.
16Notice that there are also parameter values for which the condition does not hold.
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5.2 Standing on the Shoulders of Giants
The discussion of the economy’s codification behavior over time in the case of Φ = 1 will
mainly concentrate on whether the overlapping generations economy will be codifying
in the long run. “Codifying in the long run” or “codifying from some point in time on”
means that there does not exist a period t0, such that for all t > t0,4Ce,t = 0.
Proposition 5.5 With constant codification costs, an overlapping generations economy
will be codifying in the long run if either of the following conditions is satisfied:
(i) The steady-state growth rate of capital is higher than that of the knowledge stock
(or equivalently α > 0.5).
(ii) The steady-state growth rate of capital is equal to that of the knowledge stock (or
equivalently α = 0.5) and(
1−α
α2
)α−1
(εq)1−α
νβ(kwoCs )
α(1 + gwoCτ )
α2
1−α
<
1
γ
+
εq(α2 − ν)− νq
νβkwoCs (1 + g
woC
τ )
α
1−α
, (5.7)
where kwoCs is the steady-state level of kt =
Kt
τt
without codification.
Proof. We will prove this result by contradiction. The intuition is the following. No
codification implies that the economy approaches steady-state growth. It also requires
that ∀t > t0, (τt, Ct, Kt+1) /∈ U . If (i), steady-state growth causes Kt+1 to grow more
than Kt+1,crit, ∀t. If (ii), the steady-state level of k involves Kt+1 > Kt+1,crit. Hence, for
(i) and (ii), steady-state growth and no codification are contradictory implying that the
economy will be codifying in the long run.
With regard to (i), suppose an economy characterized by α > 0.5 will not be codifying in
the long run. That is, ∃t0, such that ∀t > t0, 4Ce,t = 0. Consequently, the overlapping
generations economy must approach steady-state growth where gK,s = α1−αgτ,s. α > 0.5
implies that gK,s > gτ,s. Further let 4Ce,t0 = 0. No codification in the long run means
that it is optimal for each subsequent generation to invest in capital only. Hence, ∀t > t0,
4Ce,t = Kt+1
γ
− AK1−αt+1 τ 1−αt −Bτt −max{0, Ct − qτt} ≤ 0, (5.8)
where A =
(
1−α
α2
)α−1 (εq)1−α
νβ
and B = νq−(α
2−ν)εq
νβ
> 0.
Since by assumption the economy does not codify, the maximum term can be dropped
without loss of generality,17 and the condition can be rewritten as
Kt+1
γ
≤ AK1−αt+1 τ 1−αt +Bτt.
17From 4Ce,t = 0 by assumption and τt growing at a constant rate, it follows that the maximum term
must be 0 from some point in time on. However, since max{0, Ct − qτt} ≤ (1− q)τt, we could also
estimate Bτt + max{0, Ct − qτt} from above by Dτt with an appropriate D > 0 without affecting
the results.
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For t→∞ both sides of the equation grow without bound. As the economy is growing
with constant rates in the long run, (5.8) will hold for all t if the left hand side is growing
at a rate lower than or equal to that of the right hand side. Dividing both sides by τt
and log-differentiating gives
gK,t+1 − gτ,t ≤ AK
1−α
t+1 τ
−α
t ((1− α)gK,t+1 − αgτ,t)
AK1−αt+1 τ
−α
t +B
.
Inserting the steady-state relation of the growth rates of capital and knowledge (gK,s =
α
1−αgτ,s) transforms the above inequality into
gK,s ≤ gτ,s or α ≤ 1− α.
This contradicts the presumption of gK,s > gτ,s or α > 0.5, respectively.
Consider (ii) where gK,s = gτ,s. Again suppose the economy does not codify but satisfies
(5.7). Without codification the economy approaches steady-state behavior in the long
run, which implies kt = constant. Note that with CIES-utility the steady-state equi-
librium without knowledge codification is unique. In accordance with the household’s
utility maximization, no codification in the long run involves that ∀t > t0, equation (5.8)
is satisfied. Inserting Kt+1 = kwoCs τ
α
1−α
t (1 + g
woC
τ )
α
1−α yields(
1−α
α2
)α−1
(εq)1−α
νβ(kwoCs )
α(1 + gwoCτ )
α2
1−α
≥ 1
γ
τ
2α−1
1−α
t +
εq(α2 − ν)− νq
νβkwoCs (1 + g
woC
τ )
α
1−α
.
By assumption α = 0.5 and, hence,(
1−α
α2
)α−1
(εq)1−α
νβ(kwoCs )
α(1 + gwoCτ )
α2
1−α
≥ 1
γt
+
εq(α2 − ν)− νq
νβkwoCs (1 + g
woC
τ )
α
1−α
.
This contradicts (5.7). As a consequence, the conditions of proposition 5.5 preclude that
there is a t0 such that ∀t > t0, 4Ce,t = 0. Hence, the economy will codify in the long
run. 
It is now assumed that the codification costs decline monotonically over time at a con-
stant rate gγ. We can then state the following result.
Proposition 5.6 An overlapping generations economy will be codifying in the long run
if the steady-state growth rate of knowledge exceeds that of capital by less than the rate
at which the codification costs decline.
Proof. The proof uses a similar reasoning as that of proposition 5.5. Suppose the
economy does not codify in the long run and gτ,s−gK,s < −gγ. Let 4Ce,t0 = 0. Further,
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(5.8) must hold ∀t > t0. Neglecting the maximum term in (5.8) and log-differentiating
yields
gK,t+1 − gτ,t − gγ ≤ AK
1−α
t+1 τ
−α
t ((1− α)gK,t+1 − αgτ,t)
AK1−αt+1 τ
−α
t +B
.
Without knowledge codification the economy approaches steady-state behavior. Insert-
ing the relation of the steady-state growth rates, the inequality above can be written
as
gτ,s − gK,s ≥ −gγ.
This contradicts gτ,s − gK,s < −gγ. 
It further follows:
Corollary 5.2 Every overlapping generations economy will be codifying from some point
in time on if the rate at which the codification costs decline is greater than or equal to
the steady-state growth rate of the knowledge stock.
Proof. This is a direct result of the proof of proposition 5.6 as gτ,s − gK,s ≥ −gγ can be
transformed into
α ≤ 1+
gγ
gτ,s
2+
gγ
gτ,s
, −gγ < 2gτ,s;
α ≥ 1+
gγ
gτ,s
2+
gγ
gτ,s
, −gγ > 2gτ,s.
The condition gτ,s ≤ −gγ < 2gτ,s implies that for the economy to not codify in the long
run, α must be smaller than or equal to 0. If −gγ > 2gτ,s, α must exceed 1 for zero
knowledge codification. This contradicts α ∈ (0, 1), as assumed in section 11.3.1 for all
overlapping generations economies. 
Having discussed under what conditions the economy will start to codify sometime, the
following proposition focuses on full codification, that is, at the end of each period t,
Ct+1 = τt. For simplicity of the argument, let −gγ < 2gτ,s for the remainder of the paper
without loss of generality.
Proposition 5.7 An overlapping generations economy in steady-state equilibrium that
satisfies the condition
α >
1 + gγ
gτ,s
2 + gγ
gτ,s
(5.9)
is codifying fully.
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Proof. First, as shown in the proof of proposition 5.6, an overlapping generations econ-
omy that satisfies the condition given in the above proposition will start to codify at
some point in time. The number of efficient ideas to be codified4Ce,t is chosen according
to (5.5), which can be written as
4Ce,t +max{0, Ct − qτt}
τt
=
Kt+1
τtγt
− AK1−αt+1 τ−αt −B. (5.10)
Since the economy is assumed to be in steady state, 4Ce,t must be greater than 0
(because (5.9) precludes a steady state where 4Ce,t = 0). Hence, above’s equality must
hold as long as 4Ce,t possesses an interior solution. Being in steady state, both sides of
(5.10) must grow at equal rates. Log-differentiating yields
g4Ce+max{0,C−qτ},t−gτ,t=
Kt+1
τtγt
(gK,t+1−gτ,t−gγ)− AK
1−α
t+1
ταt
[(1−α)gK,t+1−αgτ,t]
Kt+1
τtγt
− AK1−αt+1 τ−αt −B
.
Inserting the steady-state relation of the growth rates of knowledge and capital trans-
forms the above equation into
g4Ce+max{0,C−qτ},s − gτ,s =
Kt+1
τtγt
(gK,s − gτ,s − gγ)
Kt+1
τtγt
− AK1−αt+1 τ−αt −B
.
As the denominator of the right hand side is positive (because 4Ce,t > 0), the entire
fraction will be positive whenever gK,s − gτ,s − gγ > 0. The latter can be directly trans-
formed into the condition given in the proposition. The right side being positive implies
that the amount of ideas to be codified grows faster than the knowledge stock. This
violates the steady-state condition that for 4Ce,t > 0, g4Ce+max{0,C−qτ},s = gτ,s. The
only possibility to satisfy this condition is for 4Ce,t + max{0, Ct − qτt} to realize its
upper bound at (1− q)τt as a corner solution. Consequently, an economy in steady state
characterized by α >
1+
gγ
gτ,s
2+
gγ
gτ,s
must be codifying fully.
Note also that in the case of constant codification costs an economy in steady state is
codifying fully if α > 0.5, that is, if gK,s > gτ,s. 
It can then be summarized that:
Corollary 5.3 If gτ,s − gK,s 6= gγ, an overlapping generations economy in steady state
exhibits either full or zero knowledge codification in the long run.
Proof. This corollary is an immediate consequence of propositions 5.6 and 5.7. If
gτ,s − gK,s > gγ, full codification directly follows from proposition 5.7.
With regard to gτ,s − gK,s < gγ, the proof of proposition 5.6 implies that this condi-
tion is contradictory to 4Ce,t > 0, ∀t. Hence, the economy cannot realize steady-state
growth with positive codification. From proposition 5.6’s proof further follows that if an
economy shows steady-state behavior ∀t > t0 and 4Ce,t0 = 0, then 4Ce,t = 0, ∀t > t0.
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As a consequence, only steady-state growth without codification is consistent with the
condition gτ,s − gK,s < gγ. 
This section precluded possible entry costs to knowledge codification until now. The fol-
lowing proposition considers fixed entry costs that have to be paid once at the beginning
of knowledge codification as a kind of set-up costs.
Proposition 5.8 An overlapping generations economy that started to codify without
fixed entry costs to knowledge codification will also do so with fixed entry costs.
Proof. The question to be answered is whether, given the conditions under which an
overlapping generations economy without fixed entry costs would be codifying in the
long run, there is a period in which the representative household receives a higher life
time utility by paying the fixed entry costs to knowledge codification and choosing its
optimal amount of physical capital saving and knowledge codification investment than
by just investing in physical capital. This is a comparison of the situations (S1) and
(S2). (S2) can only yield higher life time utility if there is positive knowledge codifica-
tion, otherwise the fixed cost payments were just wasted. Hence, the first question is:
Would some period’s representative agent be willing to codify if she had to pay the fixed
entry costs. More precisely, would it be optimal in situation (S2) to choose a positive
amount of knowledge codification after having paid the fixed entry costs. If so, lemma
5.3 states that there must be a w∗(f) such that UCt = UwoCt and UCt > UwoCt for all
wt > w
∗(f). As w∗(f) is finite and wt will grow to infinity in the limit, this second
condition will be given from some point in time on if the first one holds.
Consequently, consider an economy in situation (S2) where the representative agent has
to pay fixed entry costs f and thereafter decides on the optimal amount of physical
capital saving and knowledge codification. The constraints of her utility maximization
problem can then be transformed into
c1,t = wnet,t(1− st − ςt),
c2,t+1 = (1 + rt+1)stwnet,t,
where wnet,t = wt − f . Suppose there will be no knowledge codification for all t. Then
the saving rate is a function of rt+1, only. As gτ,t = gwoCτ = constant and gC,t = 0, the
economy’s dynamics are reflected by
Kt+1 = stwnet,t = st(K
α
t τ
α
t F − f),
where F = (1− α)1−αα2α(εq)α(1 + gwoCτ )−α. Using kt = Kt
τ
α
1−α
t
, it writes
kt+1 = stwnet,t = stk
α
t (1 + g
woC
τ )
− α
1−αF − stfτ−
α
1−α
t (1 + g
woC
τ )
− α
1−α .
This implies that fτ
− α
1−α
t (1+ g
woC
τ )
− α
1−α is decreasing at a constant rate. As st is bound
on the interval [slow, 1), we can estimate it from above by 1. Hence, the last term of kt+1
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in the above equation becomes arbitrarily small for large enough t. Consequently the
difference equation approaches that of an economy without fixed costs in the limit. Be-
ing interested in long run behavior, this last term can be neglected for an appropriately
large t and the previous propositions apply for positive codification in (S2) in the long
run. 
Fixed entry costs that have to be paid once only delay an economy’s knowledge codifica-
tion but do not prevent it. This may be different in the case with assumption (A2). This
assumption implies that the codification decision depends on the economy’s codification
history as previous generations that did not codify accumulated entry costs for later
generations.
Proposition 5.9 An overlapping generations economy that satisfies
α >
1 + gγ
gwoCτ
2 + gγ
gwoCτ
will be codifying in the long run and independent of its codification history if either of
the following conditions holds
(i) limt→∞
u′(cwoC1,t )
u′(cwoC1,t )−u′(cC1,t)
= 0.
(ii) limt→∞
∣∣∣ u′(cwoC1,t )u′(cwoC1,t )−u′(cC1,t) ∣∣∣ =M <∞ and
α
1−αF > M
(
α(1+gK,s)
αE
1+α(kwoCs )
α−1E(1+gK,s)α−1
)
,
where E =
(
1−α
α2
)−α
(εq)α
(
1−α
α2εq
(1 + gwoCτ )− 1 + α
)
> 0
and F = (1− α)1−αα2α(εq)α(1 + gwoCτ )−α.
Proof. The proof’s reasoning is similar to that of proposition 5.8. No codification
in the long run implies that the representative agent must prefer (S1) to (S2) for all
t > t0, where t0 is large enough. In (S1) the overlapping generations economy approaches
steady-state behavior without knowledge codification. Again steady-state growth and
no knowledge codification are contradictory for the respective values of α if either (i)
or (ii) holds. As compared to the proof of proposition 5.8, an additional difficulty is
that the codification history enters the representative agents decision problem. In this
respect, independence of the codification history means that the economy would start to
codify in some period t even if it possessed no information at all, Ct = 0. This involves
the maximum entry costs in period t of γtqτt. Consequently, if the economy starts to
codify under this condition, it must do so with lower entry costs, as well.
The formal argument proceeds as follows. In a first step, we again verify that even
if the maximum entry costs had to be paid in (S2), the economy would like to codify
eventually. Second, we show that, under the conditions given in the proposition and
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given the economy would not codify, the hypothetical utility if the representative agent
chose (S2) instead of (S1) would satisfy dUCt > dUwoCt from some point in time t1 on.
Hence, there must be a t2, where UCt2 > U
woC
t2
, contradicting the assumption that the
economy does not codify in the long run. The detailed proof is provided in appendix
7.4.
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Conclusions
The first part of thesis has given a set-theoretic formulation of the notions knowledge and
information which served as a basis for the economy’s knowledge dynamics. Those were
generally characterized by imperfect knowledge transfer between generations which could
be attenuated by purposeful and costly knowledge codification. The economic problem
of knowledge codification occurs within the intermediate firm and has been depicted by
a three-stage game, in which the firm owners have to invest in knowledge codification
in the first stage before the retiring employees leave and also before the new employees
enter the firm. The latter are asked at the second stage to take over a share of the
codification costs, which they will deny because they know that at the third stage the
firm owners will decide to give access to them for free as a higher level of human capital
of the new employees would increase their profits. In this way, the firm owners will
only codify up to the profit maximizing amount, not taking into account any positive
(equilibrium) effects on the new employees’ income.
Chapter 3 developed an overlapping generations framework incorporating this problem
of intergenerational knowledge transfer by knowledge codification. We have seen that
with a specification of production by Solow-neutral technological progress, the equilib-
rium wage is independent of the amount of knowledge codification in the previous period,
suggesting that there is no hold-up problem between the firm owners and the newly hired
employees in this particular setting. However, knowledge codification may possess posi-
tive externalities on the wage levels from the next but one period on. The considerations
on the dynamics of the established overlapping generations model revealed that knowl-
edge codification may substantially increase the growth rate of an economy’s output in
the ‘standing on the shoulders of giants’ specification, respectively, enhances the level of
output in the case where each researcher generates a constant amount of ideas in each
period. The analysis addressed the question under what conditions these gains in output
due to endogenous knowledge codification will be realized in the established overlapping
generations framework.
The main results were that in the case of constant ideas per researcher and period, the
overlapping generations economy must exceed a critical level of capital in order to be
willing to codify. With the economy approaching a stationary state in the long run,
it is clear that if the stationary state level of capital is lower than the threshold-level
for knowledge codification, the economy will stay on the lower output level without
codification. Only a drop in codification costs may then induce the creation of infor-
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mation. Comparing economies with equal stationary state capital stocks, this drop in
codification costs must be even stronger the higher is an economy’s knowledge stock. In
this respect, knowledge codification may cause an initially less sophisticated economy
to realize higher utility levels in the long run than an initially more sophisticated one.
Independent of the knowledge stock, overlapping generations economies with sufficiently
low initial levels of capital will not codify at the beginning of their development. The
rather hypothetical case reflected by assumption (A2) that for an idea to be codified
the more basic ideas it builds upon have to be codified first, additionally implies a kind
of entry cost for knowledge codification. This intensifies the situation for economies
developing from low levels of capital. Clearly, every overlapping generations economy
will be codifying sometime if codification costs converge to zero. However, the latter
only holds true if there are no fixed set-up costs of knowledge codification that have to
be paid once in the first period of codification. It is always possible to find a finite level
of set-up costs that would prevent an economy from starting to codify.
With regard to the ‘standing on the shoulders of giants’ specification of the research
process, an overlapping generations economy with fixed codification costs will be cod-
ifying in the long run if the steady state growth rate of capital is higher than that of
the knowledge stock. For equal steady state growth rates of capital and knowledge, the
economy will codify if the steady state relation of capital and knowledge is large enough.
Allowing for monotonically decreasing codification costs over time, the analysis shows
that every overlapping generations economy will be codifying in the long run if the rate
at which the codification costs decline is higher than or equal to the steady state growth
rate of the knowledge stock. In this case, an overlapping generations economy that shows
steady state behavior is codifying fully. Loosely speaking, this means that the economy
is codifying every newly discovered idea in the respective period.
These results do not change when additionally considering fixed entry costs to knowledge
codification. In contrast to the case with a constant number of ideas per researcher, the
entry costs will only delay but not prevent knowledge codification. This may be differ-
ent in the case with assumption (A2), which implies that the entry costs of knowledge
codification increase as long as the economy does not codify. Whether the above con-
ditions for knowledge codification are still sufficient depends on the specific form of the
representative household’s utility function.
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Appendix
7.1 Sufficient Conditions for the Household’s
Optimization Problem
A sufficient condition for a unique maximum of the household’s optimization problem is
that the Hessian matrix at the critical points be negative definite. The Hessian matrix
writes
H =

u′′(c1,t)+δu′′(c2,t+1)(1+rt+1)2 γtu′′(c1,t)+δu′′(c2,t+1)
∂rt+1
∂4Ce,tKt+1(1+rt+1)
+δu′(c2,t+1)
∂rt+1
∂4Ce,t
γtu′′(c1,t)+δu′′(c2,t+1)
∂rt+1
∂4Ce,tKt+1(1+rt+1) γ
2
t u
′′(c1,t)+δu′′(c2,t+1)
“
∂rt+1
∂4Ce,tKt+1
”2
+δu′(c2,t+1)
∂rt+1
∂4Ce,t +δu
′(c2,t+1)
„
∂2rt+1
∂4C2e,t
Kt+1
«
 .
The eigenvalues of H will be negative at the critical points given by
M1 = −u′(c1,t) + δu′(c2,t+1)(1 + rt+1) = 0,
M2 = −γtu′(c1,t) + δu′(c2,t+1) ∂rt+1
∂4Ce,tKt+1 = 0,
which together yield
M = −γt(1 + rt+1) + ∂rt+1
∂4Ce,tKt+1 = 0,
if the first principal minor is negative and the second principal minor is positive. The
first principal minor is negative due to the concavity of Ut in Kt+1:
∂2Ut
∂K2t+1
= u′′(c1,t) + δu′′(c2,t+1)(1 + rt+1)2 < 0.
This implies a unique maximum in (S1), that is, without knowledge codification. The
second principal minor will be positive, if and only if
∂2Ut
∂K2t+1
∂2Ut
∂4C2e,t
−
(
∂2Ut
∂Kt+1∂4Ce,t
)2
> 0. (7.1)
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Using the first order conditions, we obtain
∂2Ut
∂4C2e,t
= γ2t
∂2Ut
∂K2t+1
+ δu′(c2,t+1)
∂2rt+1
∂4C2e,t
Kt+1
and
∂2Ut
∂Kt+1∂4Ce,t = γt
∂2Ut
∂K2t+1
+ δu′(c2,t+1)
∂rt+1
∂4Ce,t .
Inserting and simplifying transforms (7.1) into
∂2Ut
∂K2t+1
(
∂2rt+1
∂4C2e,t
Kt+1 − 2γt ∂rt+1
∂4Ce,t
)
> δu′(c2,t+1)
(
∂rt+1
∂4Ce,t
)2
.
The return on physical capital, rt+1, linearly depends on τt+1 and so does τt+1 on 4Ce,t.
Hence, ∂
2rt+1
∂4C2e,t = 0 and consequently
∂2Ut
∂K2t+1
(
−2γt ∂rt+1
∂4Ce,t
)
> δu′(c2,t+1)
(
∂rt+1
∂4Ce,t
)2
.
Cancelling ∂rt+1
∂4Ce,t and using M gives
−u′′(c1,t)− δu′′(c2,t+1)(1 + rt+1)2 > δ
2
u′(c2,t+1)
1 + rt+1
Kt+1
.
Further transformations yield
u′′(c2,t+1)
u′(c2,t+1)
+
1
2c2,t+1
< −u
′′(c1,t)
u′(c1,t)
1
1 + rt+1
.
This is property (c4) of the utility function. Choosing a CIES-utility function, this
inequality defines the lower bound of θ by θ > 1
2
1−st−ςt
1−ςt . This inequality is always
satisfied for θ ≥ 0.5. 
7.2 Allocation of Labor in Temporary Equilibrium
This section examines under which conditions the equilibrium allocation of labor pos-
sesses an inner solution with positive research. The result is that for Φ = 0, the inter-
mediate sector will always employ a positive number of researchers. For Φ = 1 there
may be corner solutions for certain parameter constellations.
Generally, the question is under which conditions the following equation possesses a fixed
point in (0,1):
LA,t =
1− α
α2
τt
∂τt
∂LR,t
, (7.2)
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where τt is a function of LR,t(= 1− LA,t). Due to the Inada conditions of the aggregate
production function, LA,t > 0.
First, the case Φ = 0 is considered. To examine whether LA,t ≤ 1, the intuition is that
since the right hand side of equation (7.2) is monotonically increasing in τt, there must
be a τcrit such that LA,t = 1. Consequently, the labor market realizes corner solutions
for all periods t where τt > τcrit and positive research in all periods t where τt < τcrit.
Since with Φ = 0 the economy approaches a stationary state, the allocation of labor will
possess an interior solution in the long run if τst ≤ τcrit. As τst = νβCst+νε1−νq(1−β) if Cst > qτwoCst ,
the stationary state of the knowledge stock is increasing in the stationary-state level of
information. Without an exogenous source of information, that is, C1 ≤ τ1 and with
τ1 ≤ τwCst , the maximum stationary-state level of knowledge the economy can realize
is τwCst =
νε
1−ν(q+β(1−q) . Note that τ
wC
st implies Cst = τwCst . Hence, if there is positive
research with the stock of codified ideas at its maximum, there must also be research
with less information. Inserting the maximum knowledge stock into the right hand side
of equation (7.2) gives
LA,st =
1− α
α2
ν
1− ν(q + β(1− q) .
For LA,st to be smaller than 1, we obtain the condition
q + β(1− q) < 1,
which is always satisfied for q, β ∈ (0, 1).
For Φ = 1, the considerations proceed along previous lines. That is, we ask what is
the highest level of knowledge that can be reached in each period t and then examine
the allocation in the labor market. If the respective allocation shows positive research,
we can be sure to also have an inner solution for lower levels of the knowledge stock.
Here again, the highest knowledge stock in each period t is realized with full knowledge
codification. Hence, the fixed point problem takes the following form:
LA,t =
1− α
α2
τt−1(q + β(1− q) + εq(1− LA,t))
qετt−1
.
Simple transformations yield
LA,t =
1− α
α2 + 1− α
(
q + β(1− q)
qε
+ 1
)
.
Consequently, LA,t will only be smaller than 1 if the following condition holds:
α2
1− α >
q + β(1− q)
qε
.
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7.3 Existence of Non-Trivial Steady States
In this section of the appendix, we elaborate whether the dynamical system of the
overlapping generations economy possesses non-trivial steady states. To this end, it is
necessary to distinguish between the cases where Φ = 0 and Φ = 1. In the first, it is
shown that the economy will approach stationary-state behavior in the long run. In the
case where Φ = 1, there exist different steady states with positive growth rates. It is
verified that the overlapping generations economy must exhibit steady-state behavior in
the long run in the case of zero codification. By the attribute “non-trivial”, we intend
to preclude K1 = 0 which would imply Kt = 0, ∀t. In short, we are interested in steady
states with positive physical capital and knowledge.
7.3.1 Φ = 0
For the case of Φ = 0, the dynamical system writes
Kt+1 = stK
α
t (1− α)1−αα2αεα,
τt+1 = νqτt + νβmax{0, Ct+1 − qτt}+ νε,
Ct+1 = Ct +4Cie,t +4Ce,t.
It is now shown that the overlapping generations economy characterized by this system
of difference equations will approach a stationary state in the long run. The proof pro-
ceeds in two steps. First, it is verified that the dynamical system approaches a fixed
point for any constant level of the information stock. The second step shows that the
economy’s stock of information will be constant in the long run. Accordingly, the first
claim is:
For any fixed level of the information stock Cst, the system possesses a fixed point
(Cst, τst, Kst) ∈ R+ × [τwoCst ,∞)× [KwoCst ,∞).
To verify this statement, choose an arbitrary but fixed Cst ∈ R+. A consequence of
the stock of information being fixed is 4Ce,t = 0. Therefore, the development of the
knowledge stock is independent of that of the capital stock. It is characterized by a
linear, first order difference equation, where dτt+1
dτt
∈ (0, 1). Hence, the knowledge stock
will approach a stationary state at
τst =
{
νε
1−νq , Cst ≤ qτwoCst ;
νβCst+νε
1−νq(1−β) , Cst > qτ
woC
st .
As the knowledge stock approaches a stationary point τst, the capital stock must do so
as well, because its dynamics then satisfy the following conditions for a fixed point.
If K1 > 0 and
(a) ∂st
∂rt+1
≥ 0, ∀rt+1 ≥ 0,
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(b) limKt→0 φ′(Kt) > 1,
(c) limKt→∞ φ′(Kt) = 0,
the function
φ(Kt) = Kt+1 = stK
α
t (1− α)1−αα2αεα
possesses a non-trivial fixed point.1
Condition (a) guarantees the existence of a single valued function φ(Kt) > 0,∀Kt > 0.
The reasoning is as follows. The properties (c2) and (c3) of the utility function imply
that st ≥ slow > 0.2 Hence, for every Kt > 0 there exists a φ(Kt) > 0. Uniqueness is
given if the derivative of stKαt Q with respect to φ(Kt) will be smaller than 1.3 More
precisely, if
∂st
∂rt+1
drt+1
dφ(Kt)
Kαt Q < 1,
where Q = (1− α)1−αα2αεα. This condition holds because ∂st
∂rt+1
≥ 0 and drt+1
dφ(Kt)
< 04.
Requirement (b) assures that the function φ is steeper than the 45 degree line at the
origin and (c) guarantees that there exists a fixed point φ(Kt) = Kt. The derivative of
φ(Kt) can be written as
dφ(Kt)
dKt
=
stαK
α−1
t Q
1− ∂st
∂rt+1
∂rt+1
∂φ
Kαt Q
. (7.3)
Consider first requirement (c). For Kt →∞ the numerator will approach zero. The sec-
ond term of the denominator being negative then suffices for (c) to hold. However, it is
not immediately clear from equation (7.3) whether (b) holds. A simple argument is the
following. As (b) is supposed to guarantee that the graph of φ(Kt) is above the bisecting
line for Kt → 0, the condition can be written as stKαt Q > Kt or stKα−1t Q > 1, respec-
tively. Since st ∈ [slow, 1) and Q > 0, the condition must hold for all Kt close enough to
0. This completes the proof that the economy will reach a stationary state for fixed Cst.5
1The argument follows Galor and Ryder (1989).
2More intuitively: If, as assumed in (c3), the substitution effect prevails when rt+1 changes, the lowest
the savings rate will become is when rt+1 = 0. That is, slow solves u′(wt(1 − slow) − γ4Ct) =
δu′(slowwt). Due to the ‘no starvation’ requirement or Inada conditions (c2), slow must be greater
than 0. Note that (c2) also implies that st < 1.
3The condition is derived from the implicit function theorem.
4Since rt+1 = Kα−1t+1 E, where E =
(
1−α
α2
)−α
εα
(
τst
1−α
α2ε − 1 + α
)
> 0, the derivative shows the form
drt+1
dφ(Kt)
= (α− 1)φα−2E < 0
5Note that as τst ≥ τwoCst and ∂st∂rt+1
∂rt+1
∂τt
≥ 0 it follows that Kst ≥ KwoCst = swoCst (1− α)α
2α
1−α ε
α
1−α .
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The next step is to show that the economy’s stock of information must be constant in
the long run. As a consequence, the overlapping generations economy characterized by
Φ = 0 will eventually approach a stationary state.
Recall that the economy’s information will not decline by assumption and can only
increase in a period t if τt > Ct. It is then necessary to distinguish whether the initial
stock of information C1 exceeds τwCst . If it does, the economy must have inherited
information from some exogenous source.
Let’s first consider the case C1 ≤ τwCst . As the highest level of knowledge the economy
can realize will then be τwCst , (Ct)t∈Z is a monotonically increasing and bounded sequence.
Consequently, it must converge to supt∈ZCt = Cst ≤ τwCst .
If C1 > τwCst , the knowledge stock will approach a stationary-state level at τst(Cst) =
νβCst+νε
1−νq(1−β) < Cst. Consider τ1 < C1. The knowledge stock then monotonically approaches
τst(C1) < C1. Hence, ∀t, τt < C1, and consequently, ∀t, Ct = C1 = Cst. Let’s turn to
τ1 > C1 > τ
wC
st . An interpretation of this initial situation could be that the economy has
previously reached a higher knowledge level due to better knowledge transfer capabilities
or a higher creativity. Since τst(Ct) < Ct, ∀Ct > τwCst , there must exist a period t0, where
τt < Ct, ∀t > t0. Hence, (Ct)t∈Z is bound from above and supt∈ZCt = Ct0 = Cst. 
7.3.2 Φ = 1
For Φ = 1, the overlapping generations economy is characterized by the following system
of difference equations:
Kt+1 = stK
α
t (1− α)1−αα2α(εq)αταt−1,
τt+1 = νqτt + νβ(4Ce,t +max{0, Ct − qτt}) + νεqτt,
Ct+1 = Ct +4Cie,t +4Ce,t.
The respective growth rates are
gK,t = stK
α−1
t (1− α)1−αα2α(εq)αταt−1 − 1,
gτ,t = νq + νβ
4Ce,t +max{0, Ct − qτt}
τt
+ νεq − 1,
gC,t =
4Cie,t +4Ce,t
Ct
.
The growth rates change from one period to the next according to
dgK,t = stK
α−1
t (1− α)1−αα2α(εq)αταt−1(gs,t − (1− α)gK,t + αgτ,t−1),
dgτ,t = νβ
4Ce,t +max{0, Ct − qτt}
τt
(g4Ce+max{0,C−qτ},t − gτ,t),
dgC,t =
4Cie,t +4Ce,t
Ct
(g4Cie+4Ce,t − gC,t).
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Being defined by constant growth rates, steady states imply (dgK,t, dgτ,t, dgC,t) = (0, 0, 0), ∀t.
Consequently, there are two kinds of non-trivial steady states:
(1) Steady state without knowledge codification
If the economy does not codify,4Ce,t+max{0, Ct−qτt} = 0 and4Cie,t+4Ce,t = 0.
This implies gC,s = 0 and gτ,s = gwoCτ .
As st is bound on [slow, 1), the saving rate cannot grow at a constant rate other than
0. Consequently, gK,s = α1−αgτ,s. Therefore, a steady state without codification is
characterized by
gK,s =
α
1− αgτ,s,
gτ,s = g
woC
τ = νq(1 + ε)− 1,
gC,s = 0.
(2) Steady state with knowledge codification
Positive knowledge codification implies 4Ce,t > 0. Therefore, the overlapping
generations economy can only realize steady-state behavior if gC,s = g4Cie+4Ce,s
and gτ,s = g4Ce+max{0,C−qτ},s. By the same argument with respect to the saving
rate as in the case with zero codification, the steady-state relation of the growth
rates of capital and knowledge will be gK,s = α1−αgτ,s. Consequently, steady states
with positive knowledge codification imply
gK,s =
α
1− αgτ,s,
gτ,s = g4Ce+max{0,C−qτ},s,
gC,s = g4C,s,
where 4Ct = 4Cie,t +4Ce,t. Note that a steady state with full codification is a
special case where gτ,s = gwCτ = g4Ce+max{0,C−qτ},s = gC,s = g4C,s = ν(q(1 + ε) +
β(1− q))− 1.
We will now show that without knowledge codification, the overlapping generations econ-
omy will approach a non-trivial steady state.6
Let kt := Kt
τ
α
1−α
t
. Knowing that in steady state gK,s = α1−αgτ,s, kt = constant, ∀t, is
a necessary condition for the economy to be in steady state. Assuming no knowledge
6Galor and Ryder (1989) have shown that for any feasible set of well-behaved preferences there exists
a production function that satisfies the Inada conditions under which the overlapping generations
economy experiences global contraction and the steady-state equilibrium is characterized by the
absence of production and consumption.
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codification implies gC,t = 0 and gτ,t = gwoCτ = constant. In this case, kt = constant is
also a sufficient condition for steady-state behavior of the economy.
Hence, the economy’s dynamics can be summarized by the following first order difference
equation:
φ(kt) = kt+1 =
Kt+1
τ
α
1−α
t+1
= stk
α
t Q˜,
where Q˜ = (1 + gwoCτ )
−α(2−α)
1−α (1 − α)1−αα2α(εq)α. To verify that the overlapping gen-
erations economy experiences a non-trivial steady-state equilibrium we use the same
conditions as in the case of Φ = 0. That is, k1 > 0 and
(a) ∂st
∂rt+1
≥ 0, ∀rt+1 ≥ 0,
(b) limkt→0 φ′(kt) > 1,
(c) limkt→∞φ′(kt) = 0.
Again condition (a) guarantees that for every kt > 0 there exists a unique φ(kt) > 0.
φ(kt) > 0 follows from st ≥ slow > 0 and uniqueness is given if
∂st
∂rt+1
drt+1
dφ(kt)
kαt Q˜ < 1.
As ∂st
∂rt+1
≥ 0 and drt+1
dφ(kt)
< 0 this condition is satisfied.7
With regard to requirements (b) and (c), the derivative of φ(kt) is written as
dφ(kt)
dkt
=
stαk
α−1
t Q˜
1− ∂st
∂rt+1
∂rt+1
∂φ
kαt Q˜
.
Requirement (c) holds as the numerator will approach zero for kt →∞ and the second
term of the denominator is negative. By rewriting condition (b) as stkα−1t Q˜ > 1, it be-
comes clear that the inequality must hold for all kt close enough to 0 since st ∈ [slow, 1)
and Q˜ > 0.
Hence, the three conditions for the existence of a non-trivial fixed point are satisfied.
Uniqueness and continuity of φ(kt) together with requirements (b) and (c) imply that
7It is possible to write rt+1 = kα−1t+1 E˜, where E˜ =
(
1−α
α2
)−α (εq)α(1 +
gwoCτ )
−α
(
1−α
α2εq (1 + g
woC
τ )− 1 + α
)
> 0. Since gwoCτ = constant, the derivative shows the
form drt+1dφ(kt) = (α− 1)φα−2E˜ < 0.
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an economy with zero codification will show steady-state growth in the long run. 
With CIES-utility, the representative household’s saving rate without knowledge codifi-
cation can be written as
st =
1
δ−
1
θ (1 + kα−1t+1 E˜)
θ−1
θ + 1
, (7.4)
where E˜ =
(
1−α
α2
)−α
(εq)α(1 + gwoCτ )
−α
(
1−α
α2εq
(1 + gwoCτ )− 1 + α
)
> 0. Consequently, a
steady state implies
δ−
1
θ (1 + (kwoCs )
α−1E˜)
θ−1
θ + 1) = (kwoCs )
α−1Q˜. (7.5)
This equation possesses a unique solution for kwoCs . Hence, the economy’s steady state
without knowledge codification is unique.
7.4 Proof of Proposition 5.9
As mentioned in section 5.2 the proof comprises two steps. In a first step, it is necessary
to verify that in situation (S2) the representative household invests in a positive level
of knowledge codification in the long run. Only in this case a comparison of utilities
between situations (S1) and (S2) makes sense. This comparison is subject to the second
part of the proof, showing that from some point in time on, utility is growing stronger
in (S2) with knowledge codification than in (S1) without knowledge codification. This
implies that there must be a period in which the economy will start to codify.
(1) The first part of the proof uses a similar reasoning as the proof of proposition 5.8.
Consider an economy in (S2) where the representative agent pays fixed costs γtqτt and
thereafter decides on the optimal amount of physical capital saving and knowledge cod-
ification. The constraints of her utility maximization problem can then be transformed
into
c1,t = wnet,t(1− st − ςt),
c2,t+1 = (1 + rt+1)stwnet,t.
Suppose the economy will not be codifying for all t. Then the saving rate is a function of
rt+1 only. As gτ,t = gwoCτ = constant and gC,t = 0, the economy’s dynamics are reflected
by
Kt+1 = stwnet,t = st(K
α
t τ
α
t F − γtqτt).
Using kt = Kt
τ
α
1−α
t
, it writes
kt+1 = stwnet,t = stk
α
t (1 + g
woC
τ )
− α
1−αF − stγtqτ
1−2α
1−α
t (1 + g
woC
τ )
− α
1−α .
The condition
α >
1 + gγ
gτ,s
2 + gγ
gτ,s
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can be transformed into
gγ <
2α− 1
1− α g
woC
τ .
This implies that
γtqτ
1−2α
1−α
t (1 + g
woC
τ )
− α
1−α
is decreasing at a constant rate. We are now in a position to apply the following line of
argument again: As st is bound on the interval [slow, 1), it can be estimated from above
by 1. Hence, the last term of kt+1 in the above equation becomes arbitrarily small for
large enough t. Consequently the difference equation approaches that of an economy
without entry costs in the limit. Being interested in long-term behavior, this last term
can be neglected for sufficiently large t and proposition 5.6 implies positive codification
in (S2) in the long run.
(2) The representative agent decides to codify if (S2)-utility, UCt , is higher than (S1)-
utility, UwoCt . Consequently, the question is whether the economy that is currently not
codifying (that is with full accumulation of entry costs and gτ,t = gwoCτ ) and with C1 = 0
will reach a period t in which UCt > UwoCt . This writes
u(cwoC1,t ) + δu(c
woC
2,t+1) < u(c
C
1,t) + δu(c
C
2,t+1).
As utility is unbound in consumption, the economy will be codifying if (S2)-utility
(the right hand side) is permanently increasing more than (S1)-utility (the left hand
side). Assuming that the economy chooses (S1) in every period, we will drop the bar as
notational distinction of (S1)-saving, K¯t+1 = Kt+1. However, we still indicate the choice
that the representative agent would make in (S2) by Kˆt+1,4Cˆe,t:
u′(cwoC1,t )(dwt − dKt+1) + δu′(cwoC2,t+1)
(
∂cwoC2,t+1
∂Kt+1
dKt+1 +
∂cwoC2,t+1
∂τt+1
∂τt+1
∂τt
dτt
)
< u′(cC1,t)(dwt − dKˆt+1 − γtd4Cˆe,t −4Cˆe,tdγt − γtd4Cie,t −4Cie,tdγt)
+ δu′(cC2,t+1)
(
∂cC2,t+1
∂Kˆt+1
dKˆt+1 +
∂cC2,t+1
∂4Ce,td4Cˆe,t +
∂cC2,t+1
∂τt+1
∂τt+1
∂τt
dτt
)
.
In this way, second period consumption is interpreted as a function of Kt+1, τt and
4Ce,t. Bringing together all terms with dKt+1, dKˆt+1, d4Cˆe,t and using the first order
conditions simplifies above’s expression to
u′(cwoC1,t )dwt + δu
′(cwoC2,t+1)
∂cwoC2,t+1
∂τt
dτt < u
′(cC1,t)(dwt −4Cˆe,tdγt − γtd4Cie,t −4Cie,tdγt)
+δu′(cC2,t+1)
∂cC2,t+1
∂τt
dτt.
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Using the first order conditions once again yields
u′(cwoC1,t )
(
dwt +
1
1+rwoCt+1
∂cwoC2,t+1
∂τt
dτt
)
< u′(cC1,t)
(
dwt −4Cˆe,tdγt − γtd4Cie,t −4Cie,tdγt
+
γt
∂rCt+1
∂4Ce,t Kˆt+1
∂cC2,t+1
∂τt
dτt
)
.
Mathematical transformations give
dwt > −
u′(cC1,t)
u′(cwoC1,t )− u′(cC1,t)
(4Cˆe,tdγt + γtd4Cie,t +4Cie,tdγt)
+
u′(cC1,t)
u′(cwoC1,t )−u′(cC1,t)
 γt
∂rCt+1
∂4Cˆe,t
Kˆt+1
∂cC2,t+1
∂τt
dτt
 (7.6)
− u′(cwoC1,t )
u′(cwoC1,t )−u′(cC1,t)
(
1
1+rwoCt+1
∂cwoC2,t+1
∂τt
dτt
)
.
With respect to (S1), we have τt+1 = (1 + gwoCτ )τt. It is then possible to write
rwoCt+1 = K
α−1
t+1 τ
α
t E,
where E =
(
1−α
α2
)−α
(εq)α
(
1−α
α2εq
(1 + gwoCτ )− 1 + α
)
> 0. As a consequence,
1
1 + rwoCt+1
∂cwoC2,t+1
∂τt
=
αKα−1t+1 τ
α−1
t E
1 +Kα−1t+1 τ
α
t E
.
In (S2), τt+1 = (1 + gwoCτ )τt + νβ4Cˆe,t.8 Then
cC2,t+1 = Kˆt+1(1 + Kˆ
α−1
t+1 τ
α−1
t Gνβ4Cˆe,t + (gwoCτ − α)Kˆα−1t+1 ταt G),
where G =
(
1−α
α2
)1−α
(εq)α−1. It follows that
∂rCt+1
∂4Cˆe,t
= Kˆα−1t+1 τ
α−1
t Gνβ
and
∂cC2,t+1
∂τt
= (α− 1)Kˆα−1t+1 τα−2t Gνβ4Cˆe,t + α(gwoCτ − α)Kˆαt+1τα−1t G.
8Notice that max{0, Ct − qτt} = 0 as Ct = 0 by assumption.
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Inserting this into equation (7.6), gives
dwt
dτt
> − u
′(cC1,t)
u′(cwoC1,t )− u′(cC1,t)
4Cˆe,tdγt + γtd4Cie,t +4Cie,tdγt
dτt
+
u′(cC1,t)
(u′(cwoC1,t )−u′(cC1,t))
γt
(
(α− 1)4Cˆe,t
τt
+ (gwoCτ − α) ανβ
)
− u′(cwoC1,t )
(u′(cwoC1,t )−u′(cC1,t))
(
αKαt+1τ
α−1
t E
1+Kα−1t+1 τ
α
t E
)
.
As 4Cˆe,t must be smaller than (1− q)τt, it can be estimated by ξτt, with an appropriate
ξ ∈ [0, 1−q]. Further wt = Kαt ταt F and hence dwtdτt =
Kαt τ
α−1
t F (αgK,t+αg
woC
τ )
gwoCτ
> 0. Cancelling
Kαt τ
α−1
t yields
F (αgK,t+αg
woC
τ )
gwoCτ
> −τ
1−α
t γt
Kαt
u′(cC1,t)
u′(cwoC1,t )− u′(cC1,t)
(qgwoCτ + (q + ξ)gγ)
gwoCτ
+
τ1−αt γt
Kαt
u′(cC1,t)
u′(cwoC1,t )−u′(cC1,t)
(
(α− 1)ξ + (gwoCτ − α) ανβ
)
− u′(cwoC1,t )
u′(cwoC1,t )−u′(cC1,t)
(
α(1+gK,t)
αE
1+αKα−1t ταt E(1+gK,t)α−1
)
.
Approaching steady-state behavior without knowledge codification in the long run, the
limit of the left hand side will be a positive constant, α
1−αF . So will the last term of the
third summand, because Kα−1t ταt = k
α−1
t is constant in steady state. As a consequence,
if
lim
t→∞
u′(cwoC1,t )
u′(cwoC1,t )− u′(cC1,t)
= 0, (7.7)
the last term on the right hand side approaches 0 in the limit. It also implies that
limt→∞
u′(cwoC1,t )
u′(cC1,t)
= 0 and hence
lim
t→∞
∣∣∣∣∣ u′(cC1,t)u′(cwoC1,t )− u′(cC1,t)
∣∣∣∣∣ = 1.
The condition
α >
1 + gγ
gwoCτ
2 + gγ
gwoCτ
guarantees that τ
1−α
t γt
Kαt
is declining to zero. Consequently, the first two terms will also
approach zero in the long run,9 such that dUCt > dUwoCt from some point in time t1 on.
9It should not go without mention that in case the economy reaches the upper bound 4Cˆe,t =
(1 − q)τt in (S2), the last term in the second summand will write αKˆ
α
t+1τ
α−1
t Eˆ
1+Kˆα−1t+1 τ
α
t Eˆ
, where Eˆ =(
1−α
α2
)−α (εq)α ( 1−αα2εq (1 + gwCτ )− 1 + α). As this term is positive, the second summand will be
negative and consequently the conditions (i) and (ii) still suffice for knowledge codification in the
long run.
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Hence, there will be a period t2 > t1, where UCt2 > U
woC
t2
. Or with regard to lemma 5.3,
without knowledge codification the economy’s savings Kt+1 will exceed K¯t+1,crit for all
t ≥ t2. This implies that t2 denotes the first period of codification.
With regard to (ii), if the limit in (7.7) is greater than zero but finite, it follows that
the limit of the relation of marginal utilities in the first two terms must be finite as well.
Consequently, with the respective α as given above, only the last term will not approach
zero in the long run and the inequality reduces to condition (ii). 
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Part II
Notes on the Robustness of the
Results
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Chapter 8
Robustness with Respect to Assumptions on
Technological Change
The question raised in this chapter is whether the results of the basic model depend
on the assumption of Solow-neutral technological progress or carry over to other spec-
ifications of technological change. For this purpose, we use the model specification as
introduced in the first part of the thesis with the only difference that the production
function of the intermediate good is altered in a way so as to allow for different weights
of the knowledge stock. After deriving the new equilibria and describing the economy’s
general dynamics, the effects of relaxing the assumption of Solow-neutral technological
change on the curvature of the return on capital in the amount of knowledge codifica-
tion and its consequences for the sufficient conditions of the household’s maximization
problem are discussed. It will then be shown that by sufficiently restricting the param-
eter range for the weight of the knowledge stock in intermediate goods production, the
more general model exhibits the same structure as the basic one of the first part of the
dissertation and the main results apply.
8.1 The New Production Function of Intermediate
Goods
Let aggregate production unchanged:
F (xt, LA,t) = x
α
t L
1−α
A,t .
The only difference to the basic model is that the production function of the intermediate
good is characterized by
xt = Ktτ
ψ
α
t .
In this way, ψ reflects the assumptions on technological progress. In particular, ψ =
α would represent capital augmenting or Solow-neutral technological progress, ψ =
1 − α labor-augmenting or Harrod-neutral technological progress and ψ = 1 Hicks-
neutral technological progress. The necessary condition of the intermediate firm’s profit
maximization problem in its general form can be written as in the basic model with
Solow-neutral technological progress:
wR,t = α
2xα−1t
∂xt
∂LR,t
L1−αA,t .
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Considering that xt = Ktτ
ψ
α
t gives
wR,t = αK
α
t ψτ
ψ−1
t
∂τt
∂LR,t
L1−αA,t .
For ψ < 1, this yields the following demand for researchers and supply of intermediate
goods:1
xst =
(
α2 ∂xt
∂LR,t
wR,t
) 1
1−α
LA,t,
LdR,t = K
α
1−ψ
t
(
αψ
wR,t
) 1
1−ψ
(
∂τt
∂LR,t
) ψ
1−ψ
L
1−α
1−ψ
A,t −
1
∂τt
∂LR,t
(qτt−1 + βmax{0, Ct − qτt−1}).
In case of Hicks-neutral technological progress (ψ = 1), every researcher’s contribution
to profits is constant, given Kt and LA,t. Hence the intermediate entrepreneur would
employ as many researchers as possible at wages smaller than wR,t = αKα−1t ∂τt∂LR,tL
1−α
A,t .
She would be indifferent with respect to the number of researchers to hire if the equilib-
rium wage equals wR,t and would hire zero researchers if wages are higher than wR,t.
The profits of the intermediate entrepreneur accrue to
piintt = αK
α
t L
1−α
A,t τ
ψ
t
(
1− ψτ−1t
∂τt
∂LR,t
LR,t
)
=: Ktrt.
We did not insert LR,t into the profit function for two reasons: First, for clarity in
exposition and second, that it also includes the case of ψ = 1. In this generality the
return on physical capital investment writes
rt = αK
α−1
t L
1−α
A,t τ
ψ
t
(
1− ψτ−1t
∂τt
∂LR,t
LR,t
)
. (8.1)
8.2 Sequential Markets Equilibrium
Again, the focus will be on the sequential markets equilibrium as specified by definition
4.1. In order to receive the equilibrium prices and allocations, the focus will first be
on the labor market equilibrium which requires that Lst = LdA,t + LdR,t. Consider the
1The second order condition for a maximum is satisfied as ∂
2piintt
∂L2R,t
< 0. In particular, ∂
2piintt
∂L2R,t
=
α2(α − 1)xα−2t
(
∂xt
∂LR,t
)2
L1−αA,t + α
2xα−1t
∂2xt
∂L2R,t
L1−αA,t . Using
∂xt
∂LR,t
= Kt ψα τ
ψ
α−1
t
∂xt
∂LR,t
and ∂
2xt
∂L2R,t
=
Kt
ψ
α
(
ψ
α − 1
)
τ
ψ
α−2
t
(
∂xt
∂LR,t
)2
, the condition for the second derivative of piintt with respect to LR,t to
be negative simplifies to ψ < 1. For ψ = 1, the solution to the intermediate firms profit maximization
problem is not unique.
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case ψ < 1. Inserting labor demand of the representative final-goods firm and the
intermediate entrepreneur gives
Lst = K
α
1−ψ
t
(
ψα
wt
) 1
1−ψ
(
∂τt
∂LR,t
) ψ
1−ψ
((
1− α
wt
) 1
α
Ktτ
ψ
α
t
) 1−α
1−ψ
− 1
∂τt
∂LR,t
(qτt−1 + βmax{0, Ct − qτt−1}) +
(
(1− α)
wt
) 1
α
Ktτ
ψ
α
t .
Using Lst = 1, transformations yield
wt = (1− α)1−αKαt (ψα)ατψ−αt
(
∂τt
∂LR,t
)α
and
LA,t =
1− α
ψα
τt
∂τt
∂LR,t
.
This implies an equilibrium allocation of labor given by
LA,t = min
{
1,
1− α
ψα + 1− α
(
1 +
qτt−1 + βmax{0, Ct − qτt−1}
∂τt
∂LR,t
)}
,
LR,t = max
{
0,
ψα
ψα + 1− α
(
1− qτt−1 + βmax{0, Ct − qτt−1}
∂τt
∂LR,t
)}
.
Consequently, the equilibrium wage calculates to
wt = (1− α)1−α
(
ψαKt
∂τt
∂LR,t
)α (
ν
(
qτt−1 + βmax{0, Ct − qτt−1}+ ∂τt∂LR,t
))ψ−α
, (8.2)
where ν = ψα
ψα+1−α .
For ψ = 1, the intermediate entrepreneur offers wage wR,t that is independent of LR,t.
In equilibrium, the market either realizes a corner solution at LA,t = 1 or the wages in
final-goods production and in the research sector are equal. The latter implies
wR,t = αK
α
t ψτ
ψ−1
t
∂τt
∂LR,t
L1−αA,t = (1− α)L−αA,tKαt τψt = wA,t.
This equation transforms to
LA,t =
1− α
ψα
τt
∂τt
∂LR,t
. (8.3)
In fact, inserting the respective terms for τt and ∂τt∂LR,t yields equation (8.2). Hence, the
equilibrium wage shows the same form as for ψ < 1. In this way, the case ψ = 1 does
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not have to be distinguished any further.
With regard to possible corner solutions, the case Φ = 0 implies that there will be
positive research in each period.2 For Φ = 1, the share of researchers will be positive if
the following condition holds:3
ψα
1− α >
q + β(1− q)
qε
.
It is assumed in the following that the above condition is satisfied.
Turning to the intermediate goods market, the market clearing condition implies
xdt =
(
α
px,t
) 1
1−α
LA,t =
(
α2 ∂xt
∂LR,t
wt
) 1
1−α
LA,t = x
s
t .
Using the equilibrium wage, this condition can be written as
px,t = α
α
(
Ktψ
∂τt
∂LR,t
)α−1
(1− α)1−ατ (ψ−α)
α−1
α
t ,
and with the equilibrium number of researchers in temporary equilibrium:
px,t = (1− α)1−ααα
(
Kt
ψ
1−α
∂τt
∂LR,t
)α−1 (
ν
(
qτt−1 + βmax{0, Ct − qτt−1}+ dτtdLR,t
))(ψ−α)α−1
α
.
Let the homogeneous consumption good be the numéraire and abbreviate Tt := qτt−1 +
βmax{0, Ct − qτt−1} + dτtdLR,t . In this way, the sequential market equilibrium is charac-
terized by the following price vector:
{px,t,wt}∞t=1=
(
1, (1−α)1−ααα
„
Kt
ψ
1−α
∂τt
∂LR,t
«α−1
(νTt)
(ψ−α)α−1α , (1−α)1−α
„
ψαKt
∂τt
∂LR,t
«α
(νTt)ψ−α
)∞
t=1
.
8.3 Dynamics
With the more general assumptions on technological change the difference equation of
the capital stock now writes
Kt+1 = stK
α
t (1− α)1−α(ψα)ατψ−αt
(
∂τt
∂LR,t
)α
,
and the growth rate of physical capital is
gK,t = stK
α−1
t (1− α)1−α(ψα)ατψ−αt
(
∂τt
∂LR,t
)α
− 1.
2If C1 ≤ τ1 ≤ τwCst .
3The proof is identical to the one in the basic model.
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Using the equilibrium number of researchers, the knowledge stock transforms to
τt+1 = ν(qτt + β(max{0, Ct+1 − qτt}) + ε(qτt)Φ),
where ν = ψα
ψα+1−α .
Consequently, knowledge grows at the following rate:
gτ,t = ν
(
q + β
max{0, Ct+1 − qτt}
τt
+ εqΦτΦ−1t
)
− 1.
The difference equation of the stock of information remains unchanged:
Ct+1 = Ct +4Ct, 4Ct ≥ 0.
Again the two cases in which the researchers are not codifying at all and that in which
they are codifying every new idea in each period are indexed by ”woC” and ”wC”, re-
spectively.4 For Φ = 1, the economy realizes long run growth. The growth rates of
knowledge with full and zero knowledge codification are constant:
gwoCτ = νq(1 + ε)− 1,
gwCτ = ν(q(1 + ε) + β(1− q))− 1.
As negative knowledge codification and codification of ideas that have not yet been dis-
covered are precluded by assumption, gτ,t ∈ [gwoCτ , gwCτ ], ∀t.
Physical capital grows at the following rate:
gK,t = stK
α−1
t (1− α)1−α(ψαεq)ατψt (1 + gτ,t−1)−α − 1.
Note that another codified idea would increase both, the growth rate of knowledge gτ,t−1
and the knowledge stock τt. The former, however, shows a negative exponent. It is hence
not clear whether knowledge codification generally increases the growth rate of physical
capital. As shown in appendix 8A.2, the system of difference equations possesses two
kinds of steady states distinguished by whether the economy exhibits positive or zero
knowledge codification. An economy that does not codify at all will approach steady-
state behavior in the long run. Both kinds of steady states show the same relation of
growth rates of capital and knowledge:
gK,s =
ψ
1− αgτ,s.
With regard to output, we can write
Yt = F (Kt, LA,t, τt) = K
α
t τ
ψ
t
(
1− α
ψαεq
)1−α
(1 + gτ,t−1)1−α.
4Recall that with C1 = 0, the maximum term in the difference equation of the knowledge stock will
be zero in the first case and in the latter, Ct = τt−1 in each period.
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As in the basic model of the first part, the steady-state growth rate of output equals
that of physical capital:
gY,s = gK,s =
ψ
1− αgτ,s.
Note that with the growth rate of output being equal to that of physical capital in
steady state, a possible negative effect of knowledge codification on physical capital
growth would carry over to the economy’s output growth rate.
For Φ = 0 the economy will approach a stationary state in the long run.5 In the
cases of full or zero knowledge codification, the economy would approach the following
stationary-state levels of knowledge:
τwCst =
νε
1− ν(q + β(1− q)) ,
τwoCst =
νε
1− νq .
As in the basic model, the focus will be on endogenous knowledge codification and, hence,
on the case C1 < τwCst . For initial values C1 < τwCst , the system realizes τst ∈ [τwoCst , τwCst ].
The economy’s physical capital stock in stationary state writes
Kst = s
1
1−α
st (1− α)(ψαε)
α
1−α τ
ψ−α
1−α
st .
This leads to a stationary-state level of output according to
Yst = s
α
1−α
st (1− α)(ψαε)
2α−1
1−α τ
ψ−α
1−α+1
st . (8.4)
Here again, the stationary-state knowledge stock’s exponent may be negative and, hence,
a negative influence of knowledge codification on the economy’s output level cannot be
precluded. This issue will be further discussed in section 8.4.1 and in chapter 12 on
social optimality.
8.4 Knowledge Codification
Having only changed the production function of the intermediate good, the problem
of the representative household remains the same. Therefore, an inner solution to the
utility maximization problem has to satisfy the equality of the marginal returns to
physical capital and knowledge codification:
γt(1 + rt+1) =
∂rt+1
∂4Ce,tKt+1. (8.5)
5See appendix 8A.2.
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When using the equilibrium allocation of labor, the return on physical capital in t + 1
writes
rt+1 = K
α−1
t+1 L
−α
A,t+1τ
ψ
t+1(LA,t+1 − 1 + α) (8.6)
= Kα−1t+1 τ
ψ−α
t+1
(
1−α
ψα
)−α (
∂τt+1
∂LR,t+1
)α(
τt+1
(
1−α
ψα
)(
∂τt+1
∂LR,t+1
)−1
− 1 + α
)
.
The particular problem of the case ψ 6= α is that (8.5) cannot be solved for 4Ce,t
explicitly. Therefore, we define
M(Kt+1,4Ce,t, τt, Ct) = ∂rt+1
∂4Ce,tKt+1 − γt(1 + rt+1) = 0.
Further let
rt+1 = K
α−1
t+1 τ
ψ
t+1f(LA,t+1),
where f(LA,t+1) = L−αA,t+1(LA,t+1 − 1 + α), and
∂rt+1
∂4Ce,tKt+1 = K
α
t+1τ
ψ−1
t+1 g(LA,t+1),
where g(LA,t+1) = νβL−αA,t+1 ((ψ − α+ 1)LA,t+1 − (1− α)(ψ − α)). Appendix 8A.3 veri-
fies that ∂rt+1
∂4Ce,t > 0 for Φ = 1 and in the case of Φ = 0, if ψ ≤ α. For ψ > α and Φ = 0,
the derivative may be negative for very small values of the knowledge stock, however
must be positive from some point in time on. The following does not account for this
special case. When considering ψ > α and Φ = 0 it is assumed that the knowledge stock
is large enough.
However, it is possible in the more general setting that the return on physical capital is
strictly convex in the amount of knowledge codification. This is subject to the following
lemma.
Lemma 8.1
∂2rt+1
∂4C2e,t
=

< 0, ψ < α;
= 0, ψ = α;
> 0, ψ > α.
Proof. Calculating the second derivative gives
∂2rt+1
∂4C2e,t = (ψ − α+ 1)(ψ − α)τ
ψ−α−1
t+1 K
α−1
t+1
(
1−α
ψα
)1−α (
∂τt+1
∂LR,t+1
)α−1 (
∂τt+1
∂4Ce,t
)2
−(1− α)(ψ − α)(ψ − α− 1)τψ−α−2t+1 Kα−1t+1
(
1−α
ψα
)−α (
∂τt+1
∂LR,t+1
)α (
∂τt+1
∂4Ce,t
)2
.
It is obvious that ∂
2rt+1
∂4C2e,t = 0 for ψ = α. In the cases where ψ 6= α, the second derivative
is smaller than 0 if
(ψ − α+ 1)(ψ − α)τt+1 < (ψ − α− 1)(ψ − α)ψα ∂τt+1
∂LR,t+1
.
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The inequality holds for ψ < α. In contrast, ψ > α violates this condition and satisfies
that for ∂
2rt+1
∂4C2e,t > 0. 
The convexity for ψ > α is due to the specification of the amount of newly discovered
ideas per researcher to not depend on the ideas acquired by utilizing the information
stock but only on those that have been exogenously transferred. In this way, knowledge
codification increases the share of workers which increases the equilibrium price of the
intermediate good and consequently the profits. This effect is stronger than the negative
effect on profits by less research due to a smaller share of researchers. For increasing
returns on physical capital in knowledge codification it may even be the case that the
marginal benefit of knowledge codification increases stronger than its opportunity costs,
which means that ∂M
∂4Ce,t > 0. This raises the question as to whether the household’s
maximization problem still allows for an inner solution. According to appendix 8A.1, it is
necessary for the household’s second order conditions to hold that ∂M
∂4Ce,t − γt
∂rt+1
∂4Ce,t < 0.
The following lemma elaborates on the relation between ∂M
∂4Ce,t and
∂M
∂4Ce,t − γt
∂rt+1
∂4Ce,t
from a long run perspective with constant growth rates.
Lemma 8.2 If ψ > α and gK , gτ , gγ > 0 are constant with gτ + gγ 6= gK, then in the
long run either
(i) ∂M
∂4Ce,t < 0 and
∂M
∂4Ce,t − γt
∂rt+1
∂4Ce,t < 0
or
(ii) ∂M
∂4Ce,t > 0 and
∂M
∂4Ce,t − γt
∂rt+1
∂4Ce,t > 0.
With constant growth rates, it is possible that ∂M
∂4Ce,t > 0 and
∂M
∂4Ce,t − γt
∂rt+1
∂4Ce,t < 0, if
and only if gτ + gγ = gK.
Proof. ∂M
∂4Ce,t can be written as
∂M
∂4Ce,t = (ψ − α)(νβ)
2Kαt+1(τ
ψ−α−1
t+1 D
1−α(ψ − α+ 1)− (1− α)(ψ − α− 1)τψ−α−2t+1 D−α)
−γtνβKα−1t+1 ((ψ − α+ 1)τψ−αt+1 D1−α − (1− α)τψ−α−1t+1 (ψ − α)D−α),
where D = LA,t+1
τt+1
. ∂M
∂4Ce,t < 0 implies
(ψ − α)(νβ)2[(ψ − α+ 1)LA,t+1 − (1− α)(ψ − α− 1)] (8.7)
<
γtτt+1
Kt+1
νβ[(ψ − α+ 1)LA,t+1 − (1− α)(ψ − α)].
For ψ > α the left hand side must be positive and it is bound from above and below
due to LA,t+1 being bounded. With respect to the right hand side, rt+1 > 0 implies
LA,t+1 − (1− α) > 0, which leads to (ψ − α+ 1)LA,t+1 − (1− α)(ψ − α) > 0. Constant
growth rates imply that LA,t+1 is a positive constant and so is the left hand side. The
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right hand side either approaches 0 or∞ in the limit, depending on whether gτ+gγ < gK
or gτ + gγ > gK , respectively.
As ∂M
∂4Ce,t − γt
∂rt+1
∂4Ce,t =
∂2rt+1
∂4C2e,tKt+1− 2γt
∂rt+1
∂4Ce,t only differs from
∂M
∂4Ce,t by subtracting the
last summand twice, the necessary condition for the representative household’s second
order conditions to hold, i.e. ∂M
∂4Ce,t − γt
∂rt+1
∂4Ce,t < 0, requires
(ψ − α)(νβ)2[(ψ − α+ 1)LA,t+1 − (1− α)(ψ − α− 1)]
<
γtτt+1
Kt+1
νβ2[(ψ − α+ 1)LA,t+1 − (1− α)(ψ − α)].
It is clear that with constant growth rates this inequality shows the same long run be-
havior as 8.7. This yields the first part of the lemma and it further follows immediately
that the signs of ∂M
∂4Ce,t − γt
∂rt+1
∂4Ce,t and
∂M
∂4Ce,t can only differ if
γtτt+1
Kt+1
= constant, which
implies gτ + gγ = gK . 
It is clear that if ∂M
∂4Ce,t − γt
∂rt+1
∂4Ce,t > 0, the increasing returns to investments in the
next period overcompensate for the loss of utility due to less consumption in the first
period of the agent’s life, which must lead to a corner solution. In this case, the solution
derived from the necessary condition M = 0 is the minimum of the utility function. If
the growth rates satisfy gτ + gγ = gK ,6 the marginal benefit of knowledge codification
may increase stronger in the amount of codified ideas than its opportunity costs, but
the pair (Kt+1,4Ce,t) that yields M = 0 could still be a utility maximum. Intuitively,
this is the case if the increasing returns are not as pronounced to compensate for the
marginal utility lost by forgoing another unit of consumption in the first period. That is,
the concavity of the utility function is strong enough to still guarantee an inner solution.
Lemma 8.2 shows that for gτ + gγ 6= gK , a steady state implies that either the neces-
sary condition for an inner solution to the household’s problem holds and the marginal
condition M decreases in 4Ce,t or on the opposite, M increases in 4Ce,t, but then the
household’s problem must show a corner solution in the long run.
The following concentrates on the case where ∂M
∂4Ce,t < 0. It is shown that the main
results of the basic model carry over to this more general setting with ψ 6= α. In partic-
ular, the results require ∂M
∂4Ce,t < 0 and a unique solution to the household’s problem.
Assumption (M1) The household’s maximization problem possesses a unique solu-
tion in both situations, (S1) and (S2), and ∂M
∂4Ce,t < 0.
From the above discussion, it is clear that there exists a tradeoff between the speci-
fication of the utility function and that of technological change if (M1) is to hold. For
simplicity, we use ψ < α as this implies that ∂
2rt+1
∂4C2e,t < 0, and consequently
∂M
∂4Ce,t < 0,
6Note that gτ = gγ = gK = 0 is also possible.
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as well as ∂M
∂4Ce,t − γt
∂rt+1
∂4Ce,t < 0. It further assures unique solutions to the household’s
utility maximization by using a utility function characterized by the properties (c1)-(c4)
as verified in appendix 8A.1. In this way, the basic model specification can be used with
ψ < α being the only difference.
Given assumption (M1), it is possible to formulate:
Proposition 8.1 The lemmata 5.1, 5.2, 5.3 also hold with ψ 6= α and assumption (M1).
Proof. Lemma 5.1 claims the existence of a function Kt+1,crit(τt, Ct) implying 4Ce,t = 0.
Consider M at 4Ce,t = 0. The partial derivative with respect to Kt+1 gives
∂M(Kt+1,0,τt,Ct)
∂Kt+1
= αKα−1t+1 τ
ψ−1
t+1 g(LA,t+1)− γt(α− 1)Kα−2t+1 τψt+1f(LA,t+1).
M(Kt+1, 0, τt, Ct) = 0 implies that
Kαt+1τ
ψ−1
t+1 g(LA,t+1) = γt(1 +K
α−1
t+1 τ
ψ
t+1f(LA,t+1)).
Consequently,
∂M(Kt+1,0,τt,Ct)
∂Kt+1
∣∣∣
M(Kt+1,0,τt,Ct)=0
= α γt
Kt+1
+ γtK
α−2
t+1 τ
ψ
t+1f(LA,t+1) > 0.
The implicit function theorem then establishes lemma 5.1.
Consider now lemma 5.2 which states that 4Ce,t is an increasing function in Kt+1 on U .
First,
∂M(Kt+1,4Ce,t,τt,Ct)
∂4Ce,t
∣∣∣
M(Kt+1,4Ce,t,τt,Ct)=0
= ∂
2rt+1
∂4C2e,tKt+1 −
“
∂rt+1
∂4Ce,t
”2
Kt+1
1+rt+1
< 0
implies that there exists a function4Ce,t(Kt+1, τt, Ct) such thatM(Kt+1,4Ce,t, τt, Ct) =
0. Given τt, Ct, the implicit function theorem further gives
∂4Ce,t
∂Kt+1
= −
∂M(Kt+1,4Ce,t,τt,Ct)
∂Kt+1
∂M(Kt+1,4Ce,t,τt,Ct)
∂4Ce,t
.
Since
∂M(Kt+1,4Ce,t,τt,Ct)
∂Kt+1
∣∣∣
M(Kt+1,4Ce,t,τt,Ct)=0
= α γt
Kt+1
+ γtK
α−2
t+1 τ
ψ
t+1f(LA,t+1) > 0,
for all 4Ce,t ≥ 0, it follows that ∂4Ce,t∂Kt+1 > 0, which is lemma 5.2’s contention.
Lemma 5.3 takes possible entry costs to knowledge codification into account claiming the
existence of a unique pair (Kˆt+1,crit, K¯t+1,crit) for every (τt, Ct, f˜t) such that UCt = UwoCt .7
7The notation has been introduced in chapter 5 of the first part of the thesis.
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As the proof of lemma 5.3 uses lemmata 5.1 and 5.2, the Inada-conditions of the utility
function and the uniqueness of the solutions to the households’ optimization problem,
it also holds in the more general setting. 
As proposition 8.1 implies that the structure of the optimization problem is equal to
that in the first part. Hence, a first result is:
Proposition 8.2 For both, Φ = 0 and Φ = 1, proposition 5.1 holds in the more general
setting. That is, an overlapping generations economy with C1 ≤ qτ1, where τ1 > 0, and
an initial stock of capital K1 close enough to zero will not be codifying at the beginning
of its development.
Proof. Again it is shown that one can always find a K1 such that for any τ1 > 0 there
exists a time interval I = {t|1 ≤ t ≤ T} in which 4Ce,t = 0. It is sufficient to show that
there is no incentive to codify in the first period from a marginal perspective, leaving
out entry costs. For an interior solution M = 0. That is,
∂rt+1
∂4Ce,tKt+1 = γt(1 + rt+1),
which can be written as
Kαt+1τ
ψ−1
t+1 g(LA,t+1) = γt(1 +K
α−1
t+1 τ
ψ
t+1f(LA,t+1)).
Let τt > 0. ForKt+1 → 0, the limit of the left hand side is zero and that of the right hand
side is infinity. From ∂M
∂Kt+1
> 0 at the point M(Kt+1, 0, τt, Ct) = 0 follows Kcrit,t+1 > 0.
Consequently there exists a positive K2 ≤ Kt+1,crit. Since Kt+1 = stwt, st bound from
above and wt for given τt a continuous function of Kt where wt(Kt = 0) = 0, it is always
possible to find an initial value K1 close enough to zero such that K2 ≤ Kt+1,crit(τ1, C1)
and hence 4Ce,1 = 0. 
The following two sections elaborate on what other results carry over to the more general
setting with ψ < α. At first, the case with a constant number of ideas per researcher
and period will be discussed.
8.4.1 Constant Number of Ideas per Researcher and Period:
Φ = 0
As shown in appendix 8A.2, the specification of the research process by Φ = 0 leads to
a stationary state in the long run. Similar to proposition 5.2, it can be formulated:
Proposition 8.3 With constant codification costs, γ, an overlapping generations econ-
omy that develops over time from initial values K1, τ1, C1 close enough to zero will reach
a higher stationary-state level of knowledge than τwoCst , if and only if there exists a period
tc in which (S1)-savings satisfy K¯tc+1 > K¯t+1,crit(τwoCst , Ctc , f˜t) and τtc is close enough to
τwoCst .
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Proof. The proof uses a similar argument as that of proposition 5.2.
”=⇒”: Lemma 5.3 gives that UCt > UwoCt if Kˆt+1 > Kˆt+1,crit(τt, Ct, f˜t). As K¯tc+1 >
K¯t+1,crit(τtc , Ctc , f˜t) in a period tc where τtc is close enough to τwoCst and Ctc < qτwoCst
implies that Ctc+1 > qτtc ' qτwoCst , the economy will subsequently move into a stationary-
state level of knowledge at
τst =
βCst + ε
1
ν
− q(1− β) > τ
woC
st , qτst < Cst ≤ τst.
”⇐=”: For τst > τwoCst to hold, the stationary-state level of information must ex-
ceed qτwoCst . From Lemma 5.3, 4Ce,t is only positive if K¯t+1 > K¯t+1,crit. Hence, for
Cst > qτ
woC
st , 4Ce,t must be positive in a period where τt is close enough to τwoCst . Con-
sequently there must be a period tc in which K¯tc+1 > K¯t+1,crit(τwoCst , Ctc , f˜t). 
Notice that a peculiarity of the case ψ < α is that the equilibrium wage wt declines in
τt. The reason is the following: The marginal product of an additional idea in final-
goods production declines in the knowledge stock. The marginal product of labor in
final-goods production increases in the knowledge stock but decreases in the number of
workers. As for Φ = 0, each researcher creates a constant amount of ideas in each period,
her wage is decreasing in the knowledge stock and hence, a certain share is joining the
workforce in final-goods production. For ψ < 2α−1, the decline of the researcher’s wage
in knowledge and the corresponding shift of labor to final-goods production is so strong
that the decline of marginal productivity due to the increasing number of workers is
greater than the increase of productivity due to the higher knowledge stock. As a
consequence, this would ceteris paribus lead to less capital saving Kt+1. On the other
hand, the rent rt+1 increases in τt+1. This positively affects the saving rate if θ < 1.8
Therefore, proposition 8.3 differs from proposition 5.2 of the first part in two respects.
First, (S1)-saving in some period t to be greater than K¯t+1,crit(τwoCst , Ctc , f˜t) does not
suffice for Cst to be greater than qτwoCst . The reason is that capital saving may fall below
K¯t+1,crit(τ
woC
st , Ctc , f˜t) subsequently, and hence, there will be no codification of ideas with
indices greater than qτwoCst . Second, a stationary level of information Cst > qτwoCst does
not automatically imply higher stationary-state levels of output. The latter is subject
to the next proposition.
Proposition 8.4 If α > ψ ≥ 2α − 1, a higher stationary-state level of knowledge than
τwoCst implies Yst ≥ Y woCst . In case ψ < 2α− 1, knowledge codification may lead to lower
output levels in the long run.
Proof. Recall equation (8.4), describing the stationary-state level of output. It depends
positively on the stationary-state level of knowledge if ψ > 2α − 1, because the saving
rate in stationary state depends positively on the return on physical capital investment,
which, in turn, is a positive function of knowledge and the exponent of the stationary-
state level of knowledge in (8.4) shows a positive sign. However, this exponent turns
8More precisely, if ∂st∂rt+1 > 0.
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negative for ψ < 2α−1. In this case, the negative effect of an increase of the stationary-
state level of knowledge by codification must be offset by a corresponding increase of the
saving rate. This is not always the case, as is easily approved for logarithmic utility. Let
θ = 1. Then the saving rate in stationary state does not depend on rst and, consequently,
neither on τst. As for ψ < 2α − 1 the exponent of τst is negative, the highest level of
output the economy could reach is with τwoCst . 
Proposition 8.4 suggests an inefficiency. It is rational for the firm owners of the in-
termediate firm to do research and it may also be in line with utility maximization of
the young generation to invest in knowledge codification. Both activities enhance the
knowledge stock and therefore decrease the equilibrium wage realized by future gener-
ations. As shown in the proof of the preceding proposition, the declining wage may
affect physical capital savings to an extent that these negative effects overcompensate
the positive effects of a higher productivity of the capital stock. This problem will be
addressed separately within the discussion on social optimality.
With respect to codification costs, the following analogues to propositions 5.3 and 5.4
of the basic model are verified.
Proposition 8.5 Even if the knowledge stock negatively effects output in the long run,
every overlapping generations economy will start to codify if there is no fixed entry cost
to knowledge codification, f = 0, and the codification costs approach zero, γt → 0. For
every overlapping generations economy, there is a finite maximum entry cost f that will
prevent knowledge codification.
Proof. The proof is identical to the corresponding one in the first part of the dissertation.
Intuitively it is clear that as long as ∂rt+1
∂4Ce,t > 0 and γt = 0, the old generation of t + 1
can only be better off by knowledge codification. They do not take into account any
effects on future generations.
With the economy approaching a stationary state in the long run, there must be a max-
imum entry cost to prevent knowledge codification. 
Proposition 8.6 For overlapping generations economies close enough to stationary
state in which Cst < qτwoCst and with equal levels of capital KwoCst , the codification costs γ
must drop the more the higher the stationary-state level of knowledge in order to induce
knowledge codification.
Proof. Again, consider economies with identical stationary-state levels of capital KwoCst
and different stationary-state values of knowledge τwoCst . In particular, the focus will
be on economies with different triples (δ, ε, q). The representative agent plans to save
Kt+1 = K
woC
st < Kt+1,crit(τ
woC
st , 0), given a certain level of codification costs γˆ. The level
of codification costs that implies 4Ce,t = 0 as an interior solution for given Kt+1, τt, Ct,
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γ˜t, writes
γ˜t =
∂rt+1
∂4Ce,t
∣∣∣
4Ce,t=0
Kt+1
1 + rt+1(4Ce,t = 0) .
Focussing on stationary states and letting γ be an argument of M yields
M(γ,KwoCst ,4Ce,t, τwoCst , Cst). As ∂M∂γ , ∂M∂4Ce,t < 0 and for given KwoCst , τwoCst , Cst , M = 0
implies d4Ce,t
dγ
< 0. Hence, the codification costs would have to drop by more than
4γ = γˆ − γ˜(KwoCst , τwoCst , Cst) in order to induce knowledge codification. Holding KwoCst
constant as we compare economies with identical stocks of capital, comparative statics
with respect to ε and q establish the proposition’s contention. More precisely,
γ˜t(K
woC
st , τ
woC
st , Cst)=
(KwoCst )
α(τwoCst )
ψ−αεα−1(ψ−α+1)( 1−αψα )
1−α−(1−α)(KwoCst )α(τwoCst )ψ−α−1εα(ψ−α)( 1−αψα )
−α
1+(KwoCst )
α−1(τwoCst )ψ−α+1εα−1( 1−αψα )
1−α−(1−α)(KwoCst )α−1(τwoCst )ψ−αεα( 1−αψα )
−α .
Using τwoCst =
νε
1−νq gives
γ˜t =
εψ−1
X>0︷ ︸︸ ︷h
(KwoCst )
α( ν1−νq )
ψ−α
(ψ−α+1)( 1−αψα )
1−α−(1−α)(KwoCst )α( ν1−νq )
ψ−α−1
(ψ−α)( 1−αψα )
−αi
1+εψ
h
(KwoCst )
α−1( ν1−νq )
ψ−α+1
( 1−αψα )
1−α−(1−α)(KwoCst )α−1( ν1−νq )
ψ−α
( 1−αψα )
−αi︸ ︷︷ ︸
Y >0
.
Consequently,
∂γ˜
∂ε
=
(ψ − 1)εψ−2X(1 + εψY )− ψε2(ψ−1)XY
(1 + εψY )2
< 0.
With regard to the transmission parameter q, we denote:
X˜ = (KwoCst )α(τwoCst )ψ−αεα−1(ψ−α+1)( 1−αψα )
1−α−(1−α)(KwoCst )α(τwoCst )ψ−α−1εα(ψ−α)( 1−αψα )
−α
>0,
Y˜ = (KwoCst )α−1(τwoCst )ψ−α+1εα−1( 1−αψα )
1−α−(1−α)(KwoCst )α−1(τwoCst )ψ−αεα( 1−αψα )
−α
>0.
Then,
∂γ˜
∂q
=
∂X˜
∂q
(1 + Y˜ )− X˜ ∂Y˜
∂q
(1 + Y˜ )2
,
where ∂X˜
∂q
= ∂X˜
∂τwoCst
∂τwoCst
∂q
and ∂Y˜
∂q
, respectively. From
∂X˜
∂τwoCst
= (KwoCst )
α(τwoCst )
ψ−α−1εα−1(ψ − α)(ψ − α+ 1)
(
1−α
ψα
)1−α
−(1− α)(KwoCst )α(τwoCst )ψ−α−2εα(ψ − α− 1)(ψ − α)
(
1−α
ψα
)−α
< 0,
∂Y˜
∂τwoCst
= (KwoCst )
α−1(τwoCst )
ψ−α(ψ − α+ 1)εα−1
(
1−α
ψα
)1−α
−(1− α)(KwoCst )α−1(τwoCst )ψ−α−1(ψ − α)εα
(
1−α
ψα
)−α
> 0,
and ∂τ
woC
st
∂q
> 0, follows that ∂γ˜
∂q
< 0. Hence, it is clear that 4γ increases in q and ε or,
equivalently, in τwoCst . 
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8.4.2 Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Φ = 1
As shown in appendix 8A.2, the dynamical system of the economy possesses steady states
and the overlapping generations economy will eventually show steady-state growth in
the case of zero codification. Again, ”Codifying in the long run” or ”codifying from
some point in time on” means that there does not exist a period t0, such that for all
t > t0,4Ce,t = 0. The following proposition is the more general equivalent to proposition
5.5.
Proposition 8.7 With constant codification costs an overlapping generations economy
will be codifying in the long run if either of the following conditions is satisfied:
(i) The steady-state growth rate of capital is higher than that of the knowledge stock
(or equivalently ψ > 1− α).
(ii) The steady-state growth rate of capital is equal to that of the knowledge stock (or
equivalently ψ = 1− α) and
γ + γ(kwoCs,min)
α−1f(LA,t) < (kwoCs,min)
αg(LA,t),
where kwoCs,min is the minimum steady-state level of kt =
Kt
τt
without codification.
Proof. The proof proceeds along the lines of the one of proposition 5.5 in the first part.
No knowledge codification implies that the economy approaches steady-state growth. It
also requires that ∀t > t0, (τt, Ct, Kt+1) /∈ U . If ψ > 1 − α, steady-state growth causes
Kt+1 to grow more than Kt+1,crit, ∀t, and, hence, is contradictory to no knowledge cod-
ification in the long run.
Suppose an economy characterized by ψ > 1 − α will not be codifying in the long run.
That is, ∃t0, such that ∀t > t0, 4Ce,t = 0. Consequently, the overlapping generations
economy must approach steady-state growth where gK,s = ψ1−αgτ,s. ψ > 1 − α implies
that gK,s > gτ,s. From dM = 0 follows that
d4Ce,t = −
∂M
∂Kt+1
dKt+1 +
∂M
∂τt
dτt +
∂M
∂Ct
dCt
∂M
∂4Ce,t
.
Assuming no knowledge codification, the last term of the numerator becomes zero. Using
the following derivatives for the numerator, we obtain
∂M
∂Kt+1
= αKα−1t+1 τ
ψ−1
t+1 g(LA,t+1)− γt(α− 1)Kα−2t+1 τψt+1f(LA,t+1),
∂M
∂τt
= Kαt+1(ψ − 1)τψ−2t+1
∂τt+1
∂τt
g(LA,t+1) +K
α
t+1τ
ψ−1
t+1
∂g(LA,t+1)
∂τt
−γtKα−1t+1 ψτψ−1t+1 ∂τt+1∂τt f(LA,t+1)− γtKα−1t+1 τ
ψ
t+1
∂f(LA,t+1)
∂τt
< 0,
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where the derivatives of f(LA,t+1) and g(LA,t+1) with respect to τt are zero in the case
of no knowledge codification.9 Then, d4Ce,t can be written as
d4Ce,t = −K
α
t+1τ
ψ−1
t+1 g(LA,t+1)(αgK,t+1+(ψ−1)gτ,t)−γtKα−1t+1 τψt+1f(LA,t+1)((α−1)gK,t+1+ψgτ,t)
∂M
∂4Ce,t
.
Without knowledge codification the economy will approach a steady state where gK,s =
ψ
1−αgτ,s. Focussing on steady-state behavior gives
d4Ce,t = −K
α
t+1τ
ψ−1
t+1 g(LA,t+1)(αgK,s + (ψ − 1)gτ,s)
∂M
∂4Ce,t
. (8.8)
Since ∂M
∂4Ce,t < 0 for ψ < α, the sign of d4Ce,t is determined by the numerator. It is
positive if ψ > 1− α, which implies gK,s > gτ,s. With respect to the long term behavior
of (8.8), using
∂M
∂τt+1
= Kαt+1(ψ − 1)τψ−2t+1 g(LA,t+1) +Kαt+1τψ−1t+1
∂g(LA,t+1)
∂τt+1
−γtKα−1t+1 ψτψ−1t+1 f(LA,t+1)− γtKα−1t+1 τψt+1 ∂f(LA,t+1)∂τt+1 < 0,
where
∂g(LA,t+1)
∂τt+1
= (ψ−α+1)( 1−αψα )
1−α
(1−α)τ−αt+1
„
dτt+1
dLR,t+1
«α−1
+α(1−α)(ψ−α)( 1−αψα )
−α
τ−α−1t+1
„
dτt+1
dLR,t+1
«α
,
∂f(LA,t+1)
∂τt+1
= (1−α)τ−αt+1( 1−αψα )
1−α
„
∂τt+1
∂LR,t+1
«α−1
+α(1−α)τ−α−1t+1 ( 1−αψα )
−α
„
∂τt+1
∂LR,t+1
«α
>0,
and dividing (8.8) by Kαt+1τ
ψ−1
t+1 , transforms the resulting denominator to
∂M
∂τt+1
∂τt+1
∂4Ce,t
Kαt+1τ
ψ−1
t+1
= (ψ − 1)τ−1t+1g(LA,t+1)νβ + ∂g(LA,t+1)∂τt+1 νβ − γtK−1t+1ψf(LA,t+1)νβ
−γtK−1t+1τt+1 ∂f(LA,t+1)∂τt+1 νβ < 0.
Writing τt+1 as τt(1 + gτ,t) gives
∂g(LA,t+1)
∂τt+1
= τ−1t
h
(ψ−α+1)( 1−αψαεq )
1−α
(1−α)(1+gτ,t)−α+α(1−α)(ψ−α)( 1−αψαεq )
−α
(1+gτ,t)−α−1
i
≤ τ−1t
h
(ψ−α+1)( 1−αψαεq )
1−α
(1−α)(1+gwoCτ )−α+α(1−α)(ψ−α)( 1−αψαεq )
−α
(1+gwoCτ )
−α−1
i
,
and, thus, it is clear that limt→∞
∂g(LA,t+1)
∂τt+1
= 0. With regard to the last term of the
denominator we consider
τt+1
∂f(LA,t+1)
∂τt+1
= (1− α)(1 + gτ,t)1−α
(
1−α
ψαεq
)1−α
+ α(1− α)(1 + gτ,t)−α
(
1−α
ψαεq
)−α
.
9The reason is that LA,t = 1−ααψεq (1 + g
woC
τ ) in the case of no knowledge codification.
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Since gτt bound from above and below, so must τt+1
∂f(LA,t+1)
∂τt+1
and, consequently,
limt→∞ γtK−1t+1τt+1
∂f(LA,t+1)
∂τt+1
νβ = 0. It then follows that
lim
t→∞
∂M
∂τt+1
∂τt+1
∂4Ce,t
Kαt+1τ
ψ−1
t+1
= 0.
Hence,
d4Ce,t = −g(LA,t+1)(αgK,s + (ψ − 1)gτ,s)∂M
∂τt+1
∂τt+1
∂4Ce,tK
−α
t+1τ
1−ψ
t+1
will either approach +∞ for ψ > 1− α or −∞ for ψ < 1− α. The former implies that
there must be a period in which 4Ce,t is positive, whereas the latter is characterized by
the corner solution 4Ce,t = 0. As a consequence ψ > 1−α precludes that there exists a
t0 such that ∀t > t0,4Ce,t = 0 and, hence, the economy will be codifying in the long run.
Consider (ii). With zero knowledge codification the economy will realize steady-state
growth in the long run with an intensive capital stock kwoCs = constant. Note that the
basic model was characterized by a CIES-utility function. We could, hence, guarantee a
unique steady state without knowledge codification. In this part of the thesis, we more
generally assume that utility satisfies the properties (c1)-(c4). By this, the steady-state
equilibrium is not necessarily unique. Let the different steady-state levels of k without
codification be indexed by j and kwoCs,min = minj{kwoCs,j }. If γ + γ(kwoCs,min)α−1f(LA,t) <
(kwoCs,min)
αg(LA,t), the marginal utility of investing the last unit of the homogenous good
transferred to the next period into knowledge codification is higher than its opportunity
costs. This implies that the representative agent would be better off by spending the
last unit saved in physical capital for knowledge codification instead. In case there are
multiple steady states, if (ii) holds for kwoCs,min, it will also be satisfied for all kwoCs > kwoCs,min.

Assuming that codification costs decline monotonically over time at a constant rate gγ
yields the analogon to proposition 5.6.
Proposition 8.8 An overlapping generations economy will be codifying in the long run
if the steady-state growth rate of knowledge exceeds that of capital by less than the rate
at which the codification costs decline.
Proof. We suppose again that the economy will not be codifying in the long run and
gτ,s − gK,s < −gγ.
In the case of declining codification costs, M is also a function of γt. Then, the total
derivative dM = 0 implies
d4Ce,t = −
∂M
∂Kt+1
dKt+1 +
∂M
∂τt
dτt +
∂M
∂γt
dγt
∂M
∂4Ce,t
.
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Inserting the respective partial derivatives gives
d4Ce,t=−K
α
t+1τ
ψ−1
t+1 g(LA,t+1)(αgK,t+1+(ψ−1)gτ,t)−γtKα−1t+1 τψt+1f(LA,t+1)((α−1)gK,t+1+ψgτ,t)−γt(1+rt+1)gγ
∂M
∂4Ce,t
.
Using M = 0, the preceding expression can be rewritten as
d4Ce,t = −K
α
t+1τ
ψ−1
t+1 g(LA,t+1)(αgK,t+1+(ψ−1)gτ,t−gγ)−γtKα−1t+1 τψt+1f(LA,t+1)((α−1)gK,t+1+ψgτ,t)
∂M
∂4Ce,t
.
As the economy will eventually show steady-state behavior in the case of zero codifica-
tion, d4Ce,t transforms to
d4Ce,t = −K
α
t+1τ
ψ−1
t+1 g(LA,t+1)(αgK,s + (ψ − 1)gτ,s − gγ)
∂M
∂4Ce,t
. (8.9)
By the same line of argument as in the proof of proposition 8.7, d4Ce,t approaches +∞
if αgK,s + (ψ − 1)gτ,s − gγ > 0. Using the relation of the steady-state growth rates of
knowledge and capital this condition writes
ψ
1− α − 1 >
gγ
gτ,s
⇔ ψ
1− αgτ,s︸ ︷︷ ︸
gK,s
−gτ,s > gτ,s.
Consequently, there will be a period t where 4Ce,t > 0 if gτ,s − gK,s < −gγ which con-
tradicts steady-state behavior with zero knowledge codification in the long run. 
The respective corollary also holds in the more general setting.
Corollary 8.1 Every overlapping generations economy will be codifying from some point
in time on if the rate at which the codification costs decline will be greater or equal to
the steady-state growth rate of the knowledge stock.
Proof. This is a direct result of the proof of proposition 8.8 as gτ,s − gK,s < −gγ can be
transformed to
ψ
1− α >
gγ
gτ,s
+ 1.
The right hand side will be negative if gτ,s < −gγ, whereas the left hand side cannot
become smaller than zero for α ∈ (0, 1) and ψ > 0. 
Proposition 8.9 An overlapping generations economy in steady-state equilibrium that
satisfies the following condition
gτ,s − gK,s < −gγ
is codifying fully.
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Proof. First, as shown in the proof of proposition 8.8, an overlapping generations econ-
omy that satisfies the condition given in proposition 8.9 will start to codify sometime.
Since the economy is assumed to be in steady state, LA,t+1 will be constant over time.
dM = 0 writes
∂M
∂Kt+1
dKt+1 +
∂M
∂τt+1
[dτt(1 + gτ,t) + τtdgτ,t] +
∂M
∂γt
dγt = 0,
where
dgτ,t = νβ
4Ce,t+max{0,Ct−qτt}
τt
(g4Ce,t+max{0,Ct−qτt} − gτ,t).
For notational convenience, we set 4Cˆe,t := 4Ce,t+max{0, Ct− qτt}. Transforming the
above equation such that τtdgτ,t is on the right hand side, yields
−
∂M
∂Kt+1
dKt+1 +
∂M
∂τt+1
(1 + gτ,t)dτt +
∂M
∂γt
dγt
∂M
∂τt+1
= νβ4Cˆe,t(g4Cˆe,t − gτ,t).
Note that the right hand side must be zero in steady state. Further transformations give
−
∂M
∂Kt+1
Kt+1gK,t+1 +
∂M
∂τt+1
τt+1gτt + γt
∂M
∂γt
gγ
∂M
∂τt+1
= νβ4Cˆe,t(g4Cˆe,s − gτ,s).
Writing out the derivatives and inserting the relation of the steady-state growth rates
of knowledge and physical capital transforms the preceding expression to
−K
α
t+1τ
ψ−1
t+1 g(LA,t+1)(αgK,s + (ψ − 1)gτ,s − gγ)
∂M
∂4τt+1
= 4Cˆe,t(g4Cˆe,s − gτ,s).
As ∂M
∂4τt+1/(K
α
t+1τ
ψ−1
t+1 ) < 0 and approaches zero in the limit, the left hand side is strictly
positive for αgK,s + (ψ − 1)gτ,s − gγ > 0, which transforms to gτ,s − gK,s < −gγ. This
violates the steady-state condition that for 4Ce,t > 0, g4Ce+max{0,C−qτ},s = gτ,s. The
only possibility to satisfy this condition is for 4Ce,t + max{0, Ct − qτt} to realize its
upper bound at (1− q)τt as a corner solution. Consequently, an economy in steady state
characterized by gτ,s − gK,s < −gγ must be codifying fully. 
Consequently, in the more general setting, it is also possible to summarize:
Corollary 8.2 If gτ,s − gK,s 6= gγ, an overlapping generations economy in steady state
exhibits either full or zero codification.
Proof. Similar to the reasoning of the proof of the respective proposition in the first part,
this corollary is an immediate consequence of propositions 8.8 and 8.9. If gτ,s−gK,s > gγ,
full codification directly follows from proposition 8.9.
With regard to gτ,s − gK,s < gγ, the proof of proposition 8.8 implies that this condi-
tion is contradictory to 4Ce,t > 0, ∀t. Hence, the economy cannot realize steady-state
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growth with positive codification. From proposition 8.8’s proof further follows that if an
economy shows steady-state behavior ∀t > t0 and 4Ce,t0 = 0, then 4Ce,t = 0, ∀t > t0.
As a consequence, only steady-state growth without codification is consistent with the
condition gτ,s − gK,s < gγ. 
It should then also hold that finite fixed entry costs only delay but do not prevent an
overlapping generations economy’s knowledge codification.
Proposition 8.10 An overlapping generations economy that started to codify without
fixed entry costs to knowledge codification will also do so with fixed entry costs.
Proof. The proof is the same as in chapter 5.2 with the difference that (S1) now implies
the following difference equation of the capital stock:
Kt+1 = stwnet,t = st(K
α
t τ
ψ
t F − f).
Using kt = Kt
τ
ψ
1−α
t
, it writes
kt+1 = stwnet,t = stk
α
t (1 + g
woC
τ )
− ψ
1−αF − stfτ−
ψ
1−α
t (1 + g
woC
τ )
− ψ
1−α .
In this way, the last term of the above equation becomes arbitrarily small for large
enough t. Consequently the difference equation approaches that of an economy without
fixed costs in the limit and the previous propositions apply for positive codification in
(S2) in the long run. 
This section showed that for the specification with Φ = 1, the main results with respect
to the economy’s codification behavior carry over to the more general setting. However,
when relaxing the assumption of Solow-neutral technological progress, the section on
the economy’s dynamics revealed that knowledge codification not necessarily exerts a
positive influence on the economy’s growth rate of output. This is due to a shift of labor
from research to final-goods production as explained in section 8.4.1.
8.5 Summary
Chapter 8 elaborated on the robustness of the results of the basic model introduced in
the first part of the dissertation with respect to assumptions on technological change.
For this purpose the production function of the intermediate product has been changed
as to allow for different specifications of technological progress. A first finding was that
when relaxing the assumption of Solow-neutral technological progress, the return on
capital may be strictly convex in the amount of knowledge codification. If the weight
assigned to knowledge in intermediate goods production is strong enough this leads to
increasing returns in total saving, that is, in the sum of both saving in physical capital
and investment in knowledge codification such that the concavity of the households’ util-
ity function as specified in the basic model may not be sufficient for an inner solution.
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It was shown that this can only be the case for ψ > α. Within this parameter range,
the situation may occur where the marginal benefit of knowledge codification increases
stronger in the amount codification than its opportunity costs, but the households’ util-
ity maximization problem still shows a unique inner solution. This is the case if the
increasing returns on consumption forgone are not as pronounced and the concavity of
the utility function overcompensates for it. It has been verified that this situation is
in general inconsistent with steady-state behavior except if the difference between the
growth rates of knowledge and capital is equal to the rate at which the codification costs
decline. Generally speaking, there is a tradeoff between the specification of technological
change and that of the utility function if unique inner solutions are to be assured.
For the remainder of the chapter, this tradeoff has been solved by restricting the weight
on knowledge to ψ < α as this guarantees for an inner solution of the households’ utility
maximization with the specification of utility as in the basic model and the marginal
benefit of knowledge codification does not increase stronger in the amount of knowledge
codification than its opportunity costs. With these two properties the more general
model shows the same structure as the basic model of the first part of the dissertation.
It is shown that the main results of the basic model carry over to this more general
set-up. The particular difficulty with the proofs in this chapter was that although they
generally proceed along the lines of those in the previous part, the first order conditions
of the representative household could not be solved explicitly for the optimal amount of
knowledge codification.
The results also revealed another peculiarity of the specification ψ < α. For ψ small
enough, knowledge codification may even exert a negative influence on the stationary-
state output level of the economy for the case Φ = 0 and possibly lower growth rates in
the case with Φ = 1. This point will be discussed in more detail in section 12 on social
optimality.
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8A Appendix of Chapter 8
8A.1 Sufficient Conditions for the Household’s Optimization
Problem
In its general form, the representative household’s optimization problem is equivalent to that
of the basic model. Hence some steps have been omitted and can be looked up in chapter 7.
The difference occurs with respect to the condition 8A.2, as the second derivative of the return
on physical capital in knowledge codification is now different from zero.
The Hessian matrix writes
H =

u′′(c1,t)+δu′′(c2,t+1)(1+rt+1)2 γtu′′(c1,t)+δu′′(c2,t+1)
∂rt+1
∂4Ce,tKt+1(1+rt+1)
+δu′(c2,t+1)
∂rt+1
∂4Ce,t
γtu′′(c1,t)+δu′′(c2,t+1)
∂rt+1
∂4Ce,tKt+1(1+rt+1) γ
2
t u
′′(c1,t)+δu′′(c2,t+1)
“
∂rt+1
∂4Ce,tKt+1
”2
+δu′(c2,t+1)
∂rt+1
∂4Ce,t +δu
′(c2,t+1)
„
∂2rt+1
∂4C2e,t
Kt+1
«
 .
The first principal minor is negative due to the concavity of Ut in Kt+1:
∂2Ut
∂K2t+1
= u′′(c1,t) + δu′′(c2,t+1)(1 + rt+1)2 < 0.
This implies the unique maximum in (S1), that is without knowledge codification. The second
principal minor will be positive, if and only if
∂2Ut
∂K2t+1
∂2Ut
∂4C2e,t
−
(
∂2Ut
∂Kt+1∂4Ce,t
)2
> 0. (8A.1)
Using the first order conditions yields
∂2Ut
∂K2t+1
(
∂2rt+1
∂4C2e,t
Kt+1 − 2γt ∂rt+1
∂4Ce,t
)
> δu′(c2,t+1)
(
∂rt+1
∂4Ce,t
)2
. (8A.2)
According to lemma 8.1, ψ < α implies ∂
2rt+1
∂4C2e,t < 0. Hence, the left hand side can be esti-
mated from below by ∂
2rt+1
∂4C2e,t = 0 and it is then possible to proceed as with the basic model’s
specification. Consequently, condition 8A.2 transforms into
u′′(c2,t+1)
u′(c2,t+1)
+
1
2c2,t+1
< −u
′′(c1,t)
u′(c1,t)
1
1 + rt+1
.
This is property (c4) of the utility function and choosing a CIES-utility function, this inequality
defines the lower bound of θ. 
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8A.2 Existence of Non-Trivial Steady States
In the same way as in the corresponding section of the appendix in the first part of the thesis, it
is shown that in the case Φ = 0, the economy will approach a stationary state. For Φ = 1, there
exist different steady states with positive growth rates and the overlapping generations economy
must exhibit steady-state behavior in the long run in case of zero knowledge codification.
Φ = 0
For Φ = 0, the dynamical system writes:
Kt+1 = stKαt (1− α)1−α(ψα)ατψ−αt εα,
τt+1 = νqτt + νβmax{0, Ct+1 − qτt}+ νε,
Ct+1 = Ct +4Cie,t +4Ce,t.
As with the specification of the basic model, the proof that the overlapping generations econ-
omy characterized by the above system of difference equations will approach a stationary state
in the long run proceeds in two steps. First, it is verified that the dynamical system approaches
a fixed point for any constant level of the information stock. The second step shows that the
economy’s stock of information will be constant in the long run. Accordingly, the first claim is:
For any fixed level of the information stock Cst, the dynamical system possesses a fixed point
(Cst, τst,Kst) ∈ R+ × [τwoCst ,∞)× [KwoCst ,∞).
To verify this statement, choose an arbitrary but fixed Cst ∈ R+. Consequently, the develop-
ment of the knowledge stock is independent of that of the capital stock and characterized by
a linear, first order difference equation, where dτt+1dτt ∈ (0, 1). Hence, the knowledge stock will
approach a stationary state at
τst =
{
νε
1−νq , Cst ≤ qτwoCst ;
νβCst+νε
1−νq(1−β) , Cst > qτ
woC
st .
As the knowledge stock approaches a stationary point τst, the capital stock must do so as well,
because its dynamics then satisfy the following conditions for a fixed point.
If K1 > 0 and
(a) ∂st∂rt+1 ≥ 0, ∀rt+1 ≥ 0,
(b) limKt→0 φ′(Kt) > 1,
(c) limKt→∞ φ′(Kt) = 0,
the function
φ(Kt) = Kt+1 = stKαt (1− α)1−α(ψα)ατψ−αst εα
possesses a non-trivial fixed point.10
10The argument follows that of chapter 7 and, hence, that of Galor and Ryder (1989).
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Condition (a) guarantees the existence of a single valued function φ(Kt) > 0,∀Kt > 0. As
the properties (c2) and (c3) of the utility function imply that st ≥ slow > 0,11 there exists a
φ(Kt) > 0 for every Kt > 0. Uniqueness is given if the derivative of stKαt Q with respect to
φ(Kt) will be smaller than 1.12 That is, if
∂st
∂rt+1
drt+1
dφ(Kt)
Kαt Q < 1,
where Q = (1− α)1−α(ψα)ατψ−αst εα. This condition holds because ∂st∂rt+1 ≥ 0 and
drt+1
dφ(Kt)
< 013.
Requirement (b) assures that the function φ is steeper than the 45 degree line at the origin and
(c) guarantees that there exists a fixed point φ(Kt) = Kt. The derivative of φ(Kt) writes
dφ(Kt)
dKt
=
stαK
α−1
t Q
1− ∂st∂rt+1
∂rt+1
∂φ K
α
t Q
. (8A.3)
Let’s first consider requirement (c). For Kt → ∞ the numerator will approach zero. The
second term of the denominator being negative then suffices for (c) to hold. However, it is
not immediately obvious from equation (8A.3) whether (b) holds. A simple argument is the
following. As (b) is supposed to guarantee that the graph of φ(Kt) is above the bisecting line
for Kt → 0, the condition can be written as stKαt Q > Kt or stKα−1t Q > 1, respectively. Since
st ∈ [slow, 1) and Q > 0, the condition must hold for all Kt close enough to 0.
This completes the proof that the economy will reach a stationary state for fixed Cst.
The next step is to show that the economy’s stock of information must be constant in the long
run. This last step is identical to that in section 7.3.1. 
Φ = 1
For Φ = 1, the overlapping generations economy is characterized by the following system of
difference equations:
Kt+1 = stKαt (1− α)1−α(ψαεq)ατψt (1 + gτ,t−1)−α,
τt+1 = νqτt + νβ(4Ce,t +max{0, Ct − qτt}) + νεqτt,
Ct+1 = Ct +4Cie,t +4Ce,t.
The respective growth rates are
gK,t = stKα−1t (1− α)1−α(ψαεq)ατψt (1 + gτ,t−1)−α − 1,
gτ,t = νq + νβ
4Ce,t +max{0, Ct − qτt}
τt
+ νεq − 1,
gC,t =
4Cie,t +4Ce,t
Ct
.
11The reasoning is the same as in section 7.3.1.
12The condition is derived from the implicit function theorem.
13Since rt+1 = Kα−1t+1 E, where E = τ
ψ−α
st
(
1−α
εψα
)−α (
τst
1−α
εψα − 1 + α
)
> 0, the derivative shows the
form drt+1dφ(Kt) = (α− 1)φα−2E < 0.
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The growth rates change from one period to the next according to
dgK,t = stKα−1t (1− α)1−α(ψαεq)ατψt (1 + gτ,t−1)−α,
(gs,t − (1− α)gK,t + ψgτ,t − α(1 + gτ,t−1)−1dgτ,t−1)
dgτ,t = νβ
4Ce,t +max{0, Ct − qτt}
τt
(g4Ce+max{0,C−qτ},t − gτ,t),
dgC,t =
4Cie,t +4Ce,t
Ct
(g4Cie+4Ce,t − gC,t).
Consequently, the following two kinds of non-trivial steady states can be distinguished:
(1) Steady state without knowledge codification
If the economy does not codify, 4Ce,t + max{0, Ct − qτt} = 0 and 4Cie,t +4Ce,t = 0.
This implies gC,s = 0 and gτ,s = gwoCτ .
As st is bound on [slow, 1), the saving rate cannot grow at a constant rate other than
0. Consequently, gK,s = ψ1−αgτ,s. Therefore, a steady state without codification is
characterized by
gK,s =
ψ
1− αgτ,s,
gτ,s = gwoCτ = νq(1 + ε)− 1,
gC,s = 0.
(2) Steady state with knowledge codification
Positive codification implies 4Ce,t > 0. Therefore, the overlapping generations economy
can only realize steady-state behavior if gC,s = g4Cie+4Ce,s and gτ,s = g4Ce+max{0,C−qτ},s.
By the same argument with respect to the saving rate as in the case with zero codifica-
tion, the relation of the growth rates of capital and knowledge will be gK,s = ψ1−αgτ,s.
Consequently, steady states with positive knowledge codification imply
gK,s =
ψ
1− αgτ,s,
gτ,s = g4Ce+max{0,C−qτ},s,
gC,s = g4C,s,
where 4Ct = 4Cie,t+4Ce,t. Notice that a steady state with full codification is a special
case where gτ,s = gwCτ = g4Ce+max{0,C−qτ},s = gC,s = g4C,s = ν(q(1+ ε) + β(1− q))− 1.
We will now show that without knowledge codification, the overlapping generations economy
will approach a non-trivial steady state.
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Let kt := Kt
τ
ψ
1−α
t
. Without knowledge codification, the economy’s dynamics can be summarized
by the following first order difference equation:14
φ(kt) = kt+1 =
Kt+1
τ
ψ
1−α
t+1
= stkαt Q˜,
where Q˜ = (1 + gwoCτ )
− ψ
1−α−α(1 − α)1−α(ψαεq)α. To verify that the overlapping generations
economy experiences a non-trivial steady-state equilibrium we use the same conditions as in
the case of Φ = 0. That is, k1 > 0 and
(a) ∂st∂rt+1 ≥ 0, ∀rt+1 ≥ 0,
(b) limkt→0 φ′(kt) > 1,
(c) limkt→∞ φ′(kt) = 0.
Again condition (a) guarantees that for every kt > 0 there exists a unique φ(kt) > 0. φ(kt) > 0
follows from st ≥ slow > 0 and uniqueness is given if
∂st
∂rt+1
drt+1
dφ(kt)
kαt Q˜ < 1.
As ∂st∂rt+1 ≥ 0 and
drt+1
dφ(kt)
< 0 the condition holds.15
With regard to requirements (b) and (c), the derivative of φ(kt) writes
dφ(kt)
dkt
=
stαk
α−1
t Q˜
1− ∂st∂rt+1
∂rt+1
∂φ k
α
t Q˜
.
Requirement (c) holds as the numerator will approach zero for kt →∞ and the second term of
the denominator is negative. By rewriting condition (b) as stkα−1t Q˜ > 1, it becomes obvious
that the inequality must hold for all kt close enough to 0 since st ∈ [slow, 1) and Q˜ > 0.
Hence, the three conditions for the existence of a non-trivial fixed point are satisfied. Unique-
ness and continuity of φ(kt) together with requirements (b) and (c) imply that an economy
with zero codification will show steady-state growth in the long run. 
Note that when assuming CIES-utility the steady state would be unique.16
14For more details see section 7.3.2.
15We can write rt+1 = kα−1t+1 E˜, where E˜ = (1−α)−α(ψαεq)α(1+gwoCτ )−α
(
1−α
ψαεq (1 + g
woC
τ )− 1 + α
)
>
0. Since gwoCτ = constant, the derivative shows the form
drt+1
dφ(kt)
= (α− 1)φα−2E˜ < 0.
16See chapter 7.
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8A.3 Influence of Knowledge Codification on the Return on
Physical Capital
The return on capital in t+ 1 writes
rt+1 = Kα−1t+1
(
1−α
ψα
)−α
τψ−αt+1
(
∂τt+1
∂LR,t+1
)α(
τt+1
(
1−α
ψα
)(
∂τt+1
∂LR,t+1
)−1 − 1 + α) .
The derivative with respect to 4Ct,e uses the chain rule, ∂rt+1∂4Ct,e =
∂rt+1
∂τt+1
∂τt+1
∂4Ct,e . As
∂τt+1
∂4Ct,e =
νβ = constant, the sign of the change in the return on physical capital due to a marginal
increase in knowledge codification is determined by ∂rt+1∂τt+1 .
∂rt+1
∂τt+1
= (ψ − α+ 1)τψ−αt+1 Kα−1t+1
(
1− α
ψα
)1−α( ∂τt+1
∂LR,t+1
)α−1
−(1− α)(ψ − α)τψ−α−1t+1 Kα−1t+1
(
1− α
ψα
)−α( ∂τt+1
∂LR,t+1
)α
.
The derivative is positive, if and only if
(ψ − α+ 1)τt+1 > (ψ − α) ∂τt+1
∂LR,t+1
.
For Φ = 1, this condition can be written as
ψαεq(ψ − α)
ψ − α+ 1 < (1 + gτ,t).
Since the growth rate of knowledge must be greater than gwoCτ = νq(1 + ε)− 1, estimating the
right hand side from below gives
(ψα+ 1− α)(ψ − α)
ψ + 1− α − 1 < ε.
As α ∈ (0, 1) and ψ ∈ (0, 1], the fraction (ψα+1−α)(ψ−α)ψ+1−α must be smaller than 1. Hence, knowl-
edge codification in t increases the return on physical capital in t+ 1. 
Consider now the case Φ = 0. Knowledge codification exerts a positive effect on the rent if
τt+1 >
(ψ − α)εψα
1 + ψ − α .
From α ∈ (0, 1) and ψ ∈ (0, 1], it follows that ∂rt+1∂τt+1 > 0 if ψ ≤ α. In case ψ > α, the right hand
side is positive. Hence, for small levels of the knowledge stock, the representative household
would decrease its rent by codification. The intuition is that at low levels of knowledge a
marginal increase in τt causes wage payments of the intermediate entrepreneur to rise more than
could be compensated by higher revenues and a decreasing number of researchers. However,
every economy will reach levels of knowledge such that ∂rt+1∂4Ct,e > 0. The reason is that every
economy approaches a stationary-state level τst ≥ τwoCst and
τwoCst >
(ψ − α)εψα
1 + ψ − α .
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To see that this condition holds, we insert τwoCst =
νε
1−νq . Mathematical transformations yield
1
ψ − α > αψ(1− q).
It is then obvious that the left hand side is greater than 1, whereas the right hand side is smaller
than 1. 
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A Generalization
The purpose of this chapter is to give an overview over the model’s structural ele-
ments that drive the results. The underlying motivation is to elaborate on whether the
particular microeconomic structure of the basic model, such as a single monopolistic
intermediate firm and one knowledge stock are crucial for the results.
9.1 General Properties of the Model
The argument of this section is that the main propositions of the previous chapter gen-
erally hold for overlapping generations economies with microeconomic structures that
exhibit the following characteristics.
(U) With respect to the problem of the household, the equilibria allow to work with a
representative household whose utility function Ut(c1,t, c2,t+1) = u(c1,t)+ δu(c2,t+1)
satisfies:
(c1) u′(c) > 0, u′′(c) < 0;
(c2) limc→∞ u′(c) = 0, limc→0 u′(c) =∞;
(c3’) ∂st
∂rt+1
≥ 0, ∂st
∂wt
≥ 0 and limkt→∞ ∂st∂wtkαt <∞.
(K1) The resulting dynamics of the economy’s knowledge stock can be represented by
τt+1 = qτt + βmax{0, Ct+1 − qτt}+ ε
[
qτt + Φ˜(βmax{0, Ct+1 − qτt})
]Φ
LR,t+1,
where Φ˜,Φ ∈ {0, 1}.
(A2’) is given with respect to knowledge codification. More precisely:
In a period t and for all i, j ≥ qτt: Before an idea indexed by i is codified, all ideas
with index j, j < i have been codified already. This implies that if i is codified in
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period t, then j < i is also codified in t.
(P1) The aggregate production function is of the Cobb-Douglas type
Ft(LA,t, Kt, τt) = ξL
1−α
A,t K
α
t τ
ψ
t ,
where ξ ∈ R++ is an arbitrary constant.
(P2) There is one labor market and the equilibrium wages of the researchers, wR,t, and
the workers in final-goods production, wA,t, depend (directly or indirectly) on their
marginal productivity in final-goods production, such that
wA,t = κL
−α
A,tK
α
t τ
ψ
t ,
wR,t = λL
1−α
A,t K
α
t τ
ψ−1
t
∂τt
∂LR,t+1
,
with constants λ, κ ∈ R++.
(P3) The return on capital, rt, exhibits the form
rt = K
α−1
t h(τt),
where h(τt) = τψt f(LA,t) ≥ 0 and ∂h(τt)∂4Ce,t = τ
ψ−1
t g(LA,t).
Additionally it is necessary that:
(N) The decision maker with respect to knowledge codification possesses positive mea-
sure.
The properties have the following implications:
As in the labor market equilibrium wA,t = wR,t = wt, condition (P2) assures an equilib-
rium allocation of labor according to
LA,t =
κ
λ
τt
∂τt
∂LR,t
.
This is structurally identical to equation (8.3) giving the equilibrium allocation of labor
in the model of the previous chapter. Note that for Φ = Φ˜ = 1, the shares of workers
and researchers are independent of the stock of information as the productivity of both
increases in knowledge codification of previous periods by the same factor. Using the
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equilibrium allocation of labor as derived from (P2) together with (K1) and (A2’) then
yields the dynamical system
Kt+1 = stκ
1−αλαKαt τ
ψ−α
t
(
∂τt
∂LR,t
)α
,
τt+1 = νqτt + νmax{0, Ct+1 − qτt}+ νε
[
qτt + Φ˜(βmax{0, Ct+1 − qτt})
]Φ
,
Ct+1 = Ct +4Ct,
where ν =
(
1 + κ
λ
)−1. This system of difference equations corresponds to that given in
section (8.3). The only difference is that the present specification allows for Φ˜ = 1. It
is obvious that for Φ = 0, there is no change. With (Φ, Φ˜) = (1, 1), the equilibrium
allocation of labor is independent of knowledge codification. This simplifies the above
difference equations to
Kt+1 = stκ
1−αλαKαt τ
ψ
t
(
ν(1 + ε)
ε
)α
,
τt+1 = ν[qτt + βmax{0, Ct+1 − qτt}](1 + ε),
Ct+1 = Ct +4Ct.
It is verified in appendix 9A that this dynamical system shows the same long run behavior
as the one with (Φ, Φ˜) = (1, 0) and, hence, the nontrivial steady states are characterized
by the familiar relation of the growth rates of physical capital and knowledge:
gK,s =
ψ
1− αgτ,s.
Properties (c1)-(c3’) of the utility function further assure that in the case of zero codi-
fication (S1), the economy will approach steady-state behavior in the long run. Details
are given in appendix 9A. Note that the proof is identical to that in appendix 8A.2,
except that the saving rate may now also depend on the representative agent’s wage wt.
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) have shown that for a neoclassical growth model to have
a steady state, technological progress must be labor-augmenting, which is always satis-
fied by a Cobb-Douglas production function, hence (P1).1
Finally, due to (P3) the first order conditions of the household yield the equality of
marginal benefits of knowledge codification and its opportunity costs according to
M = Kαt+1τ
ψ−1
t+1 g(LA,t+1)− γt(1−Kα−1t+1 τψt+1f(LA,t+1)).
Further it is important to point out that a necessary condition for knowledge codification
is (N). This means e.g. that the economy comprises a finite number of households or
the amount of knowledge codification is the outcome of a collective decision of a group
of positive measure. In the previous chapters, this group was the shareholders of the
1Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), p. 54.
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intermediate firm. (N) is necessary as a decision maker with zero measure cannot in-
fluence the capital rent because her contribution to the stock of information would be nil.
Note that with the properties (c1) - (c2) of the utility function, the household’s problem
possesses a unique solution in (S1)(but not necessarily in (S2)). Additionally assuming
(c3’) assures steady-state behavior in the long run. For the case Φ = 1, this is sufficient
for the main result.
Proposition 9.1 An overlapping generations economy characterized by (U), (K1),
(A2’),(P1)-(P3) and (N) with constant codification costs will be codifying in the long run
if either of the following conditions are satisfied:
(i) The steady-state growth rate of capital is higher than that of the knowledge stock
(or equivalently ψ > 1− α).
(ii) The steady-state growth rate of capital is equal to that of the knowledge stock (or
equivalently ψ = 1− α) and
γ + γ(kwoCs,min)
α−1f(LA,t) < (kwoCs,min)
αg(LA,t),
where kwoCs,min is the minimum steady-state level of kt =
Kt
τt
without codification.
For declining codification costs, the economy will be codifying in the long run if the steady-
state growth rate of knowledge exceeds that of capital by less than the rate at which the
codification costs decline.
Proof. The proof proceeds along the lines of the previous chapters. The difference is
that in this general specification, the pair (Kt+1,4Ce,t) that satisfies M = 0 may not be
a maximum of the utility function. Hence the condition M = 0 cannot be used for the
argument. However, M still equates the marginal benefit of knowledge codification with
its opportunity costs. In this way, the line of argument is that assuming no codification
leads to steady-state growth, which implies M > 0 for the conditions given in the
proposition. However, M > 0 indicates that the representative household would be
better off when investing in knowledge codification at least the last marginal unit saved
in physical capital.
For reasons of simplicity, we will work with
M˜ = γ−1t
rt+1
4Ce,tKt+1 − 1− rt+1.
Intuitively, this is just looking at the problem from the other side. In particular, one
marginal unit of the homogenous good saved in physical capital yields 1 + rt+1 of con-
sumption in the next period, whereas spending this marginal unit in knowledge codifi-
cation enhances consumption in t + 1 by γ−1t
rt+1
4Ce,tKt+1. M˜ varies over time according
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to
dM˜ =
∂M˜
∂Kt+1
dKt+1 +
∂M˜
∂τt
dτt +
∂M˜
∂γt
dγt.
This equation can be written as
dM˜ =
Kαt+1τ
ψ−1
t+1
γt
g(LA,t+1)[αgK,t+1 − (1− ψ)gτ,t − gγ,t] +
γtK
α−1
t+1 τ
ψ
t+1f(LA,t+1)[(1− α)gK,t+1 − ψgτ,t].
Using the steady-state growth rates, the total derivative will be positive if
Kαt+1τ
ψ−1
t+1
γt
g(LA,t+1)
[
ψ − (1− α)
1− α gτ,t − gγ,t
]
> 0.
Note that in steady state the rent is constant and hence whether M˜ increases or decreases
depends on how the marginal codification benefit develops over time. The above equation
reveals that for constant codification costs and ψ > 1 − α, the term on the left hand
side is positive and increases to infinity in the limit. This establishes (i).2
With regard to declining codification costs, we rewrite
ψ − (1− α)
1− α gτ,t − gγ,t = gK,s − gτ,t − gγ,t.
It is then clear that for the difference of the steady-state growth rates of knowledge and
capital being smaller than the rate at which the codification costs decline, the codifica-
tion benefit is strictly increasing over time and hence the agent must face a period with
M˜ > 0, implying that she would be better off by deviating from zero codification.
(ii) is proven in the same way as for proposition 8.7 and will be omitted at this place,
hence. 
Consider additionally:
(M1) The household’s utility maximization problem possesses a unique solution in (S1)
and (S2) and ∂M
∂4Ce,t < 0.
For example, property (M1) would be given for the specification of chapter 8 with ψ ≤ α
and the utility function additionally satisfying (c4).3 For (Φ, Φ˜) = (1, 1) and utility
satisfying (U) + (c4), (M1) would be given for all ψ ∈ (0, 1] . This is the content of the
following lemma.
2Note that with ψ < 1− α, the left hand side would approach zero from below.
3Note that (c3’) is a weaker requirement than (c3). Hence, utility functions satisfying (c3) will also
satisfy (c3’). Recall (c4): u
′′(c2,t+1)
u′(c2,t+1)
+ 12c2,t+1 < −
u′′(c1,t)
u′(c1,t)
1
1+rt+1
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Lemma 9.1 For (Φ, Φ˜) = (1, 1), the equilibrium allocation of labor in t + 1 does not
depend on knowledge codification in t and ∂
2rt+1
∂4C2e,t ≤ 0, ∀ψ ∈ (0, 1].
Proof. With (Φ, Φ˜) = (1, 1), the difference equation of the knowledge stock can be
written as
τt+1 = ν(qτt + βmax{0, Ct+1 − qτt})(1 + ε).
Consequently, the equilibrium share of workers calculates to
LA,t+1 =
κ
λ
ν(1 + ε)
ε
.
With the labor shares being independent of the information stock, the second derivative
of the return on capital in t+ 1 with respect to the amount of codified ideas in t equals
∂2rt+1
∂4C2e,t
= ψ(ψ − 1)τψ−2t+1 Kα−1t+1 (νβ)2f(LA,t+1) < 0.

As discussed in section 8.4, ∂
2rt+1
∂4C2e,t < 0 is sufficient for
∂M
∂4Ce,t < 0 and implies that
the household’s second order condition must be satisfied if the utility function exhibits
properties (c1)-(c3’) and (c4).
Given (M1), it is then possible to state the following result.
Proposition 9.2 For an overlapping generations economy satisfying properties (U), (K1),
(A2′), (P1)− (P3), (N), and (M1), the lemmata 5.1-5.3, the propositions 5.1, 8.3, 8.5,
8.6, 8.9, 8.10, and corollaries 8.1 and 8.2 apply.
Proof. With (M1) additionally assuring the uniqueness of the household’s utility maxi-
mizer and ∂M
∂4Ce,t < 0, the proofs of section 8.4 can be applied. 
9.2 Summary
This chapter expatiated the model’s structural elements that drive the results. It has
been argued that under more or less standard assumptions with respect to the production
sectors and if the dynamics of the knowledge stock can be represented by a difference
equation similar to that of the basic specification in the first part, the result that an
overlapping generations economy will be codifying in the long run if the steady-state
growth rate of capital is higher than that of the knowledge stock, respectively, if the
difference between the growth rates of knowledge and capital is smaller than the rate
at which the codification costs decline, will generally hold for concave utility functions
with one further restriction on the curvature, (c3’), so as to assure for steady-state
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behavior of the economy without knowledge codification. The reason is that also in the
case of increasing returns in consumption forgone in which the sufficient conditions for a
maximum of the household’s problem are violated, it is favorable to invest in knowledge
codification under the respective conditions. However, this situation will then show a
corner solution in which the agent does not consume at all in the first period of her life.
Further restrictions on utility and/or the parameters of the production functions such
that the household’s utility maximization problem possesses unique inner solutions yield
the structure of the basic model as unfolded by the lemmata 5.1-5.3. Consequently the
main results as given in chapter 8 apply. It was further shown that the restriction of the
assumptions on technological progress on ψ < α so as to guarantee for an inner solution
of the household’s problem with the specification of utility in the basic model by (c1)-(c4)
is not necessary in the case with Φ = 1 if the productivity of the researchers positively
depends on the ideas they have acquired by utilizing the codified sources of knowledge.
In this case, more precisely with (Φ, Φ˜) = (1, 1), (c1)-(c4) are sufficient for an inner
solution for the entire range ψ ∈ (0, 1]. Intuitively, the productivity of the researchers,
when also depending on the knowledge acquired by attending to the information stock,
increases in the amount of knowledge codification by the same factor as the productivity
of the workers in final-goods production. Thus, the equilibrium allocation of labor is
not affected by knowledge codification of previous periods. This eliminates the second
channel by which codification activities may increase the return on physical capital,
and hence the source of the convexity of the return on physical capital in knowledge
codification.
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9A Appendix of Chapter 9
9A.1 Equivalence of the Dynamical Systems with (Φ, Φ˜) = (1, 1)
and (Φ, Φ˜) = (1, 0)
For (Φ, Φ˜) = (1, 1), the overlapping generations economy is characterized by the following
system of difference equations:
Kt+1 = stκ1−αλαKαt τ
ψ
t
(
ν(1 + ε)
ε
)α
,
τt+1 = ν[qτt + β(4Ce,t +max{0, Ct − qτt})](1 + ε),
Ct+1 = Ct +4Ct.
The respective growth rates are
gK,t = stκ1−αλαKα−1t τ
ψ
t
(
ν(1 + ε)
ε
)α
− 1,
gτ,t = ν
[
q + β
4Ce,t +max{0, Ct − qτt}
τt
]
(1 + ε)− 1,
gC,t =
4Cie,t +4Ce,t
Ct
.
The growth rates change from one period to the next according to
dgK,t = stκ1−αλαKα−1t τ
ψ
t
(
ν(1 + ε)
ε
)α
(gs,t − (1− α)gK,t + ψgτ,t),
dgτ,t = νβ(1 + ε)
4Ce,t +max{0, Ct − qτt}
τt
(g4Ce+max{0,C−qτ},t − gτ,t),
dgC,t =
4Cie,t +4Ce,t
Ct
(g4Cie+4Ce,t − gC,t).
As in steady state (dgK,t, dgτ,t, dgC,t) = (0, 0, 0), it is clear that this system shows the same
long run behavior as with (Φ, Φ˜) = (1, 0) and the steady states are characterized by
gK,s =
ψ
1− αgτ,s.
9A.2 Steady-State Behavior without Knowledge Codification
This section of the appendix shows that (c1)-(c3) suffices for the economy to approach non-
trivial steady-state growth without codification. In analogy to section 8A.2, in the situation
with zero knowledge codification, that is in (S1), the dynamics of the overlapping generations
economy can be described by
φ(kt) = kt+1 =
Kt+1
τ
ψ
1−α
t+1
= stkαt Q˜.
Of course, this applies to both cases, (Φ, Φ˜) = (1, 0) and (Φ, Φ˜) = (1, 1).
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The concavity of the utility function and the Inada conditions suffice in (S1) for a unique so-
lution of the household’s utility maximization problem. The difference to the proof in section
8A.2 is that with utility given by (U), the saving rate may not only depend on the return
on capital in the following period (as required by (c3) in the basic model), but also on the
representative household’s income. However, (c3’) is sufficient for a fixed point of φ(kt).
To verify that the overlapping generations economy experiences a non-trivial steady-state equi-
librium, consider again the following three conditions. That is, k1 > 0 and
(a) ∂st∂rt+1 ≥ 0, ∀rt+1 ≥ 0,
(b) limkt→0 φ′(kt) > 1,
(c) limkt→∞ φ′(kt) = 0.
Condition (a) is satisfied by the same argument as in section 8A.2.
With regard to requirements (b) and (c), the derivative of φ(kt) now writes
dφ(kt)
dkt
=
αkα−1t Q˜(st +
∂st
∂wt
kαt )
1− ∂st∂rt+1
∂rt+1
∂φ k
α
t Q˜
.
Requirement (c) holds as with (c3’) the numerator will approach zero for kt → ∞ and the
second term of the denominator is negative. Condition (b) is again most easily verified by
rewriting it as stkα−1t Q˜ > 1, it becomes obvious that the inequality must hold for all kt close
enough to 0 since st ∈ [slow, 1) and Q˜ > 0. Hence, the three conditions for the existence of a
non-trivial fixed point are satisfied.
The same reasoning applies to the case Φ = 0 in order to show that the capital stock will
approach a stationary state for a given knowledge stock. Therewith the proof in section 8A.2
can be applied to show that the overlapping generations economy where the researchers have
only a finite amount of ideas per period approaches a stationary state.
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Chapter 10
Oligopolistic Intermediate Sectors
The basic model structure comprises one monopolistic intermediate firm. This chapter
sketches a simple model structure with oligopolistic competition in several intermediate
sectors where each sector draws upon a different field of knowledge. It is shown that
under certain symmetry assumptions the resulting equilibrium exhibits the properties
specified in the previous chapter. This implies that a monopolistic intermediate firm is
not a necessary condition for the results derived from the basic model.
10.1 Outline of the Model Structure
10.1.1 Knowledge and Information
Let there be m different fields of knowledge indexed by k ∈ {1, ...,m} which con-
sist of infinite sets of ideas Ik. Analogously to the definitions in the second chapter,
a person Pt’s knowledge in the field k is the subset of Ik which is embodied in Pt:
TPt,k = {ik ∈ Ik|ik is embodied inPt}. And naturally, we define a person’s knowledge
as TPt = ∪kTPt,k. Accordingly, the information stock in a specific field of knowledge
is Ck,t = {ik ∈ Ik|ik is codified} and the entire set of codified ideas is Ct = ∪kCk,t.
By specifying Ik = R+ it is clear that TPt , Ct ⊂ Rk+. We assume (A1) and (A2’) in
each field of knowledge.1 Then a person’s knowledge can be represented by a vector
τPt = (sup TPt,k)k∈{1,...,m} ∈ Rk+. Further define Ct = (sup Ck,t)k∈{1,...,m}.
Let the different fields of knowledge constitute different sectors producing intermediate
good xk , k ∈ {1, ...,m}. Suppose each sector is characterized by an oligopolistic struc-
ture of n firms indexed by l ∈ {1, ..., n}. The oligopolistic structure can be interpreted
as resulting from ”equivalent innovation” as for example used in Young (1998). The
argument is that inventions are oftentimes ”paralleled by equivalent but unlike means
for reaching the same goal around the same time” (Gilfillan, 1935).2 This may be the
case if ideas cannot be fully monopolized such as when imitation or ”inventing around”
is possible. Or an increase in the knowledge stock may be interpreted as process inno-
vations which cannot be patented. In contrast to the model of Young (1998), however,
the variety in each sector is exogenous and there is only quality improving innovation.
1Recall that (A1) requires that if a person knows an idea indexed by i, she must also know all ideas
j, with j < i.
2The quote was taken from Young (1998).
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10.1.2 Final Goods Production
The final-goods sector produces the homogeneous consumption good by the following
production function:
F ((xk,t)k∈{1,...,m}, LA,t) = L1−αA,t
m∑
k=1
xαk,t.
There is a continuum of identical firms on [0,1], and we will again work with a rep-
resentative final-goods firm whose factor demand and output values are interpreted as
aggregate values. Consequently the representative firm solves
max
xt,LA,t
pifpt = F ((xk,t)k∈{1,...,m}, LA,t)−
m∑
k=1
pxk,txk,t − wA,tLA,t.
Accordingly, the demand for labor and intermediate goods is characterized by
pxk,t = αx
α−1
k,t L
1−α
A,t , ∀k ∈ {1, ...,m},
wA,t = (1− α)L−αA,t
m∑
k=1
xαk,t.
10.1.3 The Intermediate Goods Sectors
As in the basic model, the intermediate firms in the the different intermediate goods
sectors are managed by the capital owners, that is the old generation. The shareholders
of each firm decide collectively on the investment in knowledge codification by the same
process as described in section 3.2.1. Assume that each intermediate firm faces codifi-
cation costs of γt per idea.
Each sector produces an intermediate product xk according to the production function
G(Kk, τk) = Kkτ
ψ
α
k . Where Kk denotes the specific capital stock and τk represents the
knowledge stock in the specific field.3 The knowledge stock of an intermediate firm is
defined as the highest index in the set of all researchers’ human capital of firm l with
respect to the field of knowledge k. More precisely, τk,l,t := sup∪Pt∈Gk,l,tTPt,k, where, in
analogy to the basic model, Gk,l,t denotes the research group employed by intermediate
firm l in sector k. Accordingly define the knowledge stock of sector k as τk,t := supl τk,l,t
and the knowledge stock of the economy as the vector τt = (τk,t)k∈{1,...,m}. Human capital
of a person Pt again originates from three sources:
τPt = q(τk,t−1)k∈{1,...,m} + β(0, ...,max{0, Ck,l,t − qτk,t−1}, 0, ..., 0) (10.1)
+εm(0, ..., (qτk,t−1 + βmax{0, Ck,l,t − qτk,t−1})Φ, ..., 0).
3The interpretation of Kk as specific capital is not necessary for the results. It can also be interpreted
as general capital.
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First, every individual exogenously receives a share q of the economy’s knowledge stock
of the previous period, e.g. by some sort of schooling. Note that the persons are
transferred a share of each of the different knowledge stocks τk, which then enables them
to do research in any sector. Again, the transfer is imperfect: q ∈ (0, 1).
As a second source, the members of the new generation who are becoming researchers
in an intermediate firm can enhance their human capital by attending to codified ideas
if the previous generations of researchers in this firm have codified their sector specific
knowledge. Ck,l,t denotes the highest index of all ideas in firm l’s knowledge database.
Again (A2’) is required to hold with respect to knowledge codification.
A person Pt deciding to do research additionally generates a number εm(qτk,t−1 +
βmax{0, Ck,l,t − qτk,t−1})Φ of new ideas in her specific field of research k. It is as-
sumed that the variety m of a person’s knowledge positively affects research success and
that the number of new ideas generated are a function of a person’s entire knowledge in
the respective field. This corresponds to a specification with Φ˜ = 1.
The interpretation of equation (10.1) is that the members of the young generation are
exogenously transferred a certain general education and will then acquire sector specific
knowledge by utilizing the firm’s knowledge database and own research. Suppose now a
person is hired in sector k by firm l. She is then a member of this firm’s research group
Gk,l,t. In accordance to the basic specification, we assume that there are spillovers within
research groups but no spillovers between research groups of different firms within the
same sector k or between sectors.4 Consequently, this person’s human capital in the
field k then writes
τPt,k = qτk,t−1 + βmax{0, Ck,l,t − qτk,t−1} (10.2)
+εm(qτk,t−1 + βmax{0, Ck,l,t − qτk,t−1)ΦLGk,l,t ,
where LGk,l,t denotes the size of the research group.5 This is the k− th projection of Pt’s
knowledge. All members of a firm’s research group are symmetric with respect to knowl-
edge as they are transferred the same ideas exogenously and build up additional human
capital from the same stock of codified ideas within the intermediate firm. Equivalently
to the basic model there is the symmetry of the workers’ knowledge which is determined
by the exogenously transferred ideas. Within a period t, an intermediate firm in sector
k maximizes
max
xk,l,t,LGk,l,t
piintk,l,t = pxk,t(xk,t)xk,l,t − wR,tLGk,l,t ,
where xk,t =
∑
l xk,l,t.
4Note that spillovers within periods could also be allowed for without qualitative effects on the results
with respect to knowledge codification. Conceptionally, they could be interpreted as endogenous
spillovers within a generation by own research in the style of Cohen and Levinthal (1989).
5More precisely, it is defined as the Lebesgue-measure of Gk,l,t.
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For a given capital stock Kk,l,t, the problem is one-dimensional in LGk,l,t and the factor
demand is given by
wR,t = pxk,t(xk,t)
∂xk,l,t
∂LGk,l,t
+
∂pxk,t(xk,t)
∂xk,t
∂xk,t
∂xk,l,t
∂xk,l,t
∂LGk,l,t
xk,l,t.
Using the first order condition of the final-goods firm yields6
wR,t = αx
α−1
k,t L
1−α
A,t
∂xk,l,t
∂LGk,l,t
+ α(α− 1)xα−2k,t L1−αA,t
∂xk,l,t
∂LGk,l,t
xk,l,t. (10.3)
10.1.4 The Problem of the Household
The problem of the household remains principally the same as in the basic model. That
is, each individual decides on the amount of physical capital savings decentrally and
with regard to investment in knowledge codification participates in a collective decision
within the firm. Let the utility function be specified as in the basic model by (c1)- (c4).
As we would like to focus on symmetric equilibria, we make the following additional
assumption:
Assumption 10.1
. Each individual’s physical capital savings are used by only one firm. That is, each
individual is capital owner of exactly one firm.
. An individual of the young generation buys the shares of his ancestor and may
additionally ”net-save” a certain amount of his wage.
It is assumed that each individual is free to work in final-goods production or as a
researcher in any of the intermediate firms. By this, there is only one labor market
and in equilibrium, the individuals will be symmetric with respect to wage income when
young. Hence, a member Pt of the young generation who invests in firm l of sector k
faces the problem:
max
st,ςt
Ut(c1,Pt , c2,Pt) = u(c1,Pt) + δu(c2,Pt)
subject to
c1,Pt = wt(1− sPt − ςPt),
c2,Pt = (1 + rk,l,t+1)sPtwt.
we denote the set of capital owners of firm l in sector k in period t + 1 by Pk,l,t. A
member of this set then proposes a codification investment
ζk,l,t =
∫
Pk,l,t
ζPtdPt,
6The sufficient condition writes α(α− 1)xα−2k,t
(
∂xk,l,t
∂LGk,l,t
)2
L1−αA,t [2+ (α− 2)xk,l,txk,t ] < 0. As
xk,l,t
xk,t
≤ 1, the
second order condition for a profit maximum holds.
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where ζPt = ςPtwt. Due to the symmetry of all Pt ∈ Pk,l,t, each individual makes the same
proposal (which will then be accepted, of course) derived from the first order conditions:
u′(c1,Pt) = δu
′(c2,Pt)(1 + rk,l,t+1),
u′(c1,Pt) = δu
′(c2,Pt)
∂rk,l,t+1
∂ςPt
sPt .
In this way, firm l’s capital stock in t+ 1 is equal to
Sk,l,t =
∫
Pk,l,t
SPtdPt,
where SPt = sPtwt.
10.1.5 Equilibrium
It is assumed that allm sectors are symmetric with respect to the initial knowledge stock
τk,0 = τ¯0 and capital stocks Kk,1 = K¯1, and so are all firms: Kk,l,1 = K¯l,1, τk,l,0 = τ¯0,
Ck,l,1 = C¯1.
Definition 10.1 Given Kk,1, τk,0>0, Ck,l,1≥0,Kk,l,t+1=Sk,l,t and Ck,l,t+1=f(Ck,l,t, ζk,l,t),
a sequential markets equilibrium is allocations (c2,P0)P0∈P0, {(c1,Pt , c2,Pt , SPt , ζPt)Pt∈Pt , LA,t,
(LGk,l,t)∀(l,k), (xk,l,t)∀(l,k)}∞t=1 and prices {wt, (pxk,t)k∈{1,...,m}}∞t=1, such that
(i) they solve the utility maximization problem of the households and the profit maxi-
mization problems of the representative final-product firm and of the intermediate
goods firms for all t ≥ 1, and
(ii) in every period, the economy is in temporary equilibrium, that is, for all t ≥ 1:
(a) (Labor Market)
Lst = L
d
A,t +
m∑
k=1
n∑
l=1
LdGk,l,t ;
(d) (m Intermediate Goods Markets)
n∑
l=1
xsk,l,t = x
d
k,t;
(e) (Final Goods Market)
Y st =
∫
Ptc1,PtdPt+
∫
Pt−1c2,Pt−1dPt−1+
∑
k
∑
l
∫
Pk,l,tSPtdPt+
∑
k
∑
l
∫
Pk,l,tζPtdPt.
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Before determining the equilibrium prices and allocations, some preliminary considera-
tions are helpful. In the first period, the capital and information stocks of all firms are
equal and all members of the young generation are symmetric with respect to human
capital before they are hired. Therefore, all intermediate goods markets must show a
symmetric equilibrium in the first period. As in all m markets there is the same number
n of firms, all research groups will be of the same size and all intermediate firms make
the same profit. According to assumption 10.1, the young generation of the next period
takes over the firm-specific capital of the old generation and decides on ’net-saving’7 and
knowledge codification. As the members of the young generation are all symmetric with
respect to wage income and preferences and each firm is owned by an identical share
of the population, it is common knowledge that a symmetric equilibrium will again re-
sult in period t + 1. Consequently, the problems of the individuals are identical and
it is convenient to work with a representative household. Note that in the symmetric
equilibrium no agent has an incentive to deviate, that is, invest his physical capital in
another firm because the return on capital is the same in all intermediate firms. Fur-
ther, a single individual, possessing measure zero, cannot influence the return on capital.
This does not mean that there are no other equilibria, but rather that the symmetric
equilibrium exists as long as the individuals cannot effectively coordinate their capital
savings decision. In the following, we will only focus on this symmetric equilibrium.
Consider the intermediate goods markets. In a sector k, each firm’s reaction function
is given by equation (10.3). Due to the symmetry of the firms with respect to physical
capital, the resulting equilibrium amount of researchers hired by the firms must also be
symmetric. This results in identical supplies of intermediate goods xk,l,t,∀(k, l). The
equilibrium price for the intermediate good xk can then be written as
pxk,t = α(nxk,l,t)
α−1L1−αA,t .
Turning to the labor market, the equilibrium requires that wA,t = wR,t = wt:
(1− α)L1−αA,t
m∑
k=1
xαk,t = αx
α−1
k,t L
1−α
A,t
∂xk,l,t
∂LGk,l,t
+ α(α− 1)xα−2k,t L1−αA,t
∂xk,l,t
∂LGk,l,t
xk,l,t.
Due to the above symmetry arguments, it can be transformed to
(1− α)L−αA,tm(nxk,l,t)α=α(nxk,l,t)α−1L1−αA,t
∂xk,l,t
∂LGk,l,t
+ α(α− 1)(nxk,l,t)α−2L1−αA,t
∂xk,l,t
∂LGk,l,t
xk,l,t
and further to
LA,t =
(1− α)mn
ψ(1− 1−α
n
)
xk,l,t
∂xk,l,t
∂LGk,l,t
.
7Note that the assumption of capital to be eatable would also allow for negative net-saving without
problems between generations.
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Cancelling Kk,l,t yields
LA,t =
(1− α)mn
ψ(1− 1−α
n
)
τk,l,t
∂τk,l,t
∂LGk,l,t
. (10.4)
Given the firm’s knowledge stock in field k by equation (10.2), the equilibrium amount
of labor for the two occupations in the first period writes
LA,t = min
{
1,
(1− α)
ψ(1− 1−α
n
) + 1− α
(
n[qτk,t−1 + βmax{0, Ck,l,t − qτk,t−1]
ε[qτk,t−1 + βmax{0, Ck,l,t − qτk,t−1]Φ + 1
)}
,
LGk,l,t = max
0, ψ((1− α)
−1 − n−1)− n[qτk,t−1+βmax{0,Ck,l,t−qτk,t−1]
ε[qτk,t−1+βmax{0,Ck,l,t−qτk,t−1]Φ
ψ((1− α)−1 − n−1) + 1)nm
 .
Using the same line of argument as in appendix 7.2, it is easily verified that the share
of researchers will always be positive for Φ = 0 and in the case Φ = 1, positive research
in equilibrium requires that the following inequality holds:
ψ((1− α)−1 − n−1) ≥ n
ε
. (10.5)
Otherwise, the labor market equilibrium will be characterized by the corner solution
LA,t = 1 and LGk,l,t = 0, ∀(l, k). Again we assume that condition (10.5) holds in the
following.
Using the homogenous consumption good as the numéraire, the equilibrium prices in
each period are written as
wt = (1− α)(ψ((1− α)−1 − n−1) + 1)α
(
n[qτk,t−1+βmax{0,Ck,l,t−qτk,t−1]
ε[qτk,t−1+βmax{0,Ck,l,t−qτk,t−1]Φ + 1
)−α
mnαKαk,l,t
(
qτk,t−1 + βmax{0, Ck,l,t − qτk,t−1}
+ε
ψ((1−α)−1−n−1)− n[qτk,t−1+βmax{0,Ck,l,t−qτk,t−1]
ε[qτk,t−1+βmax{0,Ck,l,t1−qτk,t−1]Φ
ψ((1−α)−1−n−1)+1)n
)ψ
,
pxk,t = αn
α−1Kα−1k,l,t
(
qτk,t−1 + βmax{0, Ck,l,t − qτk,t−1}
+ε
ψ((1−α)−1−n−1)− n[qτk,t−1+βmax{0,Ck,l,t−qτk,t−1]
ε[qτk,t−1+βmax{0,Ck,l,t−qτk,t−1]Φ
ψ((1−α)−1−n−1)+1)n
)(1−α)(1−ψ
α
)
(ε[qτk,t−1 + βmax{0, Ck,l,t − qτk,t−1}]Φ)α−1
(
(1−α)mn
α(1− 1−α
n
)
)1−α
, ∀k.
10.2 Dynamics and Knowledge Codification
The resulting dynamics of the economic system are given by τt+1 = (τk,t+1)k∈{1,...,m},
Kt+1 = (Kk,t+1)k∈{1,...,m} and Ct+1 = (Ck,t+1)k∈{1,...,m}. Due to the symmetry, the econ-
omy’s dynamics are completely described by the k-th projection. Hence, the system can
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be reduced to
Kk,l,t+1 = stwt(nm)
−1 = st(1− α)nα−1L−αA,tKαk,l,tτψk,t,
τk,t+1 = qτk,t+βmax{0, Ck,l,t+1−qτk,t}+εm[qτk,t + βmax{0, Ck,l,t+1 − qτk,t]ΦLGk,l,t ,
Ck,l,t+1 = Ck,l,t +4Ck,l,t,
which is structurally equivalent to that of the previous chapter. The ‘standing on the
shoulders of giants’ specification would resemble the (Φ, Φ˜) = (1, 1)-case. Furthermore,
using the equilibrium values, the return on capital calculates to
rk,l,t = K
α−1
k,l,t τ
ψ
k,t n
α−1L−αA,t(LA,t − 1 + α)︸ ︷︷ ︸
f(LA,t)
.
This shows the form required by (P3). The wages can be written as
wR,t =
λ︷ ︸︸ ︷
α
(
1− 1− α
n
)
nα−1
ψ
α
L1−αA,t K
α
k,l,tτ
ψ−1
k,t
∂τk,t
∂LGk,l,t
,
wA,t = (1− α)nαm︸ ︷︷ ︸
κ
L−αA,tK
α
k,l,tτ
ψ
k,t,
and consequently exhibit the form given in (P2). The production function of final goods
simplifies to
Yt = mn
α︸︷︷︸
ξ
L1−αA,t K
α
k,l,tτ
ψ
k,t,
which satisfies (P1). Hence, we can formulate:
Proposition 10.1 The depicted oligopolistic structure satisfies properties (U), (K1),
(A2’), (P1)-(P3). (M1) is satisfied for the case with Φ = 1.
Proof. (P1)-(P3) is shown above, requirement (K1) follows from the respective equation
of the dynamical system as given above and (A2’) holds by assumption. (U) results from
the fact that all utility functions satisfying (c3) must also satisfy the weaker requirement
(c3’). As the specification of ideas per researcher represents the case with Φ˜ = 1, lemma
9.1 implies that if additionally Φ = 1, ∂
2rt+1
∂4C2e,t < 0, ∀ψ ∈ (0, 1] and hence,
∂M
∂4Ce,t < 0.
Further, ∂
2rt+1
∂4C2e,t < 0 implies that the utility function, as it additionally satisfies (c4), suf-
fices for the second order conditions of the household’s maximization problem to hold.
Hence, (M1) is given with Φ = 1. In the case with Φ = 0, an additional assumption, for
example ψ ≤ α, would be necessary for (M1). 
Assuming (10.5) to hold precludes atomistic competition and, thus, the oligopolistic
firms possess positive measure. In this way, proposition 10.1 implies that the results
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of the basic model also apply to a setting with more than one knowledge stock and
oligopolistic intermediate firms.
The question arises what can be said about the effects of market structure on the alloca-
tion of labor in equilibrium and the amount of knowledge codification. Answering these
questions requires a thorough analysis which is beyond the scope of this thesis. Hence,
we will only give a short sketch of some expected effects assuming ψ = α and Φ = 1.
With regard to the allocation of labor, the intuition would be that the equilibrium share
of workers is increasing in the number of firms in each sector. The argument is that
with increasing competition, the equilibrium prices of the intermediate goods decrease,
respectively, the aggregate supply of the intermediate product in one sector increases,
which positively affects the marginal productivity of labor in final-goods production.
In contrast to this, research productivity does not increase in the number of firms in
a sector. Another reason is that due to a decreasing amount of capital of the single
intermediate firms in n in the symmetric equilibrium, the return on an additional idea
invented decreases as well. Hence the shift of labor from research to final goods produc-
tion in n.
The following line of argument shows that the above intuition is correct. The derivative
of LA,t with respect to n writes
∂LA,t
∂n
=
(1− α)(2nα(α− 1) + n2 + εα(1− α))
ε(α(1− α)− n)2 .
It will be positive, whenever
−εα(1− α) < 2nα(α− 1) + n2.
Rewriting the right hand side as n[(1−α)2+α2+n− 1] reveals that it must be positive
for n ≥ 1. As the left hand side is negative for n ≥ 1, the condition is satisfied. 
Note that such an effect is not present with regard to the number of the economy’s
sectors m. The reason is that the variety of knowledge is assumed to positively affect
research success. Due to the above specification both, the productivity of workers in
final-goods production and the research productivity are increasing at the same rate in
m. However, the share of researchers per firm is decreasing in a symmetric equilibrium,
as the total share is distributed over a higher number of intermediate firms if m is in-
creasing.
With respect to the effect of the market structure on knowledge codification, matters
become much more complicated. According to the representative household’s first order
conditions, the optimal choice of knowledge codification, given a certain amount of
physical capital saved, must satisfy
∂rk,l,t+1
∂4Ck,l,t
∂4Ck,l,t
∂ζPt
SPt = 1 + rk,l,t+1,
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where γt4Ck,l,t =
∫
Pk,l,t ζPtdPt =
1
nm
ζPt and Kk,l,t =
∫
Pk,l,t SPtdPt =
1
nm
SPt .
With ψ = α, the above condition can be written as
Kαk,l,tn
α−1ν¯1−α
„
∂τk,t+1
∂LGk,l,t
«α−1
µ(1+ εn)=γt+γtK
α−1
k,l,tn
α−1ν¯−α
 
∂τk,t+1
∂LGlk,t
!α 
ν¯τk,t+1
„
∂τk,t+1
∂LGk,l,t
«−1
−1+α
!
,(10.6)
where ν¯ = (1−α)nm
α(1− 1−α
n
)
and µ = (1 + ν¯ 1
nm
)−1. Again, the left hand side of the above
equation represents the increase in consumption when old by an additional unit of the
homogenous good spent on knowledge codification, whereas the right hand side depicts
the opportunity costs of not having spent it in physical capital. Note that both the
return on capital (as the profits are declining) and the codification benefit are declining
in n. To see the latter, consider the four terms on the left hand side that depend on
n,(nα−1, ν¯1−α,µ,
(
1 + ε
n
)
) and combine nα−1 and ν¯1−α to(
(1− α)m
α(1− 1−α
n
)
)1−α
.
This term is decreasing in n. So is µ
(
1 + ε
n
)
, as we know from the considerations on
the equilibrium shares of labor, that the share of researchers LGk,l,t must be declining in
n. This implies that τk,t+1 is decreasing in n. For Φ = 1 and using (10.4), τk,t+1 can be
rewritten as
τk,t+1 = (qτk,t + βmax{0, Ck,l,t − qτk,t})µ
(
1 +
ε
n
)
,
and, hence, τk,t+1 can only decline in n if µ
(
1 + ε
n
)
does. With both the return on
physical capital and the marginal benefit of knowledge codification declining with lower
market concentration, the amount of the homogenous good transferred to the next period
will be lower. It may then be expected that both knowledge codification and physical
capital investments decline in n, which negatively affects long run economic growth.
This indicates that there may also exist a tradeoff between static and dynamic efficiency
with respect to the creation of endogenous spillovers by knowledge codification. At this
point, a further elaboration must be left for future research.
10.3 Summary
This chapter has outlined a model structure with more than one stock of knowledge,
each constituting an intermediate sector with oligopolistic competition. Knowledge of a
person has been defined as a vector in a multidimensional knowledge space. Again, it
originates from an exogenously transferred share of the economy’s knowledge stock of
the previous period in every field. When being hired as a researcher by an intermediate
firm in a specific sector, this person additionally develops expertise in the respective
field of knowledge by attending to the intermediate firm’s knowledge database and own
research within the firm’s research group. It has been shown that under certain symme-
try assumptions such a structure exhibits the properties sufficient for the main results
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as introduced in the previous chapter.
This chapter ended with a brief discussion of effects of market structure in the interme-
diate sectors on knowledge codification and economic growth, suggesting that there may
also exist a tradeoff between static and dynamic efficiency with respect to the creation
of endogenous spillovers by knowledge codification. Such an effect, however, needs to be
verified by a thorough analysis, which is beyond the scope of this dissertation.
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Chapter 11
Relation to Romer’s Model of Endogenous
Technological Change
This chapter reflects on the relation of the model introduced in the first two parts
to standard endogenous growth theory at the example of Romer’s model of endoge-
nous technological change (Romer, 1990). This model has been chosen for two reasons.
Firstly, it is a seminal contribution to the theory of endogenous growth. In particular
many idea- or R&D-driven endogenous growth models, resemble his model structure.
Secondly, the engine of growth in Romer (1990) is a growing variety of products, that
is, horizontal innovation. This challenges the interpretation of the knowledge dynamics
as given in the first part.
The first section of this chapter outlines the main differences between the models intro-
duced in the earlier chapters and the Romer model. Thereafter the question is raised
whether Romer’s microeconomic structure could be translated into an overlapping gen-
erations framework with imperfect knowledge spillovers between generations. A corre-
sponding interpretation of the Romer model is given and problems as well as further
necessary assumptions are discussed. The result is that in such a framework, private
knowledge codification within intermediate firms could not be explained but only knowl-
edge codification as the outcome of a collective decision, for example, within a state.
Allowing for such “social” knowledge codification,1 the modified Romer structure would
satisfy the general properties given in section 9.
11.1 What are the Differences to the Romer Model?
The following points can be identified.
. Distinction between Knowledge and Human Capital
In Romer (1990), knowledge is seen as a set of ideas or designs that are idealized
as disembodied and non-rival. Once a design has been invented, it can be used for
all times. The underlying argument is that by patenting the intermediate good
built from the respective design, the idea is fully codified and, hence, can be drawn
upon whenever necessary. In contrast, human capital is rivalrous and defined as
1The outcome is not necessarily identical to the one chosen by a social planner maximizing welfare of
all generations.
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years of education or training.2 Human capital is exogenous in Romer’s model and
stays at a fixed level.3
The model proposed in the present thesis differs in that human capital comple-
ments idea-driven growth. More precisely, the researchers need the respective
human capital in order to conceive ideas. In this way, the stock of human capital
determines which ideas can be used productively. It is argued that ideas embodied
in patents or intermediate products are in general not sufficient for the transfer of
knowledge between generations if the young generation lacks the requisite human
capital. In this way, knowledge may be lost in the transition between generations.
It is purposeful and costly knowledge codification that establishes the public good
characteristics that Romer attaches to his notion of knowledge.
. Horizontal Innovation
In the Romer model growth is driven by innovation that enhances the variety of
intermediate goods.
The knowledge concept as introduced in section 2.2, shows a hierarchical structure
in that ideas are ordered according to their difficulty. This intuitively suggests an
interpretation as vertical innovation, that is, quality improving innovation.
. Household is Ramsey Consumer
max
c
∫ ∞
t=0
U(c)e−ρtdt , U(c) =
c1−θ − 1
1− θ .
This means that the households in the Romer model maximize utility which is
the discounted sum of utility over an infinite time horizon instead of only over
a lifetime of two periods as in the overlapping generations model of the present
dissertation.
. Three Production Sectors
Instead of only two production sectors where research is conducted within an inter-
mediate firm, the Romer specification shows three sectors.4 In principle, an extra
research sector in which individual researchers are inventing designs is added. They
sell each design to a firm in the intermediate sector, which together with physical
capital produce the respective intermediate good. Further, an intermediate firm
receives a permanent monopoly on the intermediate good originating from the re-
spective design. By using the intermediate goods and labor, the final goods firms
2This is different from the notion of human capital used in models of growth based on unlimited human
capital accumulation such as Lucas (1988).
3Human capital can be seen as a scaling factor of the researchers’ productivity. See also the discussions
on the scale effect in growth models.
4However, Romer modelled three sectors mainly for analytical convenience.
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produce the homogenous consumption good.
. No decision maker possesses positive measure
Although the intermediate sector is characterized by monopolistic firms that pos-
sesses market power in the market for intermediate goods, a single firm cannot
influence aggregate values as it is a point on a continuum of intermediate firms.
The latter also holds true with respect to the single final goods firms and the
households.
11.2 An Interpretation of the Romer Model
This section raises the following question: Is it possible within the Romer structure to
deviate from the assumption of perfect intergenerational knowledge spillovers in the way
proposed in the previous parts of the dissertation, and if so, what can be said about the
endogenous creation of spillovers by knowledge codification?
The following discussion of this question, considers a version of the Romer model that
is characterized by three modifications:
(1) Individuals live for two periods and maximize
Ut(c1,t, c2,t+1) = u(c1,t) + δu(c2,t+1), whereu(c) =
c1−θ − 1
1− θ ;
(2) Imperfect knowledge transfer between generations;
(3) Monopoly rights for intermediate goods only for one period.
In principle, the modifications one and three just translate the continuous time structure
of the Romer model into an overlapping generations framework where the households do
not have altruistic preferences for their successors and the researchers can monopolize
their ideas only during their professional life. She neither receives monopoly rents when
old nor bequeaths them to their descendants.5
The following sections will discuss in more detail how item 2 can be incorporated into
the model and which assumptions on the knowledge dynamics would be necessary to
show the form of property (K1) with horizontal innovation.6 It is further elaborated on
whether the microeconomic structure of the modified Romer model would satisfy the
general properties of the models introduced in this thesis as given in chapter 9? We
could ask: Would short lived economic agents codify their knowledge in an overlapping
5This corresponds to the model in Judd (1985).
6Property (K1) requires that the dynamics of the knowledge stock can be described by τt+1 = qτt +
βmax{0, Ct+1 − qτt}+ ε
[
qτt + Φ˜(βmax{0, Ct+1 − qτt})
]Φ
LR,t+1.
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generations economy with the microeconomic structure of the Romer model and imper-
fect knowledge transfer between generations?
The answer must be ”No”, since in the structure of the Romer model no decision maker
possesses positive measure. Hence, the necessary condition (N) for knowledge codifica-
tion is violated. No decision maker would invest in knowledge codification as it cannot
influence the knowledge stock of the next period. Thus, within the Romer structure
there cannot be private knowledge codification within firms as in the model discussed in
the previous parts.
In the following model structure, we will allow for social knowledge codification, being
the result of a collective decision of the households within a state. This could be inter-
preted as the state providing public libraries and creating publicly accessible knowledge
databases. The corresponding decision process could be modelled in the same way as
that within the intermediate firm as described in the specification of the basic model
settings in the first part of the dissertation.
11.3 The Modified Romer Model
11.3.1 The Production Sector
Final goods production is characterized by a continuum (on [0,1]) of identical firms
producing the homogenous good by using labor LA,t and the intermediate good xi,t as
inputs. The firms maximize profits and act competitively in the product and factor mar-
kets. Again final goods production is modelled by means of a representative firm whose
production and factor demands represent aggregate values. The aggregate production
function of the Romer model is given by the following extension of the Cobb-Douglas
production function:
F ((xi,t)i≤τt , LA,t) = L
1−α
A,t
∫ τt
i=0
xt(i)
αdi.
The intermediate goods can be distinguished by whether they are competitive or mo-
nopolized. As a consequence, the different intermediate goods come at different prices
and it will be convenient to write the aggregate production function as
F ((xi,t)i≤τt , LA,t) = L
1−α
A,t
[∫ τf,t
i=0
xαi,tdi+
∫ τt
i=τf,t
xαi,tdi
]
,
where [0, τf,t] is the set of freely available ideas and (τf,t, τt] is the set of ideas that are
monopolized. The representative firm solves the following maximization problem:
max
xi,t,LA,t
pifpt = F ((xi,t)i≤τt , LA,t)−
∫ τf,t
i=0
pxi,txi,tdi−
∫ τt
i=τf,t
pxi,txi,tdi− wA,tLA,t.
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As it is a constant-returns-to-scale firm, its factor demands are defined only after the
scale of operation is pinned down. However, the demand for labor and intermediate
goods is characterized by the first order conditions. Labor and the intermediate goods
are being compensated by their marginal product:
xdi,t =
(pxi,t
α
) 1
α−1
LA,t, i ≤ τt,
LdA,t =
(
1− α
wA,t
) 1
α
[
∫ τf,t
i=0
xαi,tdi+
∫ τt
i=τf,t
xαi,tdi]
1
α .
11.3.2 Knowledge Dynamics and the Research Sector
Let the set-theoretic representation of knowledge and information be the same as intro-
duced in the first part of the thesis. The following operationalizes it in a way to explicitly
account for horizontal innovations. The knowledge stock is again represented as an in-
terval in R, that is, I = R+. This time, however, the ordering concept is characterized by
Assumption (A1’) If i is embodied in Person Pt, then there exists a Person P ′t ∈ Pt
who knows j, where j < i, ∀i, j ∈ I
This can be interpreted as chronological order when assuming that within a period,
the researchers are discovering the different ideas slightly one after the other. Or if
different ideas are invented exactly at the same time, the respective indices are assigned
randomly among them. This means that if i < j then idea i has been discovered earlier
than idea j. Recalling the bookshelf example, this would imply that the books are or-
dered, e.g. from left to right, starting with the ones containing the ideas invented early
in time. Again, they are indexed continuously beginning at 0.
Note that assumption (A1’) does not imply that the Lebesgue measure of a person’s
human capital is equal to the highest index in the set of ideas, λ(TPt) 6= sup TPt . Let
τPt = λ(TPt). In contrast to the hierarchical ordering concept,
λ : (I,B)→ R+, τPt = λ(TPt),
where B denotes the Borel-σ-algebra, is no bijection. Let the knowledge stock of an
economy in period t be defined as the union of all sets of human capital, Tt = ∪Pt∈PtTPt .
(A1’) then implies a bijection
λ : (I,B)→ R+, with τt = λ(Tt).
The unique inverse would be λ−1(τt) = Tt(= [0, τt]). In this way, the economy’s
knowledge stock can be represented in analogy to the first part of the dissertation by
τt = λ(Tt) = sup∪Pt∈PtTPt .
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Again, human capital of a person Pt ∈ Pt may originate from three sources and its
measure is written as
τPt = qτt−1 + βmax{0, Ct − qτt−1}+ ε(qτt−1 + βmax{0, Ct − qτt−1})Φ.
First, every individual is exogenously transferred a share q of the economy’s knowledge
stock of the previous period. This transfer is imperfect q ∈ (0, 1) and characterized by
the following assumption.
Assumption (KT) In a period t, if an idea indexed by i has been transferred from the
previous generation to the young generation of t, so has been idea j, j < i.
In this way, the share q of the economy’s knowledge stock that has been discovered
earliest is transferred to the next generation in every period.
As a second source, the members of the new generation can enhance their human capital
by utilizing codified ideas if previous generations codified their knowledge. With regard
to knowledge codification, it is not necessary to modify (A2) or (A2’). As in large parts
of the thesis, (A2’) is assumed.7
Finally, if person Pt decides to do research, she is able to generate a measure ε(qτt−1 +
βmax{0, Ct − qτt−1})Φ of new ideas. Denote τf,t := qτt−1 + βmax{0, Ct − qτt−1}. As
in Romer (1990), we assume that an idea that a researcher discovers is not only new to
herself but also to all other persons Pt ∈ Pt of the same generation.
Definition 11.1 A researcher P1,t has invented an idea i that is objectively new with
respect to the generation born in period t if at the very moment of its discovery,
i /∈ TPt , ∀Pt ∈ Pt \ P1,t.
Note, that this is different from the specification of the basic model, which only assumes
subjective novelty to the inventor. With respect to the magnitude to which research
productivity depends on the existing knowledge stock the Romer specification clearly
represents the Φ = 1 case. The assumption with respect to research is then:
Assumption (A3) In a period t, every researcher invents a measure ετf,t of objectively
new ideas with respect to the generation born in period t.
In the Romer model, each person decides as to whether she is going to work in final-
goods production or to do research. Let LR,t denote the number of persons who decided
to do research in period t and let them be arranged on the continuum from 0 to LR,t.
The knowledge level, that is, the set of ideas embodied in a single person depends on
assumptions about spillovers within a generation.
7(A2’) required that in a period t and for all i, j ≥ qτt, if i is codified in period t, then j < i is also
codified in t.
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Without spillovers, researchers would be heterogeneous with regard to human capital,
as by assumption each researcher invents a measure ε(qτt−1 + βmax{0, Ct − qτt−1}) of
objectively new ideas with respect to her own generation. On the other hand, assuming
perfect spillovers within a generation, the researchers (and possibly the workers) would
be symmetric with respect to knowledge. The assumptions (KT), (A1’), (A2’) and (A3)
would allow for both, no spillovers or perfect spillovers within generations, and yield the
dynamics of the economy’s knowledge stock according to8
τt = (qτt−1 + βmax{0, Ct − qτt−1})(1 + εLR,t) = τf,t(1 + εLR,t). (11.1)
According to the Romer model, each researcher sells the designs she invented at the
price p(i) to an intermediate firm, which then enjoys a monopoly on i. Let TPt,inv be
the set of ideas discovered by researcher Pt ∈ [0, LR,t]. According to (A3), λ(TPt,inv) =
ε(qτt−1 + βmax{0, Ct − qτt−1}). Then a researcher’s income accrues to
wR,t =
∫
TPt,inv
p(i)di. (11.2)
In the Romer model it is assumed that the intermediate firm receives a patent for
the intermediate good produced according to design i. Assuming imperfect knowledge
transfer between generations implies that research duplication is possible. And in the
present model, (A1’) and (A3) imply that those ideas that have not been transferred are
re-invented in the next period. Although research duplication is considered in growth
models, it is mostly incorporated by a lower marginal productivity of labor engaged in
research.9 With the present specification, the question has to be answered as to whether
ideas that are new to a generation but have been patented in a previous period can still
yield monopoly rents. If the answer is yes, (11.2) reflects a researcher’s income. The
following lines of argument would support a positive answer.
. No spillovers within generations
Assuming no spillovers between researchers of the same generation, would imply
that the respective researcher is the only person whose human capital comprises
the re-invented idea and due to the horizontal innovation assumption, every per-
son is researching in different fields such that it is not possible to easily imitate
the product once it is on the market. Hence, the re-invented idea earns monopoly
profits.
. Allowing for spillovers within generations
In the reasoning of the Romer model, the patent assures monopoly rents which
otherwise would not accrue as after the intermediate product is launched, every
other person could immediately imitate it due to perfect spillovers. This would
8Note that with the above assumptions, (KT), (A1’), (A2’), and (A3), the difference equation of the
knowledge stock is well defined.
9See e.g. Jones (1995).
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imply that the re-invented idea cannot earn a profit if it is not possible to receive
patent protection again. Allowing for spillovers, the argument must then be that
a modified patent application representing the same idea would lead to patent
protection. In principle, this would correspond to the reasoning behind ”equivalent
innovations” as mentioned in section 10.1.1.
On the other hand, it would seem reasonable to assume that the re-invented ideas do not
earn profits. For the researchers to still be homogenous with respect to income, it would
be necessary that the ratio of research duplication to ideas earning monopoly profits is
the same for all researchers. In this case, however, equation 11.2 must be modified to
reflect the researchers income. Preliminary calculations show that this may thoroughly
complicate the model. Hence, for reasons of simplicity and staying as close to the Romer
model as possible with respect to the mathematical structure, we will choose the first
line of argument, implying monopoly profits for all ideas that are objectively new with
respect to the same generation. This first line of argument is also consistent with the
knowledge concept as introduced in chapter 2.10
11.3.3 The Intermediate Goods Sector
The intermediate goods sector uses designs/ideas together with forgone output of the
last period to produce durables for final goods production. Each intermediate goods firm
produces one durable good. As there are two different kinds of ideas in each period, there
are two kinds of intermediate goods firms. On the one hand, there are the ideas that
have been transferred from the previous period, t− 1. Those are part of every person’s
knowledge in period t and, hence, are fully competitive (as their patent protection has
expired). On the other hand, the ideas invented by the researchers are new with respect
to the generation in t and earn monopoly rents.
(1) The competitive intermediate goods firms produce with a freely available design i ∈
[0, τf,t]. They rent capital at the capital market and produce the intermediate good
from an idea known to anybody. Hence, they act fully competitive. It is assumed
that the production of a unit of the intermediate good takes η units of capital. The
profit maximization problem of the competitive intermediate entrepreneur takes
the following form:
max
xi,t
piintt = pxi,txi,t − rtηxi,t.
The first order condition yields
pxi,t = rtη.
10Note that the second argument for an idea to still yield monopoly profits using the equivalent inno-
vation principle could also apply to the case without spillovers.
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With the inverse demand function of the final goods firms, the competitive en-
trepreneur’s supply of intermediate goods can be written as
xsi,t =
(ηrt
α
) 1
α−1
LA,t,
and consequently the demand for physical capital is
Kdi,t = η
α
α−1
(rt
α
) 1
α−1
LA,t.
(2) The monopolistic intermediate goods firms purchase an idea i ∈ (τf,t, τt] from a
researcher in the research sector and rent physical capital to produce the respective
intermediate good. On the supply side the intermediate entrepreneur acts as a
monopolist. Hence, the optimization problem writes
max
xi,t
piintt = pxi,t(xi,t)xi,t − rtηxi,t − p(i).
Given p(i), this leads to the first order condition
pxi,t +
dpxi,t
dxi,t
xi,t = rtη,
and consequently to
xsi,t =
(ηrt
α2
) 1
α−1
LA,t,
Kdi,t = η
α
α−1
( rt
α2
) 1
α−1
LA,t.
11.3.4 The Problem of the Household
Although the Romer specification of the household is close to the assumptions of the
basic model, there are two main differences. First, the Romer model uses a CIES-utility
function with only a non-negativity constraint on the coefficient of constant intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution, 1/θ, whereas the structure of the model presented in the
present dissertation needs some further assumptions. Second, the household participates
in a collective decision process with respect to knowledge codification.
The particular specification is as follows: There is a continuum of two-period-lived in-
dividuals Pt on [0, 1] =: Pt in each generation. There is no population growth and the
size of each generation is normalized to 1. The individuals inelastically supply one unit
of labor when young and may choose as to whether they want to work in final goods
production or in research and development. The budget constraint when young is given
by the wage wt that can be split into consumption today c1,t, saving wtst in physical
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capital and investment in knowledge codification wtςt. The savings plus the real return
on capital rt+1 equal consumption when old c2,t+1. With respect to knowledge codifica-
tion it is assumed that the household’s take part in a collective decision within a state.
Suppose they have the possibility to decide on a codification tax. This can be conducted
by a similar decision process as that within the intermediate firm of the basic model.
More precisely:
. Any individual of the young generation in a period t can propose a tax rate ςt on
labor income in order to finance knowledge codification.
. Each member of the young generation votes for or against the proposal and the
tax will be introduced if it is approved according to the unanimity rule.
. If the proposal has been accepted, the tax is collected and researchers are paid to
codify their ideas.
Assuming for simplicity that this process does not incur transaction costs, it is not
necessary to explicitly model a government sector. In this way, each young individual
makes a private decision over her physical capital savings and takes part in a collective
decision process concerning knowledge codification. A young individual in period t
maximizes utility by solving a two-stage optimization problem. At the first stage, she
decides whether she would like to make a proposal on the codification tax rate by solving
max
st,ςt
Ut(c1,t, c2,t+1) = u(c1,t) + δu(c2,t+1)
subject to
c1,t = wt(1− st − ςt),
c2,t+1 = (1 + rt+1)stwt.
The household acts competitively with regard to capital investment, taking rt+1 as given.
However, investing in codification increases rt+1. The agent chooses the pair (st, ςt) that
solves the following necessary conditions for a maximum, given by
st =
1 + rt+1
∂rt+1
∂ςt
,
ςt = 1− 1 + rt+1∂rt+1
∂ςt
(
δ−
1
θ (1 + rt+1)
θ−1
θ + 1
)
.
The agent will make a suggestion if her optimal level ςt,opt is greater zero. She will
accept any suggestions ςt,s < ςt,opt. Given a tax rate ςt,s has been approved, the agent
will then at the second stage maximize utility with respect to capital savings St, given ςt,s.
Since in the Romer structure the individuals are flexible to choose their profession, the
wages of the different occupations must be equal in equilibrium. As a consequence, each
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household faces an identical optimization problem, such that every person makes the
same proposal on the tax rate which, of course, will be accepted. Again, it is thus possible
to work with a representative household as being the young generation characterized by
its date of birth t. Each generation faces the first-stage optimization problem and its
solution is interpreted as aggregate savings St and investment in knowledge codification
ζt ≥ 0. As in the basic model, the CIES-utility function exhibits the properties (c1)
-(c3) and with 1
2
1−st−ςt
1−ςt < θ ≤ 1, ∀t, it also satisfies (c4).
11.3.5 The Costs of Knowledge Codification
Let the costs of knowledge codification again be characterized by the same cost function
as in the basic model,
Γt(4Ct) = γt4Ct,
and possibly fixed entry costs that accrue once in the first period of codification. Note
that in the modified Romer structure every researcher invents objectively new ideas.
If there are no spillovers, the researchers may have bargaining power with respect to
knowledge codification. However, the same line of argument as in section 3.3 applies.
That is, the demanding party, in this case the state or government, offers the researcher
a forcing contract that contains a compensation for knowledge codification slightly above
the marginal costs. Again, the demanding party knows that the researcher will be better
off by accepting the contract and, hence, has no incentive to revise the conditions, even
if the researcher would neglect the contract in an early stage of a game with finitely
many stages. If there were knowledge spillovers within periods, the researchers would
codify at the marginal costs according to the Bertrand-reasoning as also put forth in the
basic model.
11.3.6 Sequence of Events
The time-line of the model’s events in a period t are:
(1) At the beginning of period t, the members of the new generation are exogenously
transferred a share q of the knowledge stock of the economy of the previous period:
TPt = {i|i ≤ qτt−1}, Pt ∈ Pt.
(2) If the researchers of the previous periods codified their ideas, the young generation
of t would additionally build up human capital {i|qτt−1 < i ≤ τf,t}.
(3) Each researcher discovers a measure ε(qτt−1 + βmax{0, Ct − qτt−1}) of new ideas.
(4) The competitive intermediate firms rent capital from the capital market at price
rt and produce intermediate good xi,t, i ≤ τf,t. The monopolized intermediate
firms additionally purchase a design from a researcher at price p(i) to produce
intermediate good xi,t, τf,t < i ≤ τt.
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(5) The final-product firm rents the intermediate products at prices pxi,t and hires a
number LA,t of workers at a wage wA,t in order to produce the final good Yt.
(6) At the end of period t, the members of the young generation decide how much of
the wage income to consume c1,t and how much to transfer to the next period t+1.
On the one hand, the young generation may save in physical capital involving a
return rt+1. On the other hand, it may invest in knowledge codification, which
increases the knowledge stock of t+ 1 and consequently the rent rt+1.
(7) Dependent on the compensation ζt, the researchers of period t codify an amount
4Ct of their ideas.
(8) The old generation consumes its savings St−1 = Kt plus the return on capital rtKt
and then dies.
Note, that physical capital is assumed to be putty-putty in Romer (1990), that is, inter-
mediate goods can be converted back into general capital. In this way, an interpretation
as in section 3.5 could apply.
11.3.7 Sequential Markets Equilibrium
The economy comprises the following markets: The labor market, the capital market,
ετf,tLR,t markets for designs, τt markets for intermediate products and the market for
the consumption good. The sequential markets equilibrium is then defined as follows.
Definition 11.2 Given K1, τ0 > 0, C1 ≥ 0, and Ct+1 = f(Ct, ζt), a sequential markets
equilibrium is allocations c2,1, {c1,t, c2,t+1, St, ζt, LA,t, LR,t, xt}∞t=1 and prices {wt, rt,
(pexi,t)i≤τt , (p(i))i>τf,t}∞t=1, such that
(i) they solve the utility maximization problem of the households and the profit maxi-
mization problems of the representative final-product firm and of the intermediate
firms for all t ≥ 1, and
(ii) in every period, the economy is in temporary equilibrium, that is, for all t ≥ 1:
(a) (Labor Market)
Lst = L
d
A,t + L
d
R,t;
(b) (Capital Market)
St−1 = Kt;
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(c) (ετf,tLR,t Markets for Designs)
Each new design is purchased by an intermediate entrepreneur;
(d) (τt Intermediate Goods Markets)
xsi,t = x
d
i,t;
(e) (Final Goods Market)
Y st = c1,t + c2,t + St + ζt.
The intermediate goods markets will be examined first. The representative final goods
firm acts fully competitive in the markets, with the same demand for each kind of
intermediate good due to the additive separability of the production function. However,
supply varies by whether the intermediate entrepreneur possesses a monopoly or acts
competitive. In this way, there are τf,t competitive markets that clear if
xdi,t =
(pxi,t
α
) 1
α−1
LA,t =
(ηrt
α
) 1
α−1
LA,t = x
s
i,t,
where i ≤ τf,t. The equilibrium price and equilibrium quantity are then
pexi,t = ηrt,
xei,t =
(ηrt
α
) 1
α−1
LA,t.
The competitive intermediate firm’s profit is zero. As all competitive entrepreneurs are
symmetric, we denote the equilibrium prices and quantities of each intermediate goods
by pxf ,t and xf,t. The market clearing conditions of the monopolistic intermediate goods
markets are
xdi,t =
(pxi,t
α
) 1
α−1
LA,t =
(ηrt
α2
) 1
α−1
LA,t = x
s
i,t,
where τt ≥ i > τf,t. And the resulting equilibrium prices and quantities can be written
as
pexi,t =
ηrt
α
,
xei,t =
(ηrt
α2
) 1
α−1
LA,t.
Symmetry also applies to monopolistic intermediate goods firms, such that it is con-
venient to work with pxm,t and xm,t as being the equilibrium prices and quantities of
each monopolistic intermediate good. A monopolistic intermediate entrepreneur’s profit
amounts to
piintt = pxm,txm,t − rtηxm,t − p(i) = (ηrt)
α
α−1α
1+α
1−αLA,t(1− α)− p(i).
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Next, consider the capital market. The market is competitive on the demand side as
well as on the supply side. In equilibrium we have∫ τf,t
0
Kdi,tdi+
∫ τt
τf,t
Kdi,tdi = St−1.
Denoting by Kt the total amount of capital available in period t, that is Kt = St−1, and
using the respective demand functions as well as the symmetry of intermediate goods
firms yields ∫ τf,t
0
η
α
α−1
(rt
α
) 1
α−1
LA,tdi+
∫ τt
τf,t
η
α
α−1
( rt
α2
) 1
α−1
LA,tdi = Kt,
and consequently
rt = K
α−1
t η
ααL1−αA,t [τf,t + (τt − τf,t)α
1
1−α ]1−α.
With respect to the markets for designs the assumption is that once a design has been
produced a large number of potential suppliers of the new intermediate good bid for the
right to commercialize it. In this way, the market price for new designs is equal to the
profit of the monopolistic entrepreneur:
p(i) = (ηrt)
α
α−1α
1+α
1−αLA,t(1− α).
Inserting the equilibrium capital rent yields
p(i) = Kαt L
1−α
A,t α
1
1−αηα
1+α
α−1 (1− α)[τf,t + (τt − τf,t)α 11−α ]−α.
Each individual inelastically supplies one unit of labor when young and is free to choose
whether to work in final goods production or in research. Therefore, the labor market
equilibrium is characterized by
Lt = LA,t + LR,t.
For convenience, we are first going to determine the share of each occupational group
via the condition that wages must be equal in equilibrium. As each researcher produces
ετf,t new ideas, her income amounts to
wR,t =
∫
TPt,inv
p(i)di = ετf,t(ηrt)
α
α−1α
1+α
1−αLA,t(1− α).
Using the equilibrium quantities of the intermediate goods markets, the demand for
workers is given by
wA,t = (1− α)
(ηrt
α
) α
α−1
[τf,t + (τt − τf,t)α α1−α ].
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Consequently wR,t = wA,t yields
ετf,tLA,tα
1
1−α = [τf,t + (τt − τf,t)α α1−α ].
Since τt − τf,t = ετf,tLR,t and due to the inelastic labor supply LR,t = 1− LA,t, we have
LA,t =
α
α
α−1 + ε
ε(1 + α)
,
LR,t =
εα− α αα−1
ε(1 + α)
.
The share of workers is smaller than 1 if ε > α
1
α−1 . It is assumed that this condition holds.
By Walras law, the final goods market must then be in equilibrium as well. Let the
consumption good be the numéraire. The sequential equilibrium is then characterized
by the following price vector:

wt
rt
(pexi,t)i≤τf,t
(pexi,t)i>τf,t
(p(i))i>τf,t
 =

Kαt τ
1−α
f,t α
1
1−αηα
1+α
α−1 (1− α)α
α
α−1+ε
1+α
H−α
Kα−1t τ
1−α
f,t η
ααH1−α
Kα−1t τ
1−α
f,t η
1+ααH1−α
Kα−1t τ
1−α
f,t η
1+αH1−α
Kαt τ
−α
f,t η
α 1+α
α−1α
1
1−α (1− α)α
α
α−1+ε
ε(1+α)
H−α

,
where H = LA,t[1 + εLR,tα
1
1−α ] = (1+εα
2−α
1−α )(α
α
α−1+ε)
ε(1+α)2
.
11.3.8 Dynamics and Knowledge Codification
This section shows that using the equilibrium values, the modified Romer structure ex-
hibits the properties of the models introduced in the first two parts of the thesis.
The capital market equilibrium gives
rt = K
α−1
t τ
1−α
f,t L
1−α
A,t η
αα[1 + εLR,tα
1
1−α ]1−α.
With respect to final goods production, inserting the respective equilibrium values yield
F ((xi,t)i≤τt , LA,t) = L
1−α
A,t [
∫ τf,t
i=0
xt(i)
αdi+
∫ τt
i=τf,t
xt(i)
αdi] = LA,tτf,tx
α
f,t[1 + εLR,tα
α
1−α ],
which transforms to
F (Kt, LA,t, τt) = K
α
t L
1−α
A,t τ
1−α
f,t η
α 1+α
α−1 [1 + εLR,tα
α
1−α ][1 + εLR,tα
1
1−α ]−α.
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Wages can be written as
wR,t = K
α
t L
1−α
A,t τ
1−α
f,t εη
α 1+α
α−1α
α
1−α (1− α)[1 + εLR,tα 11−α ]−α,
wA,t = K
α
t L
−α
A,tτ
1−α
f,t η
α 1+α
α−1 (1− α)[1 + εLR,tα α1−α ][1 + εLR,tα 11−α ]−α.
Since LR,t is constant over time in the sequential market equilibrium and according to
the dynamics with respect to knowledge as given in (11.1), the knowledge stock in period
t can be written as
τt = τf,t
(
1 +
εα− α αα−1
1 + α
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ϑ
.
When defining the following constants,
ξ := ηα
1+α
α−1 [1 + εLR,tα
α
1−α ][1 + εLR,tα
1
1−α ]−αϑα−1,
κ := ηα
1+α
α−1 (1− α)[1 + εLR,tα α1−α ][1 + εLR,tα 11−α ]−αϑα−1,
λ := ηα
1+α
α−1α
α
1−α (1− α)[1 + εLR,tα 11−α ]−αϑ−α,
and additionally using ∂τt
∂LR,t
= ετf,t, it follows that the final goods production function,
the wages and the return on physical capital show the forms given in properties (P1)-(P3)
for the case ψ = 1− α.
F (Kt, LA,t, τt) = ξK
α
t L
1−α
A,t τ
1−α
t ⇒ (P1),
wA,t = κK
α
t L
−α
A,tτ
1−α
t
wR,t = λK
α
t L
1−α
A,t τ
−α
t
∂τt
∂LR,t
⇒ (P2),
rt = K
α−1
t τ
1−α
t f(LA,t)⇒ (P3),
where f(LA,t) := L1−αA,t η
αα[1 + εLR,tα
1
1−α ]1−α.
Further, the modified Romer model is characterized by the following system of difference
equations:
Kt+1 = stK
α
t τ
1−α
f,t α
1
1−αηα(1− α)α
α
α−1+ε
1+α
H−α,
τt+1 = (qτt + βmax{0, Ct+1 − qτt})(1 + εLR,t),
Ct+1 = Ct +4Ct , 4Ct ≥ 0.
It is easy to see that the difference equation with respect to knowledge exhibits the form
given in (K1), resembling the (Φ, Φ˜) = (1, 1) case. It can then be formulated:
Proposition 11.1 The modified microeconomic structure of Romer (1990) satisfies the
properties (U), (K1), (P1)-(P3), (M1) and (N).
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Note that the additional assumption of (c4) yields (M1) for the case (Φ, Φ˜) = (1, 1).11
As discussed earlier, property (N) only holds if a collective decision for example within
a state is possible. This is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 11.2 There is no private knowledge codification in the original Romer
model.
It is then clear that with social knowledge codification, it can be stated:
Proposition 11.3 Since the modified Romer structure represents the case ψ = 1 − α,
the economy will be codifying in the long run if constant codification costs satisfy
γ <
(kwoCs )
αg(LA,t)
1 + (kwoCs )
α−1f(LA,t)
, (11.3)
or the codification costs decline over time.
As an example, assume logarithmic utility. The condition (11.3) then writes
γ <
(
δ
1+δ
) α
1−α Q
α
1−αα(1− α)ηαH1−αϑβ
1 + 1+δ
δ
Q−1ηααH1−α
,
where Q = α
1
1−αηα
1+α
α−1 (1− α)α
α
α−1+ε
1+α
H−αϑq.
11.4 Summary
This chapter has discussed the relation of the model as introduced in the dissertation
and Romer’s model of endogenous technological change. The major differences of the
Romer model are the assumption of perfect spillovers and the continuous time structure.
The question has been elaborated whether the microeconomic structure of the Romer
model could be translated into an overlapping generations framework with imperfect
knowledge transfer between generations. The answer would be a reserved ”yes”.
By changing assumption (A1) concerning the ideas’ ordering concept and introducing
two additional assumptions with respect to knowledge transfer between generations and
to research, the difference equation of the knowledge stock as given by (K1) can account
for horizontal innovation. Greater difficulties arise with respect to research duplication.
The question to be answered is whether an idea that has not been transferred from the
previous period and is re-invented, can earn a monopoly profit. Different arguments have
been discussed, however, it needs further research as to whether a ”no” to this question
can combine both, knowledge dynamics according to (K1) and labor market equilibria
as induced by the regular Romer structure.
11See lemma 9.1.
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As a result of this chapter it can be stated that the mathematical structure of the modi-
fied Romer model exhibits the general properties of the model introduced in the previous
parts. However, (N) is only satisfied if a social decision on knowledge codification is pos-
sible as one of the differences between the Romer model and the one of this thesis is that
no decision maker possesses positive measure. In this way, the original Romer structure
cannot explain the private creation of knowledge spillovers by knowledge codification.
Allowing for social knowledge codification, the modified Romer model represents the case
of Harrod-neutral technological progress, ψ = 1−α, and the corresponding propositions
apply.
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Social Optimality
The discussion on social optimality will be approached from two perspectives. The
first is characterized by the question how an allocation chosen by a social planner who
maximizes a social welfare function compares to the outcome of the sequential market
equilibrium (SME) as discussed in the previous chapters. Rather than providing a full
fledged analysis, the purpose is to outline the possible inefficiences and discuss its sources.
As the welfare optimum may imply that some generations may be worse off as compared
to the SME, the weaker criterion of whether the market outcome is Pareto-optimal will
be examined, respectively, whether it is possible to achieve a Pareto-improvement by
transfers. This second perspective possesses the advantage that it does not require the
specification of a social welfare function.
12.1 The Command Optimum
The command optimum assumes a social planner that may choose all control variables
so as to maximize a social welfare function. However, it is not obvious what the relevant
social welfare function should be. A thorough discussion on welfare functions is beyond
the scope of this chapter and the interested reader is referred to the respective social
choice literature.1 As much of the literature on overlapping generations economies, we
will assume that a central planner maximizes the following intertemporal social welfare
function:
W = δu(c2,1) +
∞∑
t=1
δts[u(c1,t) + δu(c2,t+1)], (12.1)
with a social discount rate 0 < δs < 1.
The social planner’s problem can be stated as
max
c2,1,{c1,t,c2,t+1}∞1
W = δu(c2,1) +
∞∑
t=1
δts[u(c1,t) + δu(c2,t+1)]
1For discussions on social welfare functions see e.g. Ramsey (1928), Harsanyi (1955), Sen (1986),
McKenzie (1986), von Weizsäcker (1965).
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subject to
Kt+1 −Kt = Yt − (c1,t + c2,t + γt4Ct);
τt = qτt−1 + βmax{0, Ct − qτt−1}
+ε
[
qτt−1 + Φ˜(βmax{0, Ct − qτt−1})
]Φ
LR,t;
Ct = Ct−1 +4Ct−1;
Lt = LA,t + LR,t;
4Ce,t ≤ (1− q)τt;
K1, τ0 > 0, C1 ≥ 0.
Without loss of generality, let Yt = Ft(xt, LA,t) = Ft(Kt, τt, LA,t), where xt = Ktτ
ψ
α
t . Fur-
ther, we preclude parameter values that would violate the problem’s concavity without
characterizing them further.
Appendix 12A provides the first order conditions for a welfare maximum. With respect
to consumption, the social planner would in each period equal out the marginal utility
of the young generation and that of the old generation, modified by the relation of the
private and the social discount rate. This, of course, must be equal to the next period’s
return on capital in utility discounted by the social discount rate:
u′(c1,t) = δˆu′(c2,t) = δsu′(c1,t+1)
(
∂Ft+1
∂Kt+1
+ 1
)
. (12.2)
where δˆ = δ
δs
. This condition is equal to the command optimum in a standard over-
lapping generations structure in the style of Diamond (1965). In an exogenous growth
overlapping generations model this would imply the modified golden rule in steady state.2
Two issues differ from the market solution as discussed in the first two parts of the disser-
tation. First, the return on physical capital, rt+1 = ∂Ft+1∂Kt+1 does not show any distortions
due to the market power of intermediate firms. Second, the social optimum would re-
quire to allocate consumption such that marginal utilities of the different generations
within a period equal out, modified by the relation of the social and private discount
factor, rather than the marginal utilities of one generation over two periods, modified
by the private discount factor.
According to (12A.23) and similar to the market solution, the marginal future benefit of
knowledge codification must be equal to the return on another marginal unit invested
in physical capital:
γtu
′(c1,t+1)
(
∂Ft+1
∂Kt+1
+ 1
)
= βu′(c1,t+1)
∂Ft+1
∂τt+1
+ δs
(
∂Vt+2
∂Ct+2
+ β
∂Vt+2
∂τt+1
)
.
However, it is immediately clear that the social planner also accounts for the positive
external effect of knowledge codification on later generations, which is given by the last
2See for example Blanchard and Fischer (1989).
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term on the right hand side. It reveals that the value function of t + 2 is affected by
knowledge codification in period t in two ways: Directly by increasing the information
stock available for future generations and indirectly by enhancing the next generations
knowledge level. Dividing the above equation by u′(c1,t+1) and using
∂Ft+1
∂Kt+1
= αKα−1t+1 τ
ψ
t+1L
1−α
A,t+1,
∂Ft+1
∂τt+1
= Kαt+1ψτ
ψ−1
t+1 L
1−α
A,t+1,
yields
γt(1 + αK
α−1
t+1 τ
ψ
t+1L
1−α
A,t+1) = βK
α
t+1ψτ
ψ−1
t+1 L
1−α
A,t+1 +
δs
u′(c1,t+1)
(
∂Vt+2
∂Ct+2
+ β
∂Vt+2
∂τt+1
)
.(12.3)
It is then obvious that if
(
∂Vt+2
∂Ct+2
+ β ∂Vt+2
∂τt+1
)
<∞ and τt > 0,∀t, the social planner would
not codify for small enough Kt. Or put differently, the social planner’s optimal program
would not include knowledge codification at the beginning of the economy’s development
given τ1 > 0 and K1 small enough. This corresponds to the dynamics of the sequential
markets equilibrium. However, the social planner would supposedly begin to codify ear-
lier.
The allocation of labor in the command optimum is given by the following equation:
ε
[
qτt−1 + Φ˜(β(Ct − qτt−1))
]Φ [
u′(c1,t)∂Ft∂τt + δs
(
δs
∂Vt+2
∂τt+1
+ u′(c1,t+1)
∂Ft+1
∂τt+1
)
∂τt+1
∂τt
]
= u′(c1,t) ∂Ft∂LA,t . (12.4)
In contrast to the market solution, the social planner also accounts for the research ex-
ternalities to future generations, leading to a higher share of researchers.
It can be seen from equations (12.2), (12.3) and (12.4), that the sequential market
equilibrium may exhibit different inefficiencies.
Proposition 12.1 As compared to the command optimum, the following potential inef-
ficiencies of sequential market equilibria of model structures satisfying (U), (K1), (A2’),
(P1)-(P3), (N) and (M1) can be identified.
(i) Market imperfection due to (N), which creates market power of at least one deci-
sion maker.
(ii) Distributive inefficiency with respect to consumption.
(iii) Socially inefficient investment in knowledge codification.
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(iv) Socially inefficient investment in research and development.
Possible differences to the social welfare optimum due to a difference between the social
and private discount rate have not been explicitly listed, as this is not the focus of this
thesis and the social discount rate has no deeper meaning in this context.
With respect to (i), it is clear that the necessary condition for private knowledge codifi-
cation in the sequential markets equilibrium, (N), implies a welfare loss from distortions
due to market power. This constitutes a similar tradeoff as between monopoly rights
from patents and innovation. That is, accepting a certain static efficiency loss for a dy-
namic efficiency gain due to endogenously created spillovers by knowledge codification.
Further, it is clear that due to the concavity of the utility functions, the social planner
aims at equalling out each period’s consumption levels of old and young.3 This may not
necessarily be given in SME.
In general, the social inefficiencies from knowledge codification originate from the fol-
lowing sources:
(1) The externalities of knowledge codification on future generations from direct access
to the information created in t, and from indirectly creating additional exogenous
spillovers by enhancing the next periods’ knowledge stocks are not taken into
account in SME. We will refer to this as the finite horizon effect of knowledge
codification.
(2) In the specification with Φ = 1, there may be another source of intertemporal in-
efficiency with respect to investment in knowledge codification which corresponds
to the regular R&D-effect of endogenous growth models. When research produc-
tivity is characterized by Φ˜ = 1, this is obvious. For Φ˜ = 0 the effect materializes
indirectly by increasing the next period’s knowledge stock of which a share q spills
over exogenously and hence positively influences the researchers’ productivity from
the next but one period on.4
(3) In the oligopolistic structure the codification costs have been defined as γt per idea
and firm. The merging of codification activities has not been considered. It seems
3Modified by the private discount rate.
4The question may arise as to whether there are also social inefficiencies from knowledge codifica-
tion corresponding to the consumer surplus effect and the business stealing effect of research and
development. It seems plausible that such a correspondence exists with respect to the consumer
surplus effect as there was no price discrimination in the market for intermediates in the previously
discussed models. However, it is not ad hoc clear if there is an equivalent to the regular business
stealing effect as the idea that is transferred by knowledge codification must have been invented in
the previous period, already. The two effects, that is, the consumer surplus effect and the business
stealing effect of knowledge codification should be identified in a full-fledged formal analysis. Here,
we will concentrate the following discussion on the R&D-effect of knowledge codification which can
be unambiguously verified.
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highly plausible that the costs of knowledge codification exhibit subadditivity in
the number of accessors. More precisely, having defined the costs of knowledge
codification as creating a piece of information and ensuring access to it, the latter
seems to cause lower costs than the first. Hence, if for example several firms
maintain a knowledge database or library together, it should be cheaper than if
they all have one on their own. In this way, the oligopolistic intermediate sectors
would engage in inefficiently high knowledge codification efforts. This could be
termed the static inefficiency of knowledge codification so as to distinguish it from
the finite horizon effect.5
Considering research and development, the social inefficiencies may result from:
(1) A finite horizon effect with respect to R&D. The social benefit of an additional
idea to future generations is not taken into account. Such an effect also occurs
in standard endogenous growth models with finite patent lengths, where the inno-
vator’s reward is temporary, but the social gain from the discovery is permanent.
This may result from the overlapping generations framework with finite lifetimes
without altruism, or in the standard endogenous growth models from finite patent
lengths.6
(2) The regular externalities of R&D. More precisely, the R&D-effect (if Φ = 1), the
consumer surplus effect and the business stealing effect.7
(3) In an oligopolistic structure such as that of chapter 10, there will be inefficient
research duplication.
To achieve a clear distinction between the first two points in the lists of possible sources
of inefficiencies with respect to knowledge codification and research and development,
the finite horizon effect refers to the creator of an idea or information to not take into
account the social benefit that it entails to future generations’ production possibilities.
In simple words, by knowledge spillovers this idea can be used by future generations
in the production of intermediate goods. In contrast, the R&D-effect only describes
the positive externality of the knowledge spillovers on the researchers’ productivity. In
principle, one may argue that in the overlapping generations model populated by eco-
nomic agents living for two periods, it is sufficient to distinguish static inefficiencies such
as research duplication or the static inefficiency with respect to knowledge codification
from intertemporal externalities such as the finite horizon effect and the R&D-effect of
5From a static perspective when understanding it as considering only one period, knowledge codifica-
tion would always be inefficient, of course. This is not what is meant here. It is rather that a certain
amount of information is not created at its lowest possible cost.
6See e.g. Judd (1985) or Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, chapter 6).
7Note, that the basic model and the extension in the second part of the thesis do not exhibit negative
externalities due to a business stealing effect, since the intermediate sector has been modelled as a
monopoly. However, a business stealing effect is not precluded by the general properties given in
chapter 9.
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knowledge codification, without further differentiating between the latter. This, how-
ever, would hamper a discussion on which effects are due to the overlapping generations
framework and which would also be present in a standard framework with a Ramsey
consumer. Consider the following thought experiment. Let’s successively add altruism
towards their children to the households’ preferences. Although each generation cares
directly only about the next, this series of intergenerational links implies that each gen-
eration acts as if it cared about the utility of all future generations. As a consequence
the effects resulting from the short sightedness of the two period lived individuals in the
overlapping generations framework would become successively smaller. Assuming very
strong altruism would effectively yield a Ramsey consumer.8 It seems then reasonable
to expect that in this case the social inefficiency due to the distribution of consumption
within a period would vanish.
Consider the basic model introduced in the first part of the dissertation and think of the
household as a Ramsey-consumer. With the intermediate firm being a monopoly, the
first inefficiency from the market imperfection would still prevail and possibly another
from a difference between the private and the social discount rate. However, the decisions
taken within the intermediate firm should internalize all externalities from knowledge
codification and research.
When moving to oligopolistic intermediate sectors with infinitely lived intermediate
firms, the R&D-effects of research and of knowledge codification would not be inter-
nalized fully anymore and in addition the static inefficiency with respect to knowledge
codification and research duplication would arise. However, the finite horizon effect
would not occur. Increasing the number of intermediate firms to infinitely many in
monopolistic competition, that is, when thinking about the modified Romer model in-
troduced in chapter 11 with a Ramsey consumer, the classical inefficiencies due to market
power of the intermediate firms and the R&D-effect with respect research would apply.9
Due to finite patent lengths, one would also encounter a finite horizon effect with respect
to R&D. However, as argued in chapter 11, (N) would be violated leading to inefficiently
low, more precisely, zero private knowledge codification. Only social knowledge codifi-
cation that is allowing for a collective decision of the households, e.g. within a state,
would lead to the creation of information. The Ramsey-type households would then
fully internalize the intertemporal externalities of knowledge codification.
Taking the model structure of chapter 8 as a reference, the following gives a verbal
discussion on the expected major differences of the sequential market solution to the
program of the social planner for an economy developing from initial values K1, τ0 > 0,
but close to zero, and C1 = 0.
8See also Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, p. 135), Blanchard and Fischer (1989, p. 106).
9Note that in the standard Romer model, the consumer surplus effect and the business stealing effect
just balance.
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Consider first the case with a constant amount of ideas per researcher and period, i.e.
Φ = 0.
Note that with Φ = 0, the R&D-effect of innovations is zero. It is clear that in this case,
it is not possible to achieve long run growth, as the resources to influence the knowledge
stock, that is the number of researchers, are bounded and, thus, would at some point
just suffice to regenerate the ideas lost in imperfect intergenerational knowledge transfer.
However, the knowledge level in a period positively depends on the information stock
which by assumption does not decline. This suggests that as compared to the sequential
markets equilibrium, one would observe much more research and knowledge codification
in early periods in the command optimum in order to take maximal advantage of the pos-
itive externalities of the information stock. On the other hand, in an economy developing
from low levels of capital and knowledge, research and knowledge codification are more
expensive in terms of utility than in later periods.10 Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to
expect that the social optimum exhibits an information stock Cso > Cst,sme, where Cso
denotes the socially optimal long run information stock and Cst,sme the stationary state
information stock of the sequential markets equilibrium.11 This would imply that due
to the finite horizon effect, the sequential markets equilibrium exhibits inefficiently low
knowledge codification. Note that this result would be amplified by assumption (A2),
because in SME, the generation of period t does not account for an increase in entry
costs to knowledge codification for later generations.12
If the positive externalities of knowledge codification outweigh the higher costs in terms
of utility in early periods, Cso > Cst,sme must also hold for the parameter values
ψ < 2α − 1 in the model of chapter 8, although proposition 8.4 states that output
may be declining in the knowledge stock, suggesting a negative external effect of knowl-
edge codification on the succeeding generations. However, this effect results from the
equilibrium allocation of the homogenous good within a period. The reason was that the
decline of the researchers’ wage in knowledge and the corresponding shift of labor to final
goods production is so strong that the decrease of marginal productivity in final goods
production due to the increasing number of workers outweighs the increase of productiv-
ity due to the higher knowledge stock. Hence, although total output is ceteris paribus
increasing in the knowledge stock, the equilibrium wage is declining in it. Of course,
the return on capital shows a corresponding increase. So with the equilibrium wage
declining, the saving rate had to show a corresponding increase to prevent a decline in
output of the economy. This effect is not due to the market power of intermediate firms
but an example of an intertemporal inefficiency created by the equilibrium allocation
of the homogenous good. Hence, a first best policy that corrects for the distributional
inefficiency would imply higher knowledge codification and research in early periods as
discussed in the previous paragraph. However, a second best policy that is constrained
10As the marginal utilities of consumption are higher at lower consumption levels.
11Cst,sme must be smaller than or equal to τwCst due to the assumption 0 = C1 < τwCst .
12Recall that due to assumption (A2), in order to codify an idea i, all ideas j, j < i have to be codified
already.
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in reallocating output from old to young within a period, may have the opposite impli-
cations with respect to knowledge codification and research and development.
Let’s now turn to the ‘standing on the shoulders of giants’ case, i.e. Φ = 1.
With respect to knowledge codification and research and development, the specification
of the research process by Φ = 1 would imply that the SME exhibits inefficiencies result-
ing from the R&D-effect. With (Φ, Φ˜) = (1, 1), the R&D-effect of knowledge codification
is internalized by the capital owners to the extent that the higher research productivity
of the next period’s researchers affects their return on capital.
Clearly, the positive externalities of knowledge codification on future generations would
suggest that the socially optimal level of knowledge codification in each period is weakly
higher than in the sequential markets equilibrium. However, on the other hand, the
social planner also takes the creation of exogenous spillovers by increasing research and
development efforts into account. In this way, there is an additional tradeoff in the
transfer of knowledge to future generations between allocating additional resources to
research or to knowledge codification. Thus, it is not possible to preclude, that in a cer-
tain period t, the command optimum would codify less than in the sequential markets
equilibrium. This is more likely for relatively high codification costs, where it may be
cheaper to hire another researcher. Note that this tradeoff was excluded in the market
solution as the old generation managed research in the intermediate firm and conse-
quently did not take into account any effects of its decision on the next period.
Similar to the model-specification with Φ = 0, the distribution of output within a period
may matter for long run growth in the sequential market equilibrium if ψ < α. By the
same mechanism as described above, the steady state growth rate of output may be
declining with a higher growth rate of knowledge. This follows from gY,s = gK,s and
gK,s = ssk
α−1
s (1− α)1−α(ψαεq)α(1 + gτ,s)−α − 1,
where ks = Kt
τ
ψ
1−α
t
denotes the intensive capital stock in steady state. Let ψ = 1− α, as
otherwise steady state behavior would imply either full or zero knowledge codification.
According to the above equation, a higher steady state growth rate of knowledge induced
by a higher amount of knowledge codification, would have to entail a correspondingly
higher steady state saving rate or lower intensive steady state capital stock to not imply
lower economic growth in the long run.
Note, that this effect is due to a shift of labor from research to final goods production
resulting from the fact that according to the specification of the research process in
chapter 8, the research productivity of the researchers does not increase in knowledge
codification, but so does the marginal product in final goods production. Consequently,
this effect would not be present in the case (Φ, Φ˜) = (1, 1). Hence, the assumption as to
whether knowledge codification of the previous period adds to research productivity or
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not, may make a major difference to the model’s dynamics. And as mentioned previously
the first best policy implications with respect to knowledge codification may not carry
over to a second best policy that is not able to correct for the respective distributional
effect.
To summarize, the positive externalities of knowledge codification on later generations
would suggest weakly higher codification efforts in the command optimum as compared
to the sequential markets solution. However, such a conclusion would not be unam-
biguous. As discussed, in the case Φ = 1, the command optimum is characterized by
a tradeoff between investing in research and development or knowledge codification to
create knowledge spillovers to future periods. If the costs of knowledge codification are
high, there may be periods where the social planner prefers to invest another unit in
research rather than in knowledge codification; a possibility that is not available to the
young generation at the end of a period when taking over the intermediate firm. Their
only way to transfer additional knowledge is by knowledge codification and hence, the
sequential market equilibrium may show higher investments in the information stock
than the command optimum. For the specification Φ = 0, the information stock plays
a more pronounced role for long run welfare. With the economy ending up in a sta-
tionary state, the size of the information stock crucially determines the long run output
level of the economy.13 In this way, although there is also a tradeoff between creating
spillovers to the next generation by knowledge codification or additional research and
development, information, by assumption, possesses the characteristic to preserve the
idea forever, whereas an additional idea created by further research may be lost in the
knowledge transfer between generations. Hence, for Φ = 0 it is without much doubt that
the stationary state information stock will be higher in the command optimum than in
the sequential markets equilibrium.
Note, however, that the command optimum could well imply that some generations will
be worse off as compared to the sequential markets equilibrium. That is, the welfare
maximizing time paths of the control variables, may require that early generations heav-
ily invest in knowledge codification in order to maximize the external benefits enjoyed
by the later generations. It is important to keep in mind that the inefficiencies as mea-
sured by the social welfare function do not exclude that the allocation of the sequential
markets equilibrium is Pareto-efficient in the sense that it is not possible to make any
one generation better off without worsening another. Hence, the next section elaborates
on the question as to whether the allocation of the sequential markets equilibrium allows
for Pareto-improvements by transfers between different generations. This is possible if
the market outcome is dynamically inefficient. However, there may also exist efficiency
gains with respect to knowledge codification.
13In the Φ = 1 case, it is rather a means for temporally increasing knowledge transfer (of course with
all its long run effects).
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12.2 Is the Sequential Markets Equilibrium
Dynamically (In-)Efficient?
It is well known that standard overlapping generations economies with production where
the steady state growth rate of output exceeds the rate of return on physical capital are
dynamically inefficient and redistribution of resources from children to parents would
yield a Pareto-improvement to the economy.14 The intuition is that with the rate of
return in t + 1 to investment in t in steady state being smaller than the steady state
growth rate of output, the loss in consumption in t by transferring a marginal unit of
the homogenous good to the old generation in t, can be compensated by a transfer of
the young generation in t+1. As discussed in the previous chapters, without knowledge
codification, the model introduced in the present thesis, corresponds very much to the
standard Diamond model and it can be easily verified that it will show dynamic ineffi-
ciencies for certain parameter values.15 In this section, we will first ask: Is it possible
to make a statement as to whether an economy described by the model structure of
chapter 816 with positive knowledge codification in steady state is more or less likely to
show dynamic inefficiency? Thereafter, another way of achieving a Pareto-improvement
by knowledge codification is discussed.
With regard to the first aspect, the focus will be on the case Φ = 1 and ψ = 1 − α,
as according to the propositions in chapter 8, it is not possible to have steady state
behavior other than with full or zero knowledge codification for ψ 6= 1 − α. Similar
to the discussion above, gY,s > rs would imply that it is feasible for a given amount of
knowledge codification to transfer at least one marginal unit of the consumption good
from the young generation to the old and compensate it by the transfer in the next period.
As verified in 8.3, steady state behavior is characterized by gY,s = gK,s. Using the
respective growth rate and the return on capital yields the following condition for the
steady state to be dynamically inefficient:
st(1− α)Kα−1t τψt L−αA,t − 1 > Kα−1t τψt L−αA,t(LA,t − (1− α))
⇔ kα−1s
(
1+gτ,s
αεq
)−α (
(1− α)(ss + 1)− 1+gτ,sαεq
)
> 1. (12.5)
where ks = Ktτt . The question as to whether an economy that shows steady state behavior
with knowledge codification is more or less likely to exhibit dynamic inefficiency, cannot
be answered unambiguously. On the one hand, an economy with knowledge codification
is characterized by a higher steady state growth rate of output17 but on the other hand,
14In exogenous growth overlapping generations models the subject has been studied by e.g. Diamond
(1965), Tirole (1985), Abel et al. (1989). With respect to Romer-type endogenous growth models,
see Saint-Paul (1992), Grossman and Yanagawa (1993).
15Such parameter values could be easily obtained when assuming logarithmic utility.
16The specification with ψ ≤ α is used.
17The reason is that gY,s = gK,s = gτ,s for ψ = 1− α and the steady state growth rate of knowledge is
higher with knowledge codification than without.
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also by a higher return on capital. With regard to the above equation, the steady state
intensive capital stock ks must be higher in a steady state with knowledge codification
than in one without knowledge codification according to proposition 8.7. Further, the
share of researchers will be lower in a steady state with knowledge codification if Φ˜ = 0,
that is, in the specification of research as in the basic model.18 This should lower the
steady state growth rate of output. Finally, the steady state saving rate is expected
to be higher, due to a higher return on capital. The first two effects would lower the
left hand side of (12.5), whereas a higher saving rate increases it. Hence, it depends on
the magnitude of the effects whether an economy with knowledge codification in steady
state is more likely to be dynamically inefficient than one that is not codifying in steady
state. Note, that the specification Φ = 0 is characterized in the long run by gY,s = 0
and rs > 0, indicating that the sequential markets economy does not show a dynamic
inefficiency allowing a Pareto-improvement by a reallocation of resources.19
With respect to knowledge codification, there may be another possibility to achieve a
Pareto-improvement to the sequential markets equilibrium. As the wage of the young
generation is a function of the knowledge stock, the overlapping generations economy
could gain in efficiency in every period in which the increase of the equilibrium wage
by knowledge codification exceeds the present valued costs to the previous generation
of codifying another idea. To realize the Pareto-improvement, the generation of t had
to codify an additional idea and the subsequent generation would have to compensate
them in the next period.
Proposition 12.2 If
∂wt+1
∂τt+1
∂τt+1
∂4Ce,t > γtδ
−1 − ∂rt+1
∂4Ce,tKt+1 = γt(1 + rt+1)−
∂rt+1
∂4Ce,tKt+1 (12.6)
and 0 ≤ 4Ce,t < τt−Ct, a Pareto-improvement to the sequential markets equilibrium is
possible by a higher amount of knowledge codification of the generation born in t and a
compensating transfer by the descendants in t+ 1.
It is clear that if the gain in equilibrium wage payments by another codified idea is greater
than or equal to the opportunity costs in consumption of the first period or investment
in capital, respectively, minus the gain in profits from codifying an additional idea, the
codifying generation can at least be compensated. Taking a closer look at the equilibrium
wage,
wt = (1− α)Kαt τψ−αt
(κ
λ
)−α (
ε(qτt−1)Φ
)α
,
18The reason is that for Φ˜ = 0, the productivity in final goods production is increasing in the amount
of knowledge codification whereas the researchers’ productivity is not.
19See e.g. Azariadis (1993), chapter 12.
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reveals that for (12.6) to hold, it is necessary that either (Φ, Φ˜) = (1, 1) or Φ˜ = 0 and
ψ > α.20 The basic model in the first part of the thesis was characterized by Solow-
neutral technological progress, ψ = α, and, hence, the equilibrium wage was unaffected
by knowledge codification of the previous period. In this way, there is no hold-up problem
between the firm owners and the newly hired employees. However, knowledge codifica-
tion may positively influence the wage levels of the generations from the next but one
period on. In the case of Φ˜ = 0 and ψ < α, knowledge codification leads to declining
wages. Would it be correct to argue that in the latter case a Pareto-improvement could
be achieved by giving a transfer in t+ 1 for the previous generation to not codify?
Even in the case Φ = 0 and ψ < 2α− 1 in which the stationary state output is declining
in the knowledge stock in sequential markets equilibrium according to proposition 8.4,
the answer is not obvious. The reason is, that although the wage of the generation of
t + 1 increases by less knowledge codification of the previous generation, the return on
physical capital in t+2 would ceteris paribus decline. This effect may also carry over to
later generations. Hence, it would need a deeper analysis to ensure that no generation
would be worse off by such a transfer scheme. With other specifications, such as with
Φ = 1, the externalities on future generations due to less knowledge codification in t
would be even more pronounced by the R&D-effect of knowledge codification, which
would then have additional negative effects on long run growth.
Note, that such an effect was not possible under the conditions (Φ, Φ˜) = (1, 1) or Φ˜ = 0
and ψ > α, as with both, wages and the return on physical capital increasing in the
knowledge stock, the externalities on future generations of an additional codified idea
must be positive. In this case the economic problem with respect to knowledge cod-
ification as described in section 3.2.1 constitutes a classical hold-up problem. In the
respective three-stage game, the new employees would initially be willing to compensate
the firm owners for codifying another idea, however, once the investment is taken, the
latter lose in bargaining power. The newly hired employees know that the firm owners
benefit from giving access to the information by higher profits and, hence, will not offer
a compensatory payment. The above considerations indicate that the solution to the
hold-up problem would lead to at least temporarily higher growth rates of output in
the case Φ = 1 and imply a weakly higher stationary state level of total consumption
for Φ = 0. However, the solution of the hold-up problem possesses a particular dif-
ficulty: The generation of t has to take the investment decision at a time where the
recipients are not even born. Hence, it is not obvious how to implement a mechanism
to solve the commitment problem. In principle the problem shows a similar structure
as a pay-as-you-go social security system, where the generations when young transfer
consumption to the old, expecting the succeeding generation to do the same.21 With-
out altruistic preferences the Pareto-improvement with respect to additional knowledge
20With these specifications both, the equilibrium wage and the return on physical capital are increasing
in the knowledge stock. Hence, another codified idea will not have negative future externalities.
21Note that in contrast to the pay-as-you-go social security system, an infinite time horizon would not
be necessary to capture the efficiency gains from knowledge codification.
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codification can only be realized with some institutional frame or a constitution that
cannot be violated by single generations. In this way, it seems that although such a
Pareto-improvement would make no generation worse off, it cannot be enforced more
easily than the command optimum.
With respect to research and development the usual policy implications could be applied
to Pareto-improve the sequential markets equilibrium. More precisely, at least under the
conditions that both, the wages and the return on capital are positive functions of the
knowledge stock, the young generation of a period t would be willing to accept an in-
come tax to subsidize research or intermediates, respectively. However, the tax would
only be agreed upon, if the corresponding loss in utility in t is lower than the gain from
additional knowledge spillovers in t+ 1.
Note, that in the first part of this section, the Pareto-improvement by a transfer of re-
sources from young to old was due to the usual dynamic inefficiency as it may exist in
overlapping generations economies with finitely lived agents. The second transfer mech-
anism leads to a Pareto-improvement by capturing efficiency potentials of the positive
externalities of knowledge codification which are not realized in the sequential markets
equilibrium.
12.3 Summary
This chapter discussed the welfare aspects of the sequential markets equilibrium with
a particular focus on the role played by knowledge codification. It started out with a
comparison to the command optimum which is characterized by a social planner maxi-
mizing a social welfare function. As prevalent in the literature, social welfare was defined
by the discounted sum of each generation’s utility. The potential social inefficiencies of
the sequential markets equilibrium as compared to the welfare maximum arise from the
market imperfection of the intermediate goods market(s), the equilibrium distribution
of consumption, inefficient investments in knowledge codification and in research and
development. With regard to knowledge codification the inefficiencies originate from a
finite horizon effect, meaning that the short lived decision maker does not take into ac-
count the positive externalities on future generations from direct access to the respective
information and from indirectly increasing exogenous spillovers. In the case of Φ = 1, an
additional externality that corresponds to the R&D-effect of the standard endogenous
growth models can be identified. Subadditivity of codification costs would bear a static
inefficiency in an oligopolistic structure such as that of chapter 10, as the social planner
would then consolidate the firms’ knowledge codification activities.
Finally, the potential sources of inefficiency with respect to research and development
are those well known from the literature such as the R&D-effect, also a finite horizon
effect due to the short lifetimes and research duplication in the oligopolistic structure of
the intermediate goods markets.
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For the case Φ = 0 it is reasonable to expect the command optimum to exhibit a higher
level of information in the long run as compared to the stationary state level resulting
in the sequential market equilibrium, due to the positive externalities realized by the
future generations that are not taken into account in the sequential markets equilibrium.
However, this would not generally carry over to a second best policy that is constrained
in redistributing consumption from the old generation to the young. The reason is that
according to proposition 8.4, knowledge codification may possess a negative effect on
long run output for certain parameter values.
Similarly, for a specification of research by Φ = 1, the positive externalities of knowl-
edge codification would suggest weakly higher codification efforts in each period in the
command optimum as compared to the sequential markets equilibrium. However, such
a conclusion is not unambiguous as the social planner faces a tradeoff with respect to
creating spillovers between investing in research and in knowledge codification. This
tradeoff has not been present in the sequential market equilibrium as the only way for
the new capital owners to transfer additional knowledge to the next period was knowl-
edge codification. In this way, it is not possible to preclude that there are periods of
inefficiently high knowledge codification in the sequential markets equilibrium.
The second part of this chapter has asked whether it would be possible to achieve
a Pareto-improvement to the sequential markets equilibrium allocation by a transfer
scheme between the young and old generation of a period. This is possible if the over-
lapping generations economy is dynamically inefficient. As the model introduced in the
first two parts of the present dissertation shows strong similarities to the Diamond model
in case of zero knowledge codification, it is clear that it will be dynamically inefficient
for some parameter values. The question has then been raised if an unambiguous state-
ment would be possible as to whether the overlapping generations economy with positive
knowledge codification in steady state is more or less likely to show dynamic inefficiency.
On the one hand, higher knowledge codification in steady state implies a higher steady
state growth rate of output. On the other hand, however, it also involves a higher return
on capital. The magnitude of the effects do not show a unique order, such that the above
question had to be answered negatively.
Next to Pareto-improvements due to dynamic inefficiencies, it may also be feasible to
capture efficiency gains if the young generation of a period t would just codify another
idea and is compensated for it by a transfer in the next period. This is always possible
if the increase in the equilibrium wage by another piece of information is strong enough.
In this situation, the transfer of knowledge by knowledge codification in the sequential
markets equilibrium shows the characteristics of a hold-up problem.
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In order to derive the necessary conditions for a welfare optimum, we rewrite the objective
function
W = δu(c2,1) +
∞∑
t=1
δts[u(c1,t) + δu(c2,t+1)]
as W =
∞∑
t=1
δts[u(c1,t) +
δ
δs
u(c2,t)].
Let δˆ := δδs . The program of the social planner in the command optimum can then be solved
via the following Bellman equation:
Vt(Kt, τt−1, Ct) = maxcv[u(c1,t) + δˆu(c2,t)] + δsVt+1(Kt+1, τt, Ct+1)
+λ1,t(Ft(Kt, LA,t, τt)− c1,t − c2,t − γt4Ct −Kt+1 −Kt)
+λ2,t(qτt−1 + βmax{0, Ct − qτt−1}
+ε
[
qτt−1 + Φ˜(βmax{0, Ct − qτt−1})
]Φ
LR,t − τt)
+λ3,t(Ct−1 +4Ct−1 − Ct)
+λ4,t(LA,t + LR,t − Lt)
+λ5,t((1− q)τt −4Ce,t),
where cv := c1,t, c2,t, LA,t, LR,t,4Ce,t,Kt+1, τt, Ct+1, and initial values K1, τ0 > 0, C1 ≥ 0.
This leads to the following Kuhn-Tucker first order conditions for a global maximum:
∂Vt
∂c1,t
= u′(c1,t)− λ1,t = 0; (12A.1)
∂Vt
∂c2,t
= δˆu′(c2,t)− λ1,t = 0; (12A.2)
∂Vt
∂4Ce,t = −γtλ1,t + λ3,t − λ5,t = 0; (12A.3)
∂Vt
∂LA,t
=
∂Ft
∂LA,t
λ1,t + λ4,t = 0; (12A.4)
∂Vt
∂LR,t
= ε
[
qτt−1 + Φ˜(βmax{0, Ct − qτt−1})
]Φ
λ2,t + λ4,t = 0; (12A.5)
∂Vt
∂Kt+1
= δs
∂Vt+1
∂Kt+1
− λ1,t = 0; (12A.6)
∂Vt
∂τt
= δs
∂Vt+1
∂τt
+ λ1,t
∂Ft
∂τt
− λ2,t = 0; (12A.7)
∂Vt
∂Ct+1
= δs
∂Vt+1
∂Ct+1
− λ3,t = 0; (12A.8)
∂Vt
∂λ1,t
= Ft(Kt, LA,t, τt)− c1,t − c2,t − γt4Ct −Kt+1 −Kt = 0; (12A.9)
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∂Vt
∂λ2,t
= qτt−1 + βmax{0, Ct − qτt−1}
+ε
[
qτt−1 + Φ˜(βmax{0, Ct − qτt−1})
]Φ
LR,t − τt = 0; (12A.10)
∂Vt
∂λ3,t
= Ct−1 +4Ct − Ct = 0; (12A.11)
∂Vt
∂λ4,t
= LA,t + LR,t − Lt = 0; (12A.12)
∂Vt
∂λ5,t
= (1− q)τt −4Ce,t ≥ 0 withλ5,t[(1− q)τt −4Ce,t] = 0. (12A.13)
From (12A.1), (12A.2) and (12A.6) follows that with respect to consumption and capital saving,
optimality requires
u′(c1,t) = δˆu′(c2,t) = δs
∂Vt+1
∂Kt+1
(12A.15)
= γ−1t δs
∂Vt+1
∂Ct+1
. (12A.14)
Further, with respect to knowledge codification, suppose λ5,t = 0, that is an inner solution for
4Ce,t. Then we receive from (12A.3), (12A.1) that
γtu
′(c1,t) = δs
∂Vt+1
∂Ct+1
. (12A.15)
Equations (12A.4), (12A.5), (12A.1) together with (12A.7) yield the following optimality con-
dition with respect to the allocation of labor:
ε
[
qτt−1 + Φ˜(βmax{0, Ct − qτt−1})
]Φ [
δs
∂Vt+1
∂τt
+ u′(c1,t)
∂Ft
∂τt
]
= u′(c1,t)
∂Ft
∂LA,t
. (12A.16)
Using the envelope theorem gives
∂Vt
∂τt−1
= λ2,t
∂τt
∂τt−1
, (12A.17)
∂Vt
∂Kt
= λ1,t
(
∂Ft
∂Kt
+ 1
)
, (12A.18)
∂Vt
∂Ct
= λ3,t + λ2,tβ, (12A.19)
and consequently
∂Vt+1
∂τt
=
(
δs
∂Vt+2
∂τt+1
+ u′(c1,t+1)
∂Ft+1
∂τt+1
)
∂τt+1
∂τt
, (12A.20)
∂Vt+1
∂Kt+1
= u′(c1,t+1)
(
∂Ft+1
∂Kt+1
+ 1
)
, (12A.21)
∂Vt+1
∂Ct+1
= δs
(
∂Vt+2
∂Ct+2
+ β
∂Vt+2
∂τt+1
)
+ βu′(c1,t+1)
∂Ft+1
∂τt+1
. (12A.22)
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With respect to the optimal investment in physical capital and knowledge codification, the
following equation taken from (12A.14),
δs
∂Vt+1
∂Kt+1
(12A.15)
= γ−1t δs
∂Vt+1
∂Ct+1
can be rewritten as
γtu
′(c1,t+1)
(
∂Ft+1
∂Kt+1
+ 1
)
= βu′(c1,t+1)
∂Ft+1
∂τt+1
+ δs
(
∂Vt+2
∂Ct+2
+ β
∂Vt+2
∂τt+1
)
. (12A.23)
Concerning consumption it follows that
u′(c1,t) = δu′(c2,t) = δsu′(c1,t+1)
(
∂Ft+1
∂Kt+1
+ 1
)
. (12A.24)
Finally (12A.16) can be transformed to
ε
[
qτt−1 + Φ˜(βmax{0, Ct − qτt−1})
]Φ [
u′(c1,t) ∂F∂τt + δs
(
δs
∂Vt+2
∂τt+1
+ u′(c1,t+1)
∂Ft+1
∂τt+1
)
∂τt+1
∂τt
]
= u′(c1,t)
∂F
∂LA,t
.(12A.25)
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Chapter 13
Final Conclusions
The present thesis has developed a formal model of endogenous growth that incorporated
endogenous knowledge codification as a means of intergenerational knowledge transfer.
The motivation was that in contrast to the usual models of endogenous growth, which
treat knowledge codification as a by-product of research and development activities,
great efforts of private firms for the purposeful codification of knowledge can be observed.
At first, the underlying economic problem of intergenerational knowledge transfer by
knowledge codification has been identified as exhibiting the characteristics of a hold-up
problem in which a retiring employee may not be compensated for her codification efforts.
This problem can be attenuated within a firm, in which the firm owners, rather than the
retiring employees, may have an incentive for knowledge codification as it increases their
profits. The knowledge transfer problem has been modelled to occur within long-lived
intermediate firms of a two-sector overlapping generations framework. The codification
decision was interpreted as a collective decision of the capital owners when they take
over the firm. In this way, each generation’s utility maximization problem possesses two
channels to transfer income to the next period. One is by saving in physical capital and
the other is investing in knowledge codification. This tradeoff drives the main results.
Accordingly, a first result derived from the basic model as specified in the first part of the
thesis was that an overlapping generations economy developing from low output levels
will not be codifying at the beginning. This was due to the Inada conditions applying
to physical capital saving, but not to investment in knowledge codification. This result
holds true for both specifications with respect to the research process that have been
examined, that is, in the case where each researcher produces a constant amount of ideas
per period and where the research productivity is increasing linearly in the transferred
knowledge stock. The other results differ in the assumptions on research as the latter
imply different long-run dynamics. In the specification with a constant number of ideas
per researcher and period, the information stock plays a more pronounced role and is
a central determinant of the economy’s long-run output level. It has been shown that
knowledge codification may even cause an initially less sophisticated but more patient
overlapping generations economy, that is, an economy with a lower stationary state level
of knowledge which is populated by individuals with a lower rate of time preference, to
realize a higher stationary output level in the long run than an initially more sophis-
ticated one. This effect occurs when the codification costs were within a certain range
for a sufficiently long time. Even if thereafter codification costs would increase again,
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the different long-run output levels would persist due to the assumed longevity of the
information stock.
The longevity assumption plays a minor role in an overlapping generations economy
with a ‘standing on the shoulders of giants’ specification of the research process. In this
case, it is the growth rates of capital, knowledge and codification costs that determine
the economy’s long-run behavior with respect to knowledge codification. A major re-
sult was that with constant costs of knowledge codification over time, the overlapping
generations economy will be codifying in the long run if the steady state growth rate of
capital is higher than that of the knowledge stock. The intuition is that with the capital
stock increasing at a higher rate than the knowledge stock, the marginal productivity
of knowledge increases relative to that of capital and it will become worthwhile to forgo
consumption for preserving ideas by knowledge codification. Allowing for monotonically
declining codification costs over time, the analysis showed that the steady state growth
rate of knowledge exceeding that of capital by less than the rate at which the codification
costs decline is sufficient for long-run knowledge codification.
In these cases, entry costs to knowledge codification that have to be paid once in the
first period of codification such as set-up costs for computer networks or libraries and
the like, would not prevent but only delay an economy’s knowledge codification. This
result changes when considering the rather hypothetical assumption that before an idea
can be codified, the ideas it builds upon must be codified in advance. In this case, the
entry costs are increasing with every period that shows no knowledge codification. It
then depends on the particular form of the individuals’ utility function whether the over-
lapping generations economy would still show knowledge codification in the long term.
As one would expect, in the basic model knowledge codification positively influences an
economy’s output level, respectively, its growth rate. When relaxing the assumption
of Solow-neutral technological progress, this may not be the case anymore, as shown
in chapter 8 of the second part. The reason is that knowledge codification affects the
marginal productivities in research and final goods production differently, which can,
under certain parameter values, lower the equilibrium wage. In the case with constant
ideas per researcher, this may imply that savings in physical capital decline and with
it the economy’s total output level. For an overlapping generations economy with a
‘standing on the shoulders of giants’ specification of the research process it is possible
that this effect leads to a declining growth rate of output in knowledge codification. A
shift of labor from research to final goods production can be avoided in the ‘standing on
the shoulders of giants’ case by making the assumption that the research productivity
also increases in the amount of knowledge codification. In this case, the common in-
tuition of knowledge codification to increase the economy’s growth rate would be correct.
Another important finding of the second part of the thesis was that the simplifying as-
sumption of only one intermediate sector that consists of a single intermediate firm is
not necessary for the main results. With some symmetry assumptions the general model
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structure can also account for oligopolistic competition in multiple intermediate sectors,
each founded on a different field of knowledge. However, it is necessary that the decision
maker with respect to knowledge codification possesses positive measure.
The latter would be violated in Romer’s model of endogenous technological change. For
this reason, a result of the first chapter of the third part of the thesis was that private
knowledge codification cannot be explained within this model. However, a comparison of
the model structure introduced in the first two parts of the thesis and the Romer model
showed large structural similarity. In particular, when interpreting the Romer model
in an overlapping generations framework and assuming imperfect knowledge transfer as
well as patent rights only for the professional life of a researcher, it exhibits the gen-
eral properties of the model introduced in the thesis. The propositions on long-run
knowledge codification would apply when allowing for a collective decision on knowledge
codification for example within a state.
The last chapter of the third part has discussed the welfare aspects of the sequential
markets equilibrium. Two perspectives were taken up. First, potential inefficiencies of
the market solution as compared to a command optimum in which a social planner max-
imizes a social welfare function have been identified. They arise from market imperfec-
tions of the intermediate goods market(s), the equilibrium distribution of consumption,
inefficient investments in knowledge codification and in research and development.
With regard to knowledge codification, the inefficiencies originate from a finite horizon
effect, meaning that the short lived decision maker does not take into account the positive
externalities on future generations from direct access to information and from indirectly
increasing exogenous spillovers. In the case of the ‘standing on the shoulders of giants’
specification of the research process, an additional externality that corresponds to the
R&D-effect of the standard endogenous growth models can be identified. Subadditivity
of codification costs would bear a static inefficiency in an oligopolistic structure such as
that of chapter 10, as the social planner would then consolidate the firms’ knowledge
codification activities.
It has been argued that in the specification with a constant amount of ideas per re-
searcher, the command optimum should show a shift of knowledge codification activities
to earlier periods and a higher stock of codified ideas as compared to the sequential
market equilibrium in order to fully exploit the positive externatilities of information.
Using a ‘standing on the shoulders of giants’ specification of the research process, an
intuitively reasonable conjecture would be that the social planner always prefers weakly
higher levels of knowledge codification than in the sequential markets solution. However,
this may not be correct as with respect to knowledge spillovers between generations, the
social planner faces an additional tradeoff between research and knowledge codification
that has not been present in the sequential markets equilibrium as the only way for
the new capital owners to transfer additional knowledge to the next period was knowl-
edge codification. For this reason, it could not be precluded that there are periods in
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which the sequential markets equilibrium shows inefficiently high knowledge codification.
With respect to a second best policy, for example one that only considers measures with
respect to knowledge codification, the possibly negative effects of knowledge codification
on long-run development as identified in the second part of the thesis have to be kept in
mind. It is not possible to generally argue for policy measures implying more knowledge
codification, hence.
The command optimum may make certain generations worse off for the benefit of oth-
ers. This leads to the second perspective with respect to social welfare which asked as
to whether it would be possible to achieve a Pareto-improvement by a transfer scheme
between the young and old generation of a period. Such an improvement is possible
if the overlapping generations economy is dynamically inefficient. In the context of
this work, no unambiguous statement could be derived as to whether an economy with
positive knowledge codification in steady state is more or less likely to show dynamic
inefficiency. However, it may be feasible to capture efficiency gains if the young genera-
tion of a period would just codify another idea and is compensated for it by a transfer in
the next period. This is possible if the increase in the equilibrium wage by another piece
of information is strong enough. This efficiency gain would originate from a (partial)
solution to the hold-up problem of knowledge codification as identified at the beginning
of the thesis. Within the model’s perspective, as the generation to benefit from the addi-
tional idea to be codified is not yet born at the time of the actual codification process, it
seems that this Pareto-improvement can only be realized with some institutional frame
or a constitution that cannot be violated by single generations. In this way, although
making no generation worse off, such a transfer scheme cannot be enforced more easily
than the command optimum.
In the context of the present thesis, there are several avenues for future research.
With respect to the framework developed in the first two parts of the dissertation, fur-
ther research should focus on the microeconomic structure of the intermediate sector.
For example, it would be desirable to explicitly incorporate an R&D-process whose out-
come is a stochastic quality improvement as in the quality ladder models of Aghion and
Howitt (1992) or Grossman and Helpman (1991). Knowledge codification of a leading
firm could then be motivated by preserving a technologically advanced position in the
market.
Next to stochastic idea generation it is plausible to think of the amount of ideas that
are lost in the transfer between generations as a random variable. It seems that in a
stochastic environment the special characteristics of a long-lived information stock as
compared to human capital are more pronounced. In particular, the information stock
would not so much be subject to fluctuations as human capital, in this way representing
an important pillar of economic development.
172
A research question could also be how efficiency gains from eliminating the static inef-
ficiency of knowledge codification in an oligopolistic market structure due to the sub-
additivity of codification costs can be realized. In this respect, a problem may arise
in the “real world” from the firms’ considering their knowledge stock as a firm secret
that they do not want to share with competitors, although they may all possess similar
technological levels. Possibly in response to that, the European Commission plans to
establish an information clearing house in order to avoid the replication of information
that already exists on the internet. The clearing house is supposed to be a broker for in-
formation access rather than an all-encompassing archive (European Commission, 2001).
However, there are also private initiatives for a common information pool, such as in
the oil and gas industry, where the Society of Petroleum Engineers has been founded
with the mission to capture and disseminate technical knowledge to its members. The
society is sponsored by the oil and gas companies and also wants to respond to large
expected numbers of retirements in connection with declining numbers of graduates with
a degree in petroleum engineering.1 It would be interesting to additionally consider such
interactions between firms in a model with knowledge codification.
The present thesis has analyzed the intergenerational knowledge transfer within firms
by purposeful knowledge codification. Some other areas in which economically relevant
knowledge is codified have been mentioned in the introduction, such as the scientific
sector. Knowledge codification is also important for knowledge transfer within gener-
ations, for example in the context of technology transfer between firms or countries.
Furthermore, with respect to biotechnology, there is a vivid discussion on establishing
genetic libraries. In these areas, knowledge codification bears different incentives and
tradeoffs that may be worthwhile to examine.
In general, the transfer of knowledge between and within generations is at the heart of
economic growth theory and knowledge codification plays a central role for it. In this
way, the economics of knowledge codification remain an interesting, yet complex, field
for future research.
1Information available at www.spe.org.
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